Updating the State Voter Register in the Context of Relocation of Citizens: Scale, Behaviours, and Barriers (Quantitative Study)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

KEY CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

KEY FINDINGS

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY FINDINGS

Movement of People 

The scale and sociodemographic characteristics of mobility 

War-Caused Transformation of Mobility 

Geography of Mobility 

Discrepancy between the place of registration and the place of actual residence

Settlement and subsequent mobility following the relocation 

Return Factors 

Migration Factors

Relocation Intentions

Awareness of Citizens About the State Voter Register 

Experiences with changing polling places and barriers in this process 

Voters’ Intentions Regarding Data Update 

Willingness to Update the Data Among Citizens With Relocation Experience 

Barriers to the Data Update in the SVR 

Attitudes Toward Automatic Voter Data Updates 

Perceptions of the State Voter Register and the Level of Trust in It 

Communication Channels With Voters 

METHODOLOGY 

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

 

INTRODUCTION

To explore the issues around the State Voter Register and the ways to update it, Civil Network OPORA conducted a nationwide survey of Ukraine’s adult population. The fieldwork was carried out by the FAMA Research Agency using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). The survey took place from March 21 to April 19, 2026. Sample size: 2,003 respondents. 

The complete research methodology and the demographics of respondents are presented in the end of the report.

The study demonstrates the significant impact of the war on migration patterns and highlights citizens’ demand for the protection of their voting rights. It is critical to be prepared for the first post-war elections by comprehensively updating the State Voter Register, and by creating appropriate and non-discriminatory conditions for the exercise of the active voting rights of citizens residing outside their place of registration, both in the country, and abroad.

The matter has also taken on particular significance in the context of the European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 Report within the EU Enlargement policy published on November 4, 2025. As regards the functioning of democratic institutions (subsection 2.1.1. Democracy), the key recommendations in the document highlight the need “auditing and updating the State voter register”.

That is why the Civil Network OPORA launched a research project aimed at improving the effectiveness of the State Voter Register with account for the factors caused by the RF’s illegal full-scale invasion in February 2022 and the undermining of electoral infrastructure. 

KEY CONCLUSIONS

The full-scale war has radically altered population mobility and created circumstances that have exposed certain vulnerabilities in the State Voter Register system, as it was not designed to address the challenges of mass migration in wartime. Linking a voter’s address to their place of registration ceases to be a reliable mechanism in the context of mass displacement.

The survey findings show that nearly one-third of respondents do not live at their registered address. 97.1% of those surveyed have a registered place of residence but 28.5% of them do not live at the address. If the additional millions of citizens living abroad are considered, and the nearly 1 million military personnel, it can be assumed that at present, more than half of voters have an outdated voting address.

The discrepancy between registered and actual addresses is uneven and more pronounced in certain groups. Among young people (aged 18–35), the proportion of those living away from their place of registration exceeds 40%, while among Kyiv residents, it reaches nearly half. In rural areas, this figure is significantly lower—around 20%.

The discrepancy is also significantly higher among those who have experienced displacement (25% of all respondents) — whether forced and unrelated to the war. 56.7% of them live outside their place of registration, and among those who relocated after February 24, 2022, — the figure has already reached 76.5%. 

Added to this is the scale of informal mobility which is not reflected in any government registries but is comparable in volume to formally recorded mobility, and in some cases even exceeds it. Only 37.5% of respondents with migration experience are registered IDPs, and among those who moved after the full-scale invasion breakout, the figure is 44.7%. This indicated the limited representativeness of administrative data on population mobility. A significant portion of voters are de facto excluded from current records, which directly affects the quality of electoral data.

However, population mobility during a full-scale war is neither chaotic nor continuous. After the initial shock reaction to Russia’s aggression, it has partially stabilized, as most displaced persons have already integrated into their new communities and view them as their new home, although a significant number still intend to return.

81% of respondents with migration experience consider their current place of residence to be their primary home: of these, 62.4% have integrated into their new communities, while 37.6% have returned to their previous place of residence. 18% do not consider their current place of residence to be permanent, while among them, 72% plan to return.

At the same time, return is not an automatic consequence of the end of the war, but depends on a combination of several factors; therefore, the scale and intensity of the post-war return process may be lower than expected. A key factor influencing the decision to return is an improvement in the security situation—this was cited by 39.8% of respondents who have experienced displacement. Economic and domestic factors also play an important role, particularly the ability to secure an income and family circumstances, as well as basic living conditions, such as housing and infrastructure.

The displacement of citizens is a response to security risks and the loss of basic living conditions, rather than the result of long-term planning. Unlike return, which is a complex and delayed decision, displacement often occurs as a rapid response to a threat or a change in circumstances. 

Safety remains a key factor in these processes—it is what determines both the decision to leave and the possibility of returning. At the same time, respondents react not only to current threats but also to risks with long-term consequences. 67.7% of respondents who have a settlement they consider their permanent place of residence cited the risk of occupation as the key factor influencing their decision to relocate. Its importance even exceeds that of actual shelling (59.3%). 

Against this backdrop, only 9.8% of all respondents are considering the possibility of moving again, and mostly at an unspecified future date. Among them, 80.6% cannot specify a concrete timeframe, indicating the deferred nature of potential mobility. In other words, following the wave of forced displacement, most citizens do not plan to change their place of residence, and even among those who are potentially mobile, the decision depends largely on the future development of the security situation. 

Once the war ends, migration patterns will intensify, and in this context, it seems reasonable to postpone the start of the electoral process until after the war ends, in order to give citizens time to decide where they will live and update their voter registration information. The Central Election Commission voiced a simialr line of reasoning back in 2022, emphasizing the need to give voters sufficient time to return to their communities after the war. Without such an adjustment period, the risk that the State Voter Regsiter becomes outdated will persist.

It should be emphasized that a large-scale update of the Register’s data is impossible without the participation of the voters themselves. Our research demonstrates significant potential for engagement: most citizens are ready to take action, especially in response to proactive measures by the government. More than half of citizens (58%) plan to independently verify their place of voting in the State Voter Register if elections are announced, and this willingness increases to 77% in the event of proactive communication from the government. 

At the same time, barriers to engaging with the SVR are often not value-based or political—they stem from a lack of understanding of procedures, or perceptions of their complexity or length. These obstacles are primarily communication-related, rather than the result of voters’ inability to take charge of their own political engagement. 

It is also important to note that, during the years without elections, citizens have largely lost their practical experience with electoral procedures. The vast majority of voters have never used the new mechanisms (such as changing their voting address), and the younger generation have not even had the opportunity to do so. Only 6.8% of citizens correctly understand the process of changing their voting address.

Under these circumstances, a basic explanation of the procedures can significantly increase citizens’ readiness to act, and their level of trust in the process as a whole. The study shows that understanding of electoral procedures is directly linked to citizens’ willingness to update their information in the State Voter Register. Citizens who are familiar with the mechanisms for voting outside their place of registration (31% of all respondents) are significantly more likely (up to 90%) to be willing to update their information, while a lack of understanding of the procedures significantly reduces this willingness. 

Communication in this area must be timely and tailored. Digital channels offer significant opportunities for rapid outreach, but they are not a one-size-fits-all solution—different age and social groups require different formats of interaction. A high level of trust in the CEC, as well as trust in civil society organizations and local institutions, provides the foundation for building a multi-level communication strategy. 

Potential institutional solutions, such as automatic data updates, can simplify the process of keeping data up to date, but they remain sensitive to trust. Citizens are generally open to such approaches, but this support is conditional and can quickly erode in the event of errors. Any automation must be implemented cautiously, with maximum transparency and the option to verify and correct data. 

Overall, the study’s findings show that the issue of the State Voter Register’s relevance is not merely technical, but also socio-behavioral. Its resolution depends on a combination of several factors: time needed for mobility to stabilize after the war, the state’s ability to organize effective communication and create simple and understandable mechanisms for interaction, as well as the level of public trust in these processes. It is this combination that will determine the extent to which the exercise of voting rights will be ensured in post-war elections. 

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The updating of the State Voter Register should be viewed not merely as a technical procedure, but as an essential institutional component of preparing for the post-war elections and ensuring that citizens can properly exercise their right to vote. That is why the relevant recommendations concern not only updating the Register’s data but also establishing a legal framework, ensuring interagency coordination, conducting an external independent audit, performing an internal assessment of the State Voter Register systems’ readiness, ensuring public oversight, communicating with voters, and ensuring the accessibility of procedures for various groups of citizens.

 

1. To the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
   1.  Ensure that the legal framework for updating the data in the State Voter Register (SVR) is established in advance, before the end of martial law.

• Draft and adopt legislative amendments to update the State Voter Register before the end of martial law. Legislative measures must be implemented in advance, as the study’s findings confirmed a significant discrepancy between voters’ registered and actual places of residence, particularly among citizens who have been displaced since the start of the full-scale invasion.
• Amend the Law of Ukraine “On the State Voter Register,” the Electoral Code of Ukraine, and related legislation. The amendments should cover the initial update of the State Voter Register database, the determination and change of a voter’s address, a temporary change of polling place without changing the voter’s address, the clarification of personal data and the correction of errors, electronic information exchange with other state registries, the use of electronic services, guarantees for personal data protection and cybersecurity, as well as the legal framework for external independent audits of the State Voter Register data. 
• Provide for a preparatory period of at least six months following the end of martial law before the start of the electoral process. Adopt the approach proposed in the draft law on the specifics of organizing and conducting post-war elections, which provides for a period of at least six months between the termination or lifting of martial law and the start of the electoral process. This timeframe should be the minimum period for general practical preparation for the elections, during which pre-prepared mechanisms should already be in place, such as the updated voter register, allowing voters to verify their information, submitting applications, correcting errors, and informing voters.
• The roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions provides for ensuring the operation of the State Voter Register and its electronic services by the fourth quarter of 2026, taking into account security factors and cybersecurity requirements. Additionally, it is worth noting that in the European Commission’s report as part of the 2025 EU Enlargement Package, the audit and update of the State Voter Register are listed among the most pressing issues for the first post-war elections, alongside ensuring the political rights of displaced citizens, citizens abroad, and military personnel. This confirms the need for timely legislative regulation of the updating of the State Voter Register data, rather than postponing such decisions until the end of martial law.

2. Simplify the procedures for updating electoral data and ensure that is accessible through multiple channels.

• Legislate a simplified and predictable procedure for updating voter data, which will provide voters with a real opportunity to promptly verify, clarify, or change the information necessary for proper inclusion on the voter lists and the exercise of their right to vote. In particular, it is necessary to assess and revise procedural elements that create excessive administrative or technical barriers.
• To adopt the proposals set forth in the CEC’s draft law, approved by Resolution No. 1 of January 7, 2026, specifically regarding the extension of the deadline for submitting applications to change one’s voting address to no later than 30 days before Election Day (current legislation sets the deadline at no later than 5 days after the start of the election process); about the possibility of submitting such applications in paper or electronic form, including via a mobile app or the Diia portal; on the absence of a requirement to submit supporting documents for changing the voting address, etc. Separately, it is advisable to consider extending the deadline proposed by the CEC for submitting applications for a temporary change of polling location without changing the voter registration address to no later than 15 days before Election Day (current legislation provides for a deadline of no later than 5 days before Election Day).
• Legislate a requirement to periodically inform voters, through the Central Election Commission, regarding the deadlines, procedures, and differences between the processes for changing a voter’s registered address and the temporary change of voting place. In the event the temporary change of voting address option was rejected due to missing the application deadline, establish an obligation to inform the voter of the possibility through another available methods (such as via email, or via the Diia app or portal).
• Expand and standardize the use of electronic services. This involves ensuring the coordinated use of the Voter’s Personal Account, the Diia portal, or other integrated government e-services for submitting applications, pre-filling forms, notifying voters of the need to verify their data, providing updates on the status and outcome of their requests, and referring voters to the appropriate procedure based on their specific situation.
• Alongside digital services, existing methods of submission shall be maintained, including applications to the authorities responsible for administering the State Voter Register. It must also be possible to obtain initial consultations through Administrative Service Centers and local government bodies, to use postal services, to apply through an authorized representative, or use other methods specified by law in cases where in-person visits or electronic identification are objectively more complicated, and taking into account the specific needs of different age groups and social groups to avoid digital inequality.
• Ensure that government information resources are ready for electronic interaction with the State Voter Register; in particular, include the taxpayer identification number (TIN) among the voter’s personal data to ensure synchronization.

3. Ensure that legislative amendments are adopted before the end of martial law and that they are implemented in practice before the start of the preparatory period.

• The relevant legislative changes must be drafted and adopted before the end of martial law. This is necessary to ensure that the Central Election Commission, the bodies responsible for conducting the early presidential election, the Administrative Service Centers, local government bodies, and electronic service administrators have sufficient time to develop secondary legislation, carry out technical integration, test procedures, prepare guidance materials, and inform voters. The practical application of simplified procedures must be ensured no later than the start of the general preparatory period for the first post-war elections, provided that this period lasts at least six months.

4. Not to implement automatic changes to a voter’s registered address without the voter’s confirmation, based solely on IDP status.

• Legislative solutions to update the Voter Register should avoid an approach whereby a voter’s registered address or polling place is automatically changed without the voter’s confirmation, based solely on IDP status or other data regarding relocation. Such data may be useful for identifying groups of voters who require additional information regarding the inability to exercise their right to vote in temporarily occupied territories and the possibility of applying to change their voting address, for pre-filling applications, or for referring voters to the appropriate procedure. However, it should not, in and of itself, replace the voter’s independent determination of their permanent voting address. The state may use the data at its disposal as an auxiliary tool to inform voters of a possible need to verify or update their information, to refer them to the appropriate procedure, and to technically simplify the application process by automatically “pulling” certain personal details. In the event of legislative regulation of electronic interaction with voters, it must be stipulated that automated notifications or pre-filled applications have no legal effect for changing the voter’s address without active confirmation from the voter. This approach mitigates the risk of erroneous determination of the polling place, preserves the service-oriented nature of digital tools, and does not create disproportionate risks to the exercise of the active right to vote.

5. Establish a legal framework for external independent audits of the State Voter Register and improve the legislative mechanisms for political parties to exercise public oversight over the maintenance of the State Voter Register.

• Establish the legal framework for an external independent audit of the State Voter Register. It is advisable to amend the Law of Ukraine “On the State Voter Register” to set the legal framework for an external independent audit of the State Voter Register. The need for such regulation is further confirmed by the fact that the European Commission’s report within the 2025 EU Enlargement Package lists the audit and update of the State Voter Register among the most pressing issues for the first post-war elections. Such amendments shall be adopted before the termination or lifting of martial law, and the audit itself shall be conducted well in advance of the start of the electoral process for the first post-war elections so that its results can be taken into account in developing new and improving existing practices for updating (refreshing) SVR data.
• The legal framework for the audit should define the audit’s objectives, the entities responsible for conducting it, the criteria for their independence, professionalism, and integrity, the audit methodology, procedures for accessing data, safeguards for the personal data protection, cybersecurity requirements, procedures for publishing results, mechanisms for addressing identified issues, and deadlines for correcting the shortcomings. When defining these parameters, the ODIHR’s general approaches, as set out in its Opinion on Serbia’s Draft Law on the Unified Voter Register dated October 3, 2025, may be taken into account, particularly regarding the independence of the audit mechanism, the balance of its composition, the transparency of its work, civil society participation, personal data protection, and an appropriate response to the audit findings. At the same time, it is important to note that the circumstances underlying the need for an audit of the voter register in Ukraine and Serbia differ.
• The audit should focus on the completeness, accuracy, timeliness, and consistency of the Register’s data; the quality of information exchange with other state registries; the correctness of the initial database update; and the Register’s ability to ensure the compilation of voter lists for the first post-war elections.

6. Establish a dedicated Working Group on the matters regarding the uupdate of voter data.

• It is advisable to establish a separate working group or subgroup on voter registration and record-keeping within a relevant committee, subcommittee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, or an existing parliamentary working group tasked with drafting legislative proposals regarding elections during exceptional or post-war periods, in order to ensure the right to vote in the first post-war elections. Its task should be to develop the final draft of legislative amendments on the issues identified in paragraphs 1.1–1.5 of these recommendations.
• It is advisable for the relevant committee or subcommittee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to regularly monitor the progress of the SVR’s preparations for the first post-war elections, in particular regarding the functioning of the bodies maintaining the Register, the readiness of electronic services, preparations for an external audit, practices of public oversight over the maintenance of the Register, and the implementation of measures provided for in the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. The findings of such monitoring should be taken into account by a working group or subgroup when drafting legislative changes regarding voter registration and record.
• A separate working group or subgroup should assess whether the existing mechanisms for public oversight of political parties regarding the maintenance of the State Voter Register are sufficient for the settings of the first post-war elections. In particular, the provisions of Articles 12 and 24 of the Law of Ukraine “On the State Voter Register” should be analyzed regarding the entities in charge of public oversight, the procedure for political party representatives to access Register data, the deadlines and procedures for such access, guarantees for the protection of personal data, as well as the procedure for parties to appeal to the Register’s administrative bodies in the event of violations.
• Based on this analysis, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should, where necessary, improve the legislative framework for public oversight of the maintenance of the State Voter Register so that political parties can effectively verify the completeness and accuracy of the Register’s data and voter lists within the legal procedures, without violating personal data protection requirements or creating risks from political abuse of access to electoral data.

 

2. To the Central Election Commission
   1. Conduct an internal assessment (monitoring) of the readiness of the SVR administration system.

• The CEC should periodically conduct an internal assessment of the organizational, technical, staffing, and procedural readiness of the SVR system for the conduct of elections, without waiting for the end of martial law or the start of the electoral process. Such an assessment should cover the operational status of the voter registration authorities, their staffing capacity to handle the expected increase in voter inquiries, the readiness of the voter registration electronic services, the state of cybersecurity and the continuity of the AICS Register’s operations, the ability of the SVR authorities to provide advisory support to voters, readiness to exchange data with other state information resources, and the availability of alternative operating mechanisms in the event of technical failures or the unavailability of certain electronic services or SVR authorities.
• The key findings of the internal assessment of the readiness of the Voter Register system should be published separately or included in the CEC’s annual reports, except for the information subject to restricted access. Such information should be sufficiently detailed to provide an understanding of the state of the Register’s organizational, technical, personnel, and procedural readiness, the audits conducted, the problems identified, the corrective actions taken, and the needs that remain unaddressed.

2. Ensure the organizational conditions for conducting an external independent audit of the SVR data once its legal framework has been established, and facilitate public oversight of the Register’s operations by political parties.

• Once the Verkhovna Rada has adopted the legal framework for the audit, the Central Election Commission must ensure that the organizational, technical, and security conditions necessary for conducting it are in place. This involves preparing anonymized and aggregated data, establishing secure access procedures, coordinating with auditors, ensuring cybersecurity, preserving the integrity of the Register’s data, and subsequently incorporating the audit results.
• Based on the results of the CEC audit, it is advisable to prepare a response plan addressing the identified issues, specifying which recommendations can be implemented before the start of the electoral process, which require legislative changes, and which should be addressed as part of the medium-term modernization of the Register.
• The CEC should assess the practical effectiveness of the current mechanism for political parties to exercise public oversight of the maintenance of the State Voter Register, as provided for by the Law of Ukraine “On the State Voter Register” and the Procedure for Access to Information in the State Voter Register by a Political Party Representative for the Purpose of Exercising Public Oversight of the Register’s Maintenance, approved by CEC Resolution No. 95 of June 2, 2020. In particular, it is worth determining whether read-only access is sufficient to identify typical issues in the Register’s data, whether it provides political parties with a real opportunity to submit substantiated requests to the State Voter Register maintenance authorities, and whether the current model creates excessive barriers to exercising such oversight while simultaneously complying with personal data protection requirements.

3. Develop an action plan in 2026 to implement the CEC’s Communication Strategy, including a separate section on updating the Voter Register data.

• Since the CEC’s Communication Strategy for the post-war elections was approved by CEC Resolution No. 70 of December 23, 2025, the next step should be to adopt an action plan for its implementation, which will include a separate section on the State Voter Register. Such a plan should not be postponed until the official start of the electoral process, as informing voters about the verification and updating of data in the State Voter Register is an element of early preparation for the first post-war elections.
• Include in the action plan a separate section on updating voter register data, which should cover voters verifying their own information in the register, changing their voting address, temporarily changing their polling place, correcting errors in personal data, as well as procedures for voters who do not reside at their place of registration, have a history of relocation, have returned to their previous place of residence, stay out of contry, or are unable to use electronic services.
• Organize the action plan by target audiences, typical real-life situations, communication channels, timelines, and indicators. As part of this plan, provide for the preparation of standardized guidelines on how voters should proceed in typical situations related to verifying data in the Voter Register, changing their voting address, temporarily changing their polling place, stating out of country, or discovering an error in the Register’s data.
• Tailor communications to specific audiences and information channels. It is advisable to develop specific approaches for internally displaced persons, voters out of country, young people, older age voters, rural residents, voters with disabilities, military personnel, as well as citizens living in temporarily occupied territories or areas close to the front lines.
• Provide for proactive voter outreach through personalized and mass communication channels by encouraging voters to take specific actions and tracking performance metrics: check their registration status, verify their voting address, choose the appropriate procedure, or contact the relevant authorities to correct their information. To this end, it is advisable to utilize push notifications in the Diia app, SMS messages, the Voter’s Personal Account, the official websites of the CEC and of the State Register of Voters, the CEC’s social media accounts, public service announcements on television and billboards, local channels of local government bodies, Administrative Service Centers, and other physical points of contact with voters.
• The use of the Diia mobile app as a channel for push notifications should be viewed primarily as a tool for informing voters and guiding them through the proper procedure. Subject to further technical and legal adjustments, Diia could also be authorized for use in pre-filling applications or integrating with the State Voter Register’s electronic services.

4.  Provide for monitoring the effectiveness of communication regarding the SVR and regularly updating the action plan.

• The action plan for implementing the Communication Strategy should include indicators of the effectiveness of communication regarding the State Voter Register. Among these indicators, it is advisable to include the reach of various voter groups, the clarity and accessibility of messages, the number of visits to the SVR’s electronic services, the number of requests for data verification, changes to the voter’s registered address, and temporary changes to the polling place, as well as common voter questions, regional differences, and voter groups that remain underservedly undercovered.
• Provide for regular adjustments to the action plan and communication messages based on the findings of such monitoring.
• Monitoring should assess not only formal audience reach but also whether voters understand the difference between the procedures, whether they know where to apply, and whether different groups of voters have a real opportunity to verify, update, or change their voter data in a timely manner.

5. Ensure that the entities responsible for advising voters on updating their voter registration information are properly prepared.

• The Central Election Commission shall prepare standardized guidelines for voter registration authorities, Administrative Service Centers, local government bodies, members of election commissions, centers for free legal aid, civil society organizations, and other entities that can provide voters with initial guidance on verifying and updating their voter registration information.
• Such materials should include information on standardized counseling procedures, brief response templates for frequently asked questions, distinctions between changing one’s registered voting address, temporarily changing one’s polling place, and updating personal information, instructions on how to forward voters to the appropriate procedure, and protocols for handling technical failures of the electronic service or situations where in-person visits are not possible.
• In the short term, such materials can be prepared by the CEC and its Secretariat. In the medium term, systematic training should be conducted with the involvement of the Center for Training of Election Process Participants once the necessary conditions for its operation as a public-law legal entity have been established. The roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions provides for ensuring the operation of such a Center as a public-law legal entity by the fourth quarter of 2027.

3. To the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and to central executive authorities
   1. To ensure interagency coordination of the process of the SVR data update.

• The government and relevant central executive bodies must ensure that registries and information systems are ready for electronic data exchange with the State Voter Register, particularly regarding information on registration or declaration of residence, documents, citizenship, death, changes to personal data, consular registration, IDP status, and other data that may be relevant for updating the Register.
• Provide adequate funding for measures to update the State Voter Register of. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should provide funding for measures related to the modernization of electronic services, cybersecurity, personal data protection, inter-registry interaction, preparation for an external audit of the SVR, a communication campaign, and training for entities that will advise voters.

2. Ensure the digital integration of electoral data update services with government e-services.

• Ensure technical interoperability between the State Voter Register electronic services and government digital platforms. The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Central Election Commission and other entities, should ensure the technical terms for the coordinated use of the Voter’s Personal Account, the Diia portal, the Diia app, and other government electronic services to inform voters, pre-fill applications, to notify voters of the status and outcome of their requests, and referring voters to the appropriate procedure.
• Ensure that digital services are accessible to different groups of voters. When developing and testing these services, it is essential to take into account the needs of older age voters, people with disabilities, rural residents, voters with low digital literacy, and people who do not have reliable internet access.

4. To the Ministry of Social Policy, Family, and Unity of Ukraine
   1. Ensure the correct use of the IDP data in the process of SVR update.

• The Ministry of Social Policy, Family, and Unity of Ukraine, in cooperation with the CEC, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and other authorized entities should address the issue of removing legal and procedural barriers to the systematic use of data on internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the process of updating the State Voter Register.
• Help inform IDPs and people with experience of displacement about the process for verifying and updating voter registration information. The Ministry should utilize its own communication channels, social media, and collaboration with social protection agencies, communities, and organizations working with IDPs to disseminate the CEC’s standardized guidelines regarding the verification of data in the SVR, changes to the voter’s address, and temporary changes to the polling place.

 

5. To the authorities in charge of the maintenance of the State Voter Register
   1. Prepare for an increase in the number of requests from voters regarding the verification and updating of data.

• It is advisable for the authorities responsible for maintaining the Voter Register to assess, well in advance, their own staffing and organizational capacity to handle the expected increase in voter requests regarding the verification of personal data, changes to voting addresses, temporary changes in polling places, and corrections to errors in the Register.
• The entities responsible for maintaining the SVR must have clear procedures in place in the event of temporary unavailability of electronic services, technical failures, communication disruptions, or the inability of individual entities responsible for maintaining the Register to operate.

2. Ensure consistent guidance for voters on the procedures for updating voter registration information.

• Identify the reasons why voters do not understand voter registration procedures and tailor explanations to voters’ typical needs. Voter registration authorities should not only provide voters with information on changing their voting address, temporarily changing their polling place without changing their voting address, updating personal data, and correcting errors in the Register, but also document common questions, errors, and difficulties that arise during inquiries. This will help determine whether there are issues related to the complexity of certain procedures, unclear terminology, voters’ diverse life situations, digital barriers, or the quality of explanations. Based on this information, explanations should be tailored to the needs of specific voter groups and aligned with the CEC’s standardized materials.
• Voter consultations should be provided based on uniform guidelines, standard responses, and explanations prepared by the Central Election Commission to ensure consistency in the application of procedures across different regions.
• The authorities responsible for conducting the early voting process must ensure proper coordination with the Administrative Service Centers and local government bodies, which can serve as the primary channel for providing information or referring voters to the appropriate procedure.

6. To local self-government bodies, local state administrations, and to Administrative Service Centers
   1. Use the Administrative Service Centers as initial points of information and referral for voters.

• Local self-government bodies, local state administrations, and the Administrative Service Centers established by them should ensure the availability of standardized informational materials, either drafted or approved by the Central Election Commission as part of the implementation of the Communication Strategy and the corresponding action plan, regarding the verification of data in the Voter Register, changes to the voter’s address, temporary changes to the polling place, and the correction of errors.
• Administrative Service Centers and local government bodies should serve as points of contact for providing initial information, counseling, and technical support for voter inquiries, or for referring voters to the appropriate procedure — within the scope of their authority as explicitly defined by law or by-laws.
• Ensure that consultation services are accessible to voters with lower levels of digital literacy. Administrative service centers and local government bodies should be particularly important for older age voters, rural residents, people with disabilities, people with limited mobility, and voters who are unable to use electronic services on their own.

2. Facilitate local communication regarding the verification and updating of voter registration data.

• Local governments should use official community websites, social media pages, local media, announcements at Administrative Service Centers, village councils, social infrastructure facilities, and other local channels to disseminate the CEC’s standardized messages regarding the verification and updating of voter data. Such local communication should be part of a unified information campaign, as outlined in the action plan for implementing the Communication Strategy.
• Communication efforts should specifically target voters who do not live at their registered address, have experience with displacement, have returned to their previous place of residence, live in rural areas, or lack access to electronic services.
• The Central Election Commission, local state administrations, and Administrative Service Centers should help identify common issues regarding the understanding of procedures, the most frequently asked questions from voters, and groups that require additional information — without accessing personal voter data or interfering with the authority of the voter register maintenance bodies. Such anonymized information must be provided to the SVR authorities and the CEC to adjust messages, communication channels, and guidance materials as part of the implementation of the CEC’s Communication Strategy.

7. To the relevant specializing non-governmental organizations
   1. Facilitate independent monitoring of the availability of procedures for updating voter data.

• Conduct independent monitoring to determine whether different groups of voters have a realistic opportunity to verify, update, or change their voter registration information in a timely manner. Particular attention should be paid to internally displaced persons, voters living away from their place of registration, older age voters, rural residents, voters abroad, people with disabilities, and citizens with lower levels of digital literacy. The focus of such monitoring should not only be on the formal existence of procedures but also on whether voters understand the difference between changing their voting address, temporarily changing their polling place without changing their voting address, updating personal data, and correcting errors in the Voter Register. The results of such monitoring can be used to provide the CEC, voter register maintenance bodies, local self-government bodies, and Administrative Service Centers with recommendations on clarifying explanations, improving services, and removing barriers.
• Civil society organizations may conduct independent reviews of draft laws, secondary legislation, guidance materials, and procedures related to the implementation of the National Action Plan. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that such decisions comply with the principles of legal certainty, non-discrimination, proportionality, personal data protection, procedural accessibility, and effective legal remedies.
• Civil society organizations working with internally displaced persons, voters abroad, older adults, people with disabilities, residents of rural areas, or other voter groups may collect and submit to the Central Election Commission anonymized information regarding common questions, barriers, instances of misunderstanding of procedures, and issues with accessing electronic or alternative methods of communication.

2. Help educate voters on how to verify and update their voter registration information.

• Civil society organizations can help disseminate the CEC’s standardized guidelines regarding the verification of data in the Voter Register, changes to the voter’s registered address, temporary changes to the polling place, and the correction of errors. Such information must be consistent with the CEC’s Communication Strategy and the action plan for its implementation to avoid fragmented or contradictory messages.
• It is advisable to tailor educational materials to voters in different life situations and with varying levels of access to digital services. Specific formats should be provided for internally displaced persons, voters abroad, young people, older age voters, rural residents, people with disabilities, and voters who do not actually reside at their registered address.
• Civil society organizations can supplement national communication efforts with local campaigns, consultations, public events, online guides, hotlines, and informational materials written in plain language and accessible formats for people with disabilities.

8. To political parties
   1. Strengthen the capacity of political parties to exercise public oversight of the SVR maintenance.

• Prepare authorized representatives of political parties to exercise public oversight of the maintenance of the State Voter Register. Political parties that, in accordance with the law, have the right to exercise public oversight of the maintenance of the State Voter Register should prepare their authorized representatives in advance to work with the Register’s data. Such training should cover the procedure for accessing information in the SVR, the limits on the use of the information obtained, procedures for contacting the authorities responsible for maintaining the Register in the event of errors or violations, as well as requirements regarding the protection of personal data.
• Use the results of the Register data verification only through the response procedures provided for by law and in compliance with personal data protection requirements. If a political party discovers that a voter may not be included in the Register, that a person has been wrongly or repeatedly included in the SVR, that there are errors in voters’ personal data, or that there are other violations of the SVR maintenance procedures, it must contact the relevant SVR maintenance authority in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law. Such activities should be aimed at correcting errors in the Register and improving the quality of voter lists, rather than at politically discrediting the SVR without proper factual justification.

2. Help educate voters on how to verify and update their voter registration information.

• Disseminate official, standardized explanations regarding the procedures of the Voter Register. Political parties may assist in disseminating the CEC’s official explanations regarding data verification in the Voter Register, changes to the voter’s registered address, temporary changes to the polling place without changing the registered address, updating personal data, and correcting errors in the Register. Such educational activities should be based on standardized CEC communications and should not create alternative or politically biased interpretations of the procedures.
• Inform voters of the need to verify their information in the Voter Register in advance. Political parties may use their own communication channels to remind voters to check their information in the Register, determine their voting address, identify the appropriate procedure based on their circumstances, and contact the Register in a timely manner to correct errors or update their information.

9. To international partners, delegations of foreign states, and to international organizations
   1. Provide financial, technical, or expert assistance to the Central Election Commission in preparing to update the voter register data and conducting an external independent audit.

• As part of international support for democratic processes and preparations for the first post-war elections, it is a priority to provide the Central Election Commission with financial, technical, or expert assistance regarding the updating of the voter register, the modernization of the voter register’s automated information system, cybersecurity, personal data protection, and preparations for an external independent audit.
• Since the European Commission’s report on the 2025 EU Enlargement Package identifies the audit and update of the Electoral Code among the most pressing issues in preparing for the first post-war elections, international expert support is a priority for developing audit methodologies, criteria for the independence of audit entities, data access standards, personal data protection safeguards, cybersecurity protocols, and mechanisms for responding to audit results.

2. Provide financial, technical, or expert assistance to implement an information campaign on verifying and updating voter registration data.

• Given the scale and complexity of preparing for the first post-war elections, as well as the state’s limited financial resources for implementing the full range of preparatory measures, international financial, technical, or expert assistance should strengthen the CEC’s capacity to ensure systematic and consistent communication with voters regarding the early presidential election. Such assistance could be allocated toward disseminating the CEC’s unified messages as part of an action plan to implement the Communication Strategy, which would include informational materials, public service announcements, accessible formats for people with disabilities, as well as materials for Administrative Service Centers, communities, village councils, local media, civil society organizations, and social services.

3. Provide financial, technical, or expert support to train personnel who will advise voters on voter registration procedures.

• Given the scale of future engagement with voters and the need for consistent application of voter registration procedures, such assistance should be channelled toward developing training modules, instructions, practical case studies, online courses, and materials for voter registration authorities, Administrative Service Centers, local government bodies, election commission members, civil society organizations, and other entities that will advise voters.
• Once the necessary institutional framework has been established for the Center for Training Election Process Participants to operate as a public-law entity, international assistance will be required to develop training standards, train instructors, create an online platform, provide technical equipment, and evaluate training outcomes.

 

KEY FINDINGS

The scale of migration and the implications.

• A quarter of Ukraine’s population (25%) have the experience of relocation but the mobility in Ukraine is mostly about a one-time relocation (mostly forced) rather than frequent movements. 88% of respondents with migration experience have changed their place of residence once or twice.
• Internal migration has increased significantly since the start of the full-scale war. Most respondents with migration experience (71.5%) indicated that their most recent move took place after February 24, 2022. Overall, at least 17.3% of the adult population changed their place of residence during this period.
• 13% of displaced persons have experience of leaving the country and returning to Ukraine, and overall, 5.1% of all respondents returned from abroad after 2022.
• Young people aged 18–35 are the most mobile (29.3% of this group have experienced displacement), whereas among people aged 60 and older, the corresponding figure is 20.8%. At the same time, the nature of mobility has changed: while men were more mobile prior to 2014 (accounting for 79.3% of all recent moves during that period), women have been more mobile since 2022 (accounting for 58.8% of all recent moves during that period).
• Among those who have experienced displacement (25% of all respondents), about 70% of relocations have been forced, particularly among residents of the east. At the same time, 61% of people with migration experience changed their region of residence (33% to remote regions, 28% to neighboring regions). Displacements after 2022 are most often heading toward cities (76%), particularly Oblast centers.
• The problem with the State Voter Register is not about the lack of data, but rather that much of it is out of date: nearly 30% of the population do not live at their registered addresses (28.5% of those who are registered). Among citizens with relocation experience, 56.7% do not live at their place of registration, while among those who moved after 2022, the figure has already reached 76.5%.
• Among citizens whose current place of residence and place of registration coincide, 6.7% plan to change their place of residence, while another 5.1% are undecided. Among those who already live away from their place of registration, the potential for further mobility is higher — 17.1%.
• The largest gap between actual place of residence and place of registration is found among young, economically active residents of large cities: more than 40% of young people (aged 18–35) and up to 45% of Kyiv residents do not live at their registered address, and this share is higher among more affluent groups.
• Government registers do not fully reflect actual mobility: among persons who have been displaced since the start of the full-scale invasion, only 44.7% of citizens have official IDP status.
• Despite the scale of mobility, the majority of displaced persons (81%) already consider their current place of residence to be their primary home. Of them, 62.4% have integrated into new communities, while 37.6% have returned to their previous place of residence. At the same time, 18% of displaced persons said that they did not consider their current place of residence to be permanent. Among this group, 72% plan to return.

Return Preconditions

• The return is not an automatic process, even after the war ends. It depends on several conditions being met simultaneously. Therefore, the return scale may be smaller than expected.
• Security is a key precondition for the return of displaced citizens: nearly 40% of respondents who have experienced displacement cited it as the sole factor. Furthermore, return is very often not considered possible without a cessation of shelling and a basic sense of physical safety — 66% (among respondents who selected “safety” as a factor) link return to a reduction in the intensity of shelling.
• In the regions most affected by hostilities, security is a key factor in returning: in the East, 55.1% of displaced respondents directly link their return to security factors. In contrast, in the South, the largest share of citizens (39.4%) cannot specify the conditions for returning.
• A quarter of citizens with experience of displacement (25.7%) do not associate returning with any of these factors — for them, this is not a relevant scenario at this time. Consequently, even if conditions improve, a portion of the population may not return. At the same time, the decision to return is not based solely on the security situation — family circumstances, income, and housing conditions also play a significant role.
• The economic factors driving migration are primarily related to employment: 64.1% (of displaced respondents who cited economic factors) were motivated by the prospect of receiving a job offer. In contrast, family circumstances play a different role depending on age: for older people (aged 60 and older), they are one of the key factors (up to 28.2% of older age people cited family circumstances), while for younger people (aged 18–35), they are secondary.
• Housing factor is critically linked to the availability of basic living conditions. Having or restoring housing is an important but insufficient precondition without stable access to electricity, heating, and water, which are equally important for the decision to return.

Factors Driving Migration

• Displacement is primarily a response to risks and the loss of basic living conditions, rather than the planning effort. Unlike return, which is a complex and long-term decision, displacement is often a rapid response to a threat or a search for better opportunities.
• Safety is undoubtedly the dominant factor driving displacement: more than half (51.5%) of respondents who have a settlement they consider their primary residence cite it as the sole reason for moving. However, citizens are responding not only to shelling but also to the risk of occupation — 67.7% (among respondents who cited safety as a factor) consider this factor to be the key one.
• Economic factors are the reason for relocation for 16.4% of respondents who consider a particular locality to be their primary residence, family circumstances — 12.8%, medical services — 6.3%, and housing conditions — 5.3%.
• Nearly one-third (28–30%) of citizens who have a place of residence they consider their primary home do not associate moving with any particular factor. Young people (aged 18–35) are significantly more sensitive to security and economic factors, while older people (aged 60 and older) are less likely to consider moving at all — 46.1%.
• Among the economic reasons for moving, it is not the overall state of the economy that plays a key role, but rather the availability of specific opportunities, such as employment (55.4% of respondents for whom economic factors are key) or a job they have already found (43.8%).
• Educational mobility is highly segmented and tied to life events. People move not for the sake of a “better education in general,” but because of specific triggers, such as their children’s enrollment to study courses or schooling.
• In contrast, among family circumstances, the key factors are caring for relatives (49.9%) and family reunification (43.6%).
• Among housing-related factors, the most common reasons for moving are damage to the home (45.2%) and the search for better living conditions (46.8%) or greater accessibility (38.9%). The availability of basic utilities (heating, electricity, and water) also plays an important role.
• Medical reasons for relocation are not widespread, but they are critical for certain groups: in these cases, relocation is driven by the need for specific medical treatment (69.8%), rather than the overall quality of healthcare.

Expected Migration Trends

• Most citizens (83.7% of respondents who have a place of residence they consider their primary home) do not plan to move within the country, while only 9.8% have a definite or probable intention to move.
• Even among those who are open to the idea of moving, the timing of the decision remains uncertain: 80.6% cannot specify a specific timeframe.
• Security remains a background factor for all groups, but it does not always translate into an intention to move. It is cited with nearly equal frequency by both those who plan to move and those who do not — over 52% in both groups.
• For potentially mobile citizens, the role of income, family circumstances, and housing conditions is growing significantly. The opportunity to earn an income is cited as a factor in migration by 15.2% of those planning to move, compared with 5.9% of those who do not plan to move.
• Profile of a potentially mobile group: predominantly men, people aged 36–59, residents of the Central/Southern regions and rural areas. In contrast, older people and residents of regional centers are more likely to be settled.
• Potential mobility is not limited to a single direction: 30.1% of those planning to move (i.e., about 3% of all respondents) are considering moving abroad, but the majority still intend to relocate within Ukraine.

Awareness of the State Voter Register and the experience of changing a polling place

• General awareness of the State Voter Register does not translate into a practical understanding of the procedures for exercising voting rights. Citizens often confuse changing their voting address with temporarily changing their polling place, and do not know how these procedures work in practice. It is indicative that only one respondent out of more than 2,000 who participated in the survey was able to correctly identify all the necessary steps for carrying out the relevant procedures in the State Voter Register.
• The low level of awareness can be partly attributed to the prolonged absence of electoral processes in the country, as well as the relative novelty of certain mechanisms. In particular, the procedure for changing one’s voting address was introduced shortly before the 2020 local elections and has not become widespread — only about 100,000 voters out of more than 35 million took the opportunity.
• 54.8% of respondents have heard of the State Voter Register, while nearly 40% have no idea what it is. This level of awareness varies significantly depending on age, education, and region: young people (up to 48.1% are unaware of the State Voter Register), residents of the South and East, and people with lower levels of education are significantly less informed.
• Only 31.3% of respondents would choose the option to temporarily change their polling place in the scenario presented to them: how to vote if a voter is temporarily away from their place of registration on Election Day. At the same time, a significant portion of respondents would either return to their place of registration to vote (25.9%) or would skip voting (14.9%). Another 18.2% were undecided.
• At the same time, among the methods for temporarily changing one’s polling place mentioned by respondents, the Diia (65.8%) and the Administrative Service Centers (ASC) were cited most frequently, while official channels (the Voter Register website and Register offices) were mentioned much less often.
• Citizens do not understand the mechanism for changing their voting address: only 6.8% correctly identify it as a permanent change in voting location, while the majority (50.8%) confuse it with a temporary change in voting location or even with “residency registration” (11.5%).
• Understanding the procedures for changing one’s polling place and voter registration address is directly linked to a willingness to update one’s information in the Voter Register. Among those who correctly understand how to vote outside their place of registration (31.3% of respondents), the willingness to update their information reaches 90%, while among those who believe they will have to skip voting, it is only 56.2%. Future information campaigns should be aimed not only at raising awareness of the Register but also at explaining specific mechanisms and action plans.
• A relatively significant share of citizens — 19.7% — have experience changing their polling place, although the vast majority (78.5%) have never used this procedure. For those who have had such experience, the procedure generally did not pose any difficulties: 84.1% did not encounter any problems, and only 10.7% reported difficulties.
• The barriers to changing one’s polling place are mostly informational and organizational, rather than technical. Most often, these involve a lack of information (such as which documents to provide or where to go), limited opportunities to apply in person, and the complexity of online procedures. Long waiting lines and difficulties with getting added to the voter rolls were also frequently cited.
• 53.1% of the adult population do not anticipate any difficulties in changing their polling place for the post-war elections. However, among those who expect difficulties, informational and organizational barriers dominate, again: lack of awareness (19.8%), risk of not having enough time (8.7%), lack of an electronic signature (8.4%), or inability to visit the relevant authority in person (14.4%). 

Intentions of Citizens Regarding the Update of Electoral Data

• More than half of citizens are willing to update their information in the Voter Register on their own: 58.3% plan to check their polling place if an election is announced, while 41.7% do not intend to do so.
• The willingness to update personal information is significantly higher in large cities (over 60% in Kyiv and Oblast capitals), whereas in rural areas, the majority (53.2%) do not plan to verify their information.
• Awareness and trust directly influence behavior: among those who have heard of the SVR, 64.1% are willing to verify data, compared to just 51.9% of those who are unaware of it. Similarly, as trust in the Register increases, so does the willingness to take action.
• The most effective incentive is proactive action on the part of the government: when the government urges citizens to update or verify their polling place, the number of “active” voters rises to 77.4%, while the number of those unwilling to verify their information on their own drops by nearly half.
• Willingness to update data is higher among people aged 18–59 (over 80%), those with a college degree (83.8%), and those familiar with the SVR (81.4%) when a communication campaign is conducted. Among those who have experienced relocation, this willingness stands at 83.7% compared to 76% among the rest of the respondents. At the same time, those who have experienced relocation after 2022 show a lower willingness to update their data upon the state’s request (69.1%).
• The most convenient channel for changing one’s polling place is the Diia app: 76.6% of those willing to update their information at the government’s request chose it. Other channels lag significantly behind in popularity: the Administrative Service Center (ASC) —17.3%, the Local Self-Government Office (LGO) —12.3%, the Voter Register website —11%, post offices —7%, and Voter Register offices —3.7%. 
• The demand for digital tools is particularly strong among young people: 91.2% of respondents aged 18–35 choose Diia as their primary channel of interaction, compared to only 49.4% of those aged 60 and older. Among older age groups, there remains a demand for offline services: 27.3% of respondents aged 60 and older find it convenient to contact local government agencies, whereas this figure is minimal among young people.
• Diia is the primary channel for interacting with voters and has significant potential for scaling (given its ~24 million users), but it cannot be the sole solution. An effective data update policy requires a combination of digital and offline tools to avoid excluding certain population groups.
• Among those unwilling to update their data, both practical and value-based barriers prevail. The most common reasons are lack of trust to the government (22.3%) and concerns about personal data protection (21.9%). Another portion (15.5%) explicitly cites a reluctance to participate in elections. 
• The reluctance to update one’s polling place is also attributed to informational barriers: 11.2% of those unwilling to update their information do not understand how to do it, while another 8.6% consider the procedure too time-consuming.
• Barriers to changing one’s polling place vary significantly by age:
  • older people are more likely to anticipate informational difficulties (up to 15.1% do not understand the procedure);
  • young people more often cite behavioral constraints —lack of time (18.8%) and unwillingness to participate in elections (24.3%);
  • the economically active group (ages 36–59) distrusts the government the most
• Willingness to update voter registration data depends on a combination of trust, awareness, and understanding of the procedures. Some of the barriers are communication-related and can be reduced by explaining the accessibility of the procedures and the security of the process.

Perceptions of automatic voting location updates for specific voter groups (IDPs)

• The idea of centrally changing the polling place for internally displaced persons (IDPs) based on the address listed in their IDP certificate remains a sensitive issue.
• Support for automatic data updates is very high — over 84% of the “control” group of respondents view this idea positively — but drops sharply when the risk of incorrect polling place assignment is mentioned: in such a case, only 42.1% view this option positively, while the majority (57.9%) view automatic data updates negatively (among the group of respondents who were informed of the risks of such a procedure).
• Citizens’ attitudes to automatic data updates are conditional and depend on trust in the accuracy of the data. The risk of error in determining the polling place is a much more critical factor than convenience or time savings. Data on IDPs’ places of residence do not always reflect their actual place of stay, which creates a risk of incorrect centralized updates.
• Automatic data updates can be an effective tool only if procedures are transparent, communication is clear, and mechanisms for public oversight are in place.

Credibility of the State Voter Register

• The overall level of trust in the State Voter Register can be characterized as moderate: 22.7% of respondents have a high level of trust in this body, 37.5% have a low level, and the largest group —39.8% —holds a medium trust. The median value of the trust index is closer to the “rather trust” position than to strong confidence.
• It is precisely this level of trust that explains the sensitivity to risks (for example, in the case of centralized data updates). Any doubts about the accuracy of the information can quickly erode support.
• Trust in the SVR varies significantly across sociodemographic groups: it is higher among rural residents (31.9% fully trust it) and lower in large cities, where the share of skeptics reaches about 40%. People with higher education are less likely to express high trust in the SVR (14.9%) and more often take a cautious stance. Regionally, trust in the SVR is higher in the South, while low levels of trust are more common in the West; in the Center and East, uncertainty prevails.

Media Consumption Patterns of Voters

• Communication regarding the promotion of the SVR must be multi-channel: digital tools (primarily Diia, social media, and messengers) should be combined with offline channels to reach all segments of the population.
• Digital channels clearly dominate: 77.4% of respondents receive information via social media and messaging apps, which far exceeds all other sources. Television (24.1%), online media (23.1%), and interpersonal contacts (20.6%) lag significantly behind. Young people consume information almost entirely online (up to 87.9%), while older groups rely much more on television (up to 50.8%).
• In terms of social media, Telegram remains the most popular channel for news consumption (62.3% of respondents).
• Although 34.5% of respondents trust social media, nearly as many (32.4%) do not trust any source.
• The Central Election Commission (CEC) enjoys the highest level of trust regarding election matters (32.6%). At the same time, civil society organizations (14.8% —all together, without specifying the organization’s name) can serve as an additional channel, particularly for trust-building.
• Communication cannot be solely centralized, as 56.6% of citizens consume both national and local sources equally, which requires combining these levels.
• Voters’ greatest demand is for practical information, not just political content: where and how to vote (43.6%), how to check their registration status (24.2%), and how to change their polling place (12.9%).
• The most convenient channel for obtaining official information is Diia (45.2%). Among those willing to update their data in the State Voter Register, 56.7% chose it as a communication channel, with only 14.2% of those unwilling to update. In contrast, offline channels remain critically important for older and less digitally savvy segments of the population (for them, television, local authorities, the Administrative Service Center, and SMS notifications are important).

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY FINDINGS

Movement of People

The scale and sociodemographic characteristics of mobility

Population mobility is a multifaceted characteristic of society that allows for the assessment of human capital development, economic processes, and social change. In the context of the State Voter Register (SVR), it becomes more significant given the register’s functioning mode. Since a voter’s address is determined by the citizen’s place of registration (unless they have changed it themselves), high mobility places an additional burden on the system and reduces the relevance of the data if citizens do not update their place of registration after moving to another place.

The findings of the survey indicate that a significant portion of Ukraine’s population has experienced displacement; however, for most, this experience is limited in terms of the number of times they have moved. Overall, a quarter (25%) of respondents, who have a settlement they consider their primary place of residence, have experienced relocation to another place within the country or out of country for a long or indefinite period of time. Among them, the vast majority moved once (68%) or twice (20%). 

Experience of population relocation (n=1823)

Category	% among respondents who have a settlement they consider their primary place of residence
Had the relocation experience	25
Did not have any relocation experience	75

Number of relocations (n=462)

Number of relocations	% among respondents with relocation experience
1	68
2	20

When broken down by macroregion (based on current place of residence), the highest share of respondents who had moved was recorded in the eastern regions —40.6%. In the southern regions, this figure stands at 26.1%, in the central regions —22.8%, while in the western regions —14.7%.

It is worth noting the role of socioeconomic factors. Respondents whose households have financial savings are more likely to have experienced displacement (31.4%) compared to those without savings (23.1%).

The prevalence of displacement is relatively even across genders: 27.3% among men and 23.7% among women. However, age is a more significant factor: younger respondents (aged 18–35) are more likely to have experienced displacement (29.3%) than older people —26.2% among those aged 36–59 and 20.8% among those over 60. 

According to the 2021 report of the International Organization for Migration, before the start of the full-scale war, more than half a million Ukrainian citizens — representing appr. 1–1.5% of the population — have changed their place of residence every year. However, this figure accounts only for officially registered relocations, and does not include any informal mobility.

In addition, following the start of Russia’s aggression in 2014 and the temporary occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory, a distinct segment of forced displacement emerged in Ukraine. As of 2021, the official number of internally displaced persons stood at approximately 1.5 million.

War-Caused Transformation of Mobility

The survey shows that 28% of Ukrainians made their most recent move before February 24, 2022, which amounts to about 7% of the current population. Of these, 13% moved before 2014, and 15% moved between 2014 and the start of the full-scale invasion.

Since this indicator takes into account only the respondents’ most recent move, it does not include people who moved after 2014 and subsequently moved again after February 24, 2022. Given the scale of internal migration after 2014, the proportion of citizens with pre-war mobility experience may be underestimated.

After 2022, the intensity of displacement increased significantly: 71.5% of those with migration experience informed that their most recent move occurred after the start of the full-scale invasion. Additionally, it is worth noting that 17.3% of all respondents did not live in the settlement where they currently reside prior to February 24, 2022, confirming the significant scale of migration following the start of the full-scale war.

Among those with experience of displacement, 70% have lived in their current place of residence for up to 4 years, that is, during the period of the full-scale invasion: of these, 15% have been there for less than a year, and 55% for 1 to 4 years.

The period of recent relocation (n=462)

Time period	% among respondents with relocation experience
before 2014	13
2014–2022	15
after 2022	71.5

 

Mobility in Ukraine is largely forced. About 70% of respondents with migration experience described their most recent move as completely or mostly forced. Among them, residents of the eastern regions account for the largest share (41.1%). 

Forced displacement (caused by security factors, particularly war) is largely linked to social vulnerability. Among those who were forcibly displaced, nearly half are respondents with low financial means (45.9%), while among those who moved voluntarily (particularly for economic or personal reasons), the share of such respondents is significantly lower (23.7%). A similar trend is observed regarding financial savings: 67.3% of those who were forcibly displaced have no savings, whereas among voluntary migrants, respondents who do have savings predominate (60%). 

Among those who last moved before 2014, men (79.3%) were in the majority. In contrast, since the start of the full-scale war, women (58.8%) have made up the majority of displaced persons. This can be explained by a shift in the nature of mobility—from economically driven to forced, linked to family relocation. 

The age distribution does not differ significantly across time periods, although the share of younger respondents has increased slightly among recent displacements (34.3%). At the same time, displacements after 2022 are more often directed toward living in cities (76%), particularly regional centers, which can likely be explained by a preference for settlements with better access to infrastructure, services, and employment opportunities.

Geography of Mobility

Most relocations took place to settlements located far from the respondents’ previous places of residence. The largest share of respondents with migration experience (33%) moved to other, non-adjacent regions of Ukraine. Another 28% moved to a neighboring region, and 25% — within their own region. In addition, 13% of citizens with relocation experience left the country and later returned to Ukraine.

At the same time, the percentage of respondents who were staying abroad after the start of the full-scale invasion and later returned to Ukraine is 5.1% of the total number of respondents.

Geography of Relocations (n=462)

Relocation Type	% among respondents with relocation experience
Other Oblast (other than neighbouring)	33
Neighbouring Oblast	28
Within the Oblast	25
Out of the country (returned)	13
5.1% of all respondents returned from abroad after 2022

The geography of mobility has a direct impact on the protection of citizens’ voting rights. While moving within a single region has a limited impact on a voter’s ability to exercise their right to vote, moving to another region or abroad creates a significant gap between the voter’s actual place of residence and their registered voting address, requiring proactive steps to update the information.

Discrepancy between the place of registration and the place of actual residence 

The greatest risk to the accuracy of the State Voter Register data is the discrepancy between citizens’ place of registration and their actual place of residence, since registration is the key basis for determining a voter’s address. According to the survey results, 97.1% of respondents have a registered place of residence. This figure is virtually consistent across all social groups.

In particular, the share of those with a “residence registration” increases with age —from 93.9% among younger respondents to over 99% among those aged 60 and older. Regional differences are also minimal, although in the South, slightly fewer —94.7% of respondents —have a registered place of residence.

At the same time, among those who have a registered address, 28.5% do not live at that place. In other words, nearly one-third of Ukraine’s current population does not actually live at their registered address.

Consistency between place of residence and place of registration (n=2000/n=1938)

Category	% of the total number of respondents and % among respondents who have the registered address
Have the registered address	97.1
Do not have the registration at the registered address	2.9
Reside at the registration address	71.5
Do not reside at the registration address	28.5

This discrepancy is significantly influenced by sociodemographic characteristics. It is most pronounced among younger respondents: while only about 16% of respondents aged 60 and older live outside their place of registration, among young people (aged 18–35), this figure exceeds 40%.

Differences are also evident depending on the type of settlement. The largest gap is observed in large cities, particularly in Kyiv, where nearly one in two residents lives outside their place of registration. In contrast, in rural areas, this situation is significantly less common —one in five residents lives outside their place of registration.

Discrepancy between place of residence and place of registration: age and regional differences (among respondents who have a registered place of residence, n=1920)

Age group	%	Settlement type	%
18–35	41	Kyiv city	45
36–59	30	Oblast capital	26
60+	16	Other city	32
		Village/town	21

Among well-off respondents, the share of those living away from their place of registration is significantly higher (approx. 40%) than among less well-off groups. 

The discrepancy between place of registration and place of residence increases significantly among the mobile population. Among those who have experienced migration, 56.7% live outside their place of registration, and among those who moved after February 24, 2022, — as many as 76.5%. This means that the SVR data does not reflect the actual place of residence for most of them.

At the same time, among those who have not changed their place of residence, only 14.6% live outside their place of registration, which further underscores the role of mobility as the primary factor in the loss of relevance of the SVR data.

The situation is similar for internally displaced persons. Only 37.5% of those who have experienced displacement are officially registered as IDPs. Even among those who were displaced after the start of the full-scale invasion and still live outside their pre-war place of residence, only 44.7% have official IDP status, indicating a significant proportion of informal displacement and the limited ability of government registries to reflect actual migration patterns. 

Impact of relocation on the place of registration

Group	Reside outside the registered address%
Did not have any relocation experience (n=1328)	14.6
Had the relocation experience (n=436)	56.7
Relocated after 2022 (n=328)	76.5

Settlement and subsequent mobility following the relocation

Most respondents with experience of relocation (81%) currently live in a settlement they consider their primary place of residence. In contrast, nearly one in five (18%) live in a place they do not consider their primary place of residence, and among them, 72% are considering returning.

Whether the relocated citizens consider their current place of residence as primary (n=462) 

Status	% of respondents with relocation experience
Consider as a primary place of residence	81
Do not consider as a primary place of residence	18 (72% plan to return, n=83)

Among citizens with experience of displacement who currently live in the settlement they consider their primary residence, 37.6% returned after a prolonged absence. Of these, 44% returned within less than a year, and 35% returned within 1–4 years. At the same time, 62.4% moved to their current place of residence from another settlement, indicating a greater tendency to stay and settle in a new place than to return.

Additionally, it is worth noting that even among those whose current place of residence and registration coincide, 6.7% plan to change their place of residence, and another 5.1% are undecided. Among those who already live away from their place of registration, the proportion of people planning to move is significantly higher —17.1% —indicating that the potential for further mobility remains.

Thus, a quarter of those surveyed have experienced displacement. Migration increased after the start of the full-scale war and has become predominantly forced. The combination of high mobility, a significant proportion of interregional movements, and a low level of formalization poses a systemic challenge to ensuring the accuracy of the State Voter Register data. A significant portion of citizens are either already living outside their registered voting address or may change their place of residence in the near future. 

Return Factors

The survey results show that, among the factors influencing return for citizens with experience of displacement, there is a clear priority —and that is, above all, safety.

When respondents with migration experience were asked to choose the single most important factor determining their decision to return, nearly 40% cited an improvement in the security situation (39.8%). Other factors are significantly less important: family circumstances —13.2% and the ability to earn an income —7.8%.

Notably, a high proportion of respondents chose the option “none of the above” (25.7%). This may indicate that for a significant portion of citizens, returning is not currently a realistic scenario, regardless of specific conditions.

In regions directly affected by hostilities, return is almost entirely contingent on security conditions. Among residents of the East, 55.1% of respondents with migration experience identified an improvement in the security situation as a precondition for returning, while in the West and Center this figure is about one-third. 

Security is also significantly more often a key factor for returning among women (50.6%) than among men (27.6%).

At the same time, the proportion of respondents with experience of relocation who do not attribute their decision to return to any of the suggested factors varies by region. Specifically, in the South it reaches 39.4%, whereas in the East it is 11.5%.

Economic factors for returning are practically irrelevant for older age groups (0% among people aged 60 and older), whereas they are more prominent among younger respondents. Among wealthier citizens, the ability to earn an income was cited as a condition for returning significantly more often (22.6%) than among less affluent individuals (2.3%).

Family circumstances, on the other hand, are more important for older respondents: while 13.5% of young people selected this factor, the figure rises to 28.2% among those aged 60 and older. This distribution may indicate that, for older people, returning is more often linked to the need to be close to loved ones or to receive/provide care.

If we take a broader approach, where citizens could select several factors influencing their decision to return, the structure remains consistent but shows more dimensions. Security is a leading factor again (chosen by 39.6% of respondents with relocation experience), but the role of other factors is growing: family circumstances —16.3%, income —11.7%, housing conditions —10.6%.

As we can see, the decision to return is often shaped by a combination of several factors, whereas economic and living conditions, although not decisive, are still quite important. Even after the security situation improves, return depends on whether basic living conditions are restored.

A detailed analysis of the sub-factors revealed that behind each of the key factors lies a reasoning for the decision to return.

• Within the security factor, the physical dimension of danger is the primary determinant. For 66% of respondents with migration experience who cited security as the main condition for returning, the most important factor is the cessation or significant reduction of shelling. At the same time, for 28.8%, the key factor is the de-occupation of territories, while 25.3% link the possibility of returning to the absence of the threat of occupation. The role of demining of territories is somewhat smaller but still significant (11.9%). In contrast, aspects such as a reduction in crime rates have virtually no influence on the decision to return.
• Among those for whom economic factors are most important, personalized employment opportunities play a key role. Thus, 64.1% said that receiving a specific job offer is decisive for them, while 43.4% cited the availability of job openings in their field. At the same time, 20.9% consider the opportunity to resume or start a business an important condition. Factors such as job transfer or demobilization play a significantly smaller role. 
• Family circumstances indicate that both emotional attachment and a sense of responsibility are important to citizens. The most significant sub-factor is the need to take care for another person (42.6%), which outweighs motives such as moving to be with family members (27.3%). In contrast, personal life events, such as starting a family or divorce, have a significantly smaller impact.
• Among respodents with relocation experience who cited housing conditions as the main factor for returning, for 33.5% the decisive factor is the restoration of damaged housing, for 26.4% —the possibility of obtaining new housing, and for 24% —its affordable cost. Basic living conditions rank at nearly the same level of importance. Approximately 26% cited the availability of water, electricity, and heat as a condition for returning. As we can see, after experiencing regular attacks on energy and civilian infrastructure, people place significantly greater emphasis on the stability of basic living conditions.

Factors impacting the decision to return (n=462)

Factor	% among respondents with relocation experience	Subfactor	% among respondents who selected this factor
Security	39.6	Cessation or reduction of shelling	66
		De-occupation of territories	28.8
		No threat of occupation	25.3
Family circumstances	16.3	Taking care for another person	42.6
		Moving to stay with family members	27.3
Economic factors	11.7	Job offer	64.1
		Job openings in their professional field	43.4
		The opportunity to restart or start a business	20.9
Housing conditions	10.6	Repair of damaged housing	33.5
		The opportunity to find a new place to live	26.4
		Availability of electricity, water, and heating supply	26

Respondents could select all options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

Thus, the decision to return is based on a combination of several factors. First and foremost is safety —without it, returning is rarely even considered. The ability to secure an income is also important, as are basic living conditions —housing, infrastructure, and family circumstances. At the same time, a significant share of respondents did not select any of these factors at all: presumably, returning is not currently part of their plans. Ultimately, returning is not an automatic consequence of the war’s end, and the post-war scale and intensity of this process may be smaller than expected. 

Migration Factors

The vast majority of citizens (92.4%) have a settlement they consider their primary place of residence. OPORA selected this group to analyze the factors influencing a potential or actual decision to relocate.

As with return migration, the security situation clearly dominates among the reasons for relocation. When respondents were asked to choose the single most important factor, more than half cited the security situation (51.5%). Other factors are significantly less important: the ability to earn an income was chosen by 7.6% of respondents, family circumstances by 6.1%, while housing conditions, medical services, or education have even less impact.

At the same time, a fairly high proportion of respondents selected the “none of the above” option (28.1%). This may indicate that a significant portion of citizens do not view relocation as a realistic scenario or do not associate it with the factors listed.

A sociodemographic analysis shows that younger age groups are significantly more likely to be influenced by security risks: among respondents aged 18–35, 51% cited the security situation as a factor in relocation, whereas among those aged 60 and older, only 39.5% did so. At the same time, nearly half of the older respondents (46.1%) indicated that none of the proposed factors influenced their decision to migrate.

From a regional perspective, the security factor is directly linked to proximity to the front line: in the East, 63.6% of respondents selected it, while in the West, 36.6% did.

Economic motives for relocation have a greater impact on young people: the opportunity to earn an income was selected as a factor for relocation by 27.8% of respondents (aged 18–35), while among those aged 60 and older, only 1.8% selected it. A similar trend is observed regarding educational factors, which are almost entirely concentrated among younger age groups (12.4% versus 0% among older adults).

The financial situation of respondents primarily influences the economic motivation for relocation. Among more affluent respondents, the opportunity to earn an income was cited as a factor for moving more frequently (22.5%) than among respondents with lower incomes (12.2%). In contrast, among the latter, a significantly higher proportion do not consider any of the factors relevant (38.4%), which may indicate limited opportunities for mobility.

In a broader model, where respondents could select multiple options, the pattern becomes more pronounced. The security situation remains the key factor (49.1%), but the importance of economic and social reasons is growing: economic factors were chosen by 16.4% of respondents, family circumstances by 12.8%, healthcare services by 6.3%, housing conditions by 5.3%, education by 4.9%, and living conditions in the settlement by 4.4%.

The proportion of those who did not select any of the factors remains high (29.6%), which further confirms that, for a significant portion of the population, the issue of relocation is either not relevant or not linked to specific circumstances.

Overall, the decision to relocate —just like the decision to return —is based on a clear hierarchy of factors, with safety being the decisive one.

• Those who cited security concerns as the main reason for migration are responding not only to current dangers but also to risks that may have long-term consequences. The threat of occupation (67.7%) has the greatest influence on the decision to move, even surpassing frequent shelling (59.3%). Landmines (15.7%) and rising crime rates (11%) play a significantly smaller role. This indicates that citizens may make the decision to leave as a preventive measure —before the situation deteriorates critically.
• Economic factors are more diverse. Most often, respondents mention employment opportunities (55.4%) and the fact of having a job (43.8%). Also playing a significant role are job transfers (29.5%) and opportunities for doing business (24.4%).
• Among educational factors, the most important are relocating for children’s education (45.5%) and enrollment in an educational institution (43%). At the same time, the quality of education (25.9%) and the opportunity to attend classes in person (21.7%) also play a role, though primarily as secondary considerations.
• Family circumstances, as in the case of returning, are linked to emotional and practical considerations. The greatest influence comes from the need to care for another person (49.9%) and moving to be with family members (43.6%). At the same time, starting a family (19.1%) and divorce (9%) are less relevant. 
• Among those for whom housing conditions are the main factor in migration, an important factor is housing destruction (45.2%), which is directly linked to the war. People also move in search of better conditions (46.8%) or due to the high cost of housing (38.9%). The lack of basic services —heating (32.7%), electricity (29.7%), and water (28.3%) —also plays a significant role.
• Medical factors were mentioned less frequently, but in some cases, they are the deciding factor. The most significant factors are the need for specialized treatment (69.8%) and the search for better medical services (43.3%). For 39% of respondents, a key factor for moving is the lack of access to medical services.
• Living conditions in the settlement also influence the decision to move. Most often, these include better infrastructure (41.6%), transportation accessibility (35.2%), and the environmental situation (34.4%). A sense of rejection by the local population also plays a significant role (20.8%).

Factors impacting the actual or potential decision to relocate (n=1823)

Factor	% among respondents who have a place they treat as their primary place of residence	Subfactor	% among respondents who chose the factor
Security	49.1	Threat of territory occupation	67.7
		Shelling	59.3
		Mine contamination of territories	15.7
Economic factors	16.4	Employment opportunities	55.4
		Work in a new place	43.8
		Job relocation	29.5
Family circumstances	12.8	Becoming a caregiver for another person	49.9
		Relocating to live with family members	43.6
		Staring a family	19.1
Meical services	6.3	Specialized medical treatment	69.8
		Search for better health care services	43.3
Housing conditions	5.3	Search for better housing conditions	46.8
		Destruction of housing	45.2
		High housing costs	38.9

Respondents could select all options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

As we can see, displacement is more often a response to risks or constraints —primarily security and infrastructure-related ones. Unlike return, which appears to be a complex and long-term decision, relocation is often a rapid response to a threat or the loss of basic living conditions.

Relocation Intentions

Most citizens currently do not plan to move. Only 3.8% of respondents said they definitely wanted to move, while another 6% said they were “somewhat likely” to do so. At the same time, 83.7% (the sum of “somewhat unlikely” and “definitely unlikely”) do not consider this a possibility for themselves, and another 6.5% were undecided. 

Intentions about changing the place of residence (n=1823)

Category	% among respondents who have a settlement they consider to be their primary place of residence
Strongly agree	3.8
Somewhat agree	6
Somewhat disagree	23.4
Strongly disagree	60.3
Unsure	6.5

As we can see, it appears that following a wave of forced displacement, a significant portion of the population has settled in their current place of residence and does not view further mobility as a desirable or necessary scenario.

Among those who do plan to move, the overwhelming majority (80.6%) have not yet decided on a timeline. Only a small proportion of respondents mentioned a specific timeframe for moving: within 1 year —7.9%, 1 to 2 years —4.9%, 3 to 4 years —1.8%. Another 4.9% link a possible move to the end of the war.

Certainty regarding the relocation timelines (n=165)

Timeline	% among those planning to relocate
Within a year	7.9
1–2 years	4.9
3–4 years	1.8
After the end of war	4.9
Undecided	80.6

However, the factors influencing the decision to move vary depending on whether one intends to relocate. In particular, among those planning to change their place of residence, economic factors play a significantly greater role: the ability to earn an income was cited by 15.2% (compared to 5.9% among those who do not plan to move). There is a somewhat greater role of family circumstances (9% vs. 5.4%) and housing conditions (4.5% vs. 2%).

The security situation remains the dominant factor shaping the context of life and is relevant regardless of intentions: it is important for more than half of respondents, both among those planning to move (52.2%) and those who do not (52.3%).

Among those considering a move, men predominate (58.1%), while among those who do not plan to change their place of residence, women predominate (56.6%). The largest share of potentially mobile individuals consists of respondents aged 36–59 (49.2% of those planning to move), while among people over 60, a preference for staying put predominates (35% of those not planning to move, compared to just 6.7% of those planning to move).

Regionally, intentions to relocate are somewhat more pronounced in the Center (39.1%) and the South (30.7%). In contrast, among residents of the East, the share of those planning to move is significantly lower (8.4%). It is likely that, following a wave of forced displacement, a portion of the population in the eastern regions has already relocated or adapted to current conditions.

By type of settlement, residents of rural areas are more likely to relocate (30.2%). Residents of regional centers are more likely to prefer settling down (35.6% of those who do not plan to move).

Regarding potential relocation destinations, the largest share of respondents is considering moving abroad (30.1%). The number of those planning internal relocation is also significant: 27.4% —within the same region, 25.4% —to another, non-neighboring region, and another 17.1% —to a neighboring region.

Potential migration routes (n=179)

Route	% among respondents planning the relocation	% of the total number of respondents
Out of the country	30.1	3
Within the Oblast	27.4	2.7
Other Oblast (other than the neigbouring)	25.4	2.5
Neighbouring Oblast	17.1	1.7

As we can see, certain social groups are more inclined to relocate —primarily younger respondents, men, and the economically active population. At the same time, most citizens, especially older people and residents of regional centers, tend to prioritize stability.

Security factors are dominant in the context of migration decisions, but do not always translate into a clear intention. Such decisions are also largely determined by economic and family circumstances, which indicates the pragmatic nature of potential mobility.

Awareness of Citizens About the State Voter Register

The survey indicates that overall awareness of the State Voter Register is relatively moderate. Just over half of the respondents (54.8%) said they had heard of the State Voter Register before, 37.9% had no idea what it was, and another 7.3% were undecided. 

Men are slightly more likely to report having heard of the SVR (59.0% compared to 51.2% among women). The correlation between awareness and age is more pronounced —ranging from 45.2% among young people to nearly 60% among older respondents. Among younger respondents (ages 18–35), nearly half (48.1%) have no idea what the Voter Register is. This can be partly explained by the fact that, due to the prolonged war, a generation has grown up with no experience of participating in elections.

The highest level of awareness of the SVR was recorded in the West (65.8%), while in the South (47.7%) and East (46.7%) it is significantly lower. Among respondents with higher education, 63.4% had heard of the SVR, while among those with secondary education, only 45.5% had. 

A more detailed analysis shows that the overall level of understanding of specific procedures remains limited. In particular, citizens have virtually no understanding of the difference between a temporary change of polling place and a change of voting address.

Respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario: imagine that a voter is registered in Kyiv but will be on vacation in Odesa on Election Day. In this case, the most appropriate solution is to temporarily change the polling place, which allows the voter to cast a ballot at their actual location without changing their voter registration address.

However, only 31.3% of respondents chose this option, while 9.8% believe that such a voter must change their voting address. 25.9% believe that to participate in the election, one must return to the place of registration (Kyiv), and another 14.9% are convinced that in such a situation, they would have to skip voting. Finally, 18.2% were unable to decide on an answer.

How voters plan to act if they stay away from their registration place on the Election Day (n=2000)

Answers	% of adult population
Temporarily change the voting location (the most relevant option)	31.3
Return to the registered address	25.9
Unsure	18.2
I will have to skip the vote	14.9
Change electoral address	9.8

There is a clear correlation between the level of understanding of the procedures and the willingness to update one’s information in the SVR. Among respondents who selected the correct or nearly correct course of action (specifically, a temporary change of polling place), the willingness to update their information is highest (up to 90%). In contrast, among those who believe that in such a situation they would have to skip the vote, this willingness is significantly lower (56.2%).

A significant portion of respondents either are unaware of the existing mechanisms for ensuring voting rights or are unsure of the correctness of their actions. Even among those who chose the correct or nearly correct course of action, there is uncertainty regarding exactly how this procedure is carried out. Respondents who selected the answers “temporarily change the polling place” or “change the voter registration address” were asked how they could do so. Currently, this can only be done through the State Voter Register —online or in person at Register offices.

However, respondents most often mentioned the option of using the Diia app (65.8%) and contacting the Administrative Services Center (25.9%). Options involving the State Voter Register website (14.5%) or directly contacting the Register offices (10.8%) were chosen much less frequently. This may indicate that citizens rely primarily on the services they are most familiar with, rather than on the actual mechanisms for carrying out the relevant procedures.

This procedural confusion is also confirmed by responses to questions about the nature of changing one’s voting address. When asked what changing a voting address entails (a permanent change in the place of voting), only 6.8% of respondents selected the correct definition. Instead, more than half (50.8%) believe it refers to a temporary change of polling place, while another 11.5% equate it with a change of registration (“residence permit”). Finally, 30.9% were unable to answer this question. Thus, the procedure for changing one’s voting address remains unclear to most citizens.

Citizens' understanding of the process for changing their voting address (n=2000)

Category	% of the total number of respondents
Permanent change of the polling place	6.8
Temporary change of the polling place	50.8
Change of registration place (“residence permit”)	11.5
Unsure	30.9

Changing one’s voting address refers to a permanent change in the place of voting that spans multiple election cycles and is not limited to a single election day. A citizen may use this procedure no more than once per calendar year. 

Further analysis shows that awareness of the State Voter Register does not always translate into a correct understanding of the procedures. The share of respondents who selected the correct course of action in the case study regarding voting away from one’s place of registration and determining a voting address differs only slightly between those who have heard of the State Voter Register and those who have no knowledge of it. At the same time, among respondents unaware of the State Voter Register, the belief that they would have to skip voting in such a situation is nearly twice as common, and the share of those who cannot decide on an answer is significantly higher.

Thus, basic awareness of the existence of the SVR is insufficient for developing practical skills in exercising voting rights. Accordingly, information campaigns should be aimed not only at increasing awareness of the Register but also at explaining specific mechanisms and scenarios.

Only one respondent out of the 2,003 surveyed correctly identified all the necessary actions, mechanisms, and concepts included in the questions designed to assess understanding of SVR procedures.

This level of awareness may be dueto the fact that, among other things, no national or local elections have been held in Ukraine for nearly six years. Consequently, a significant portion of the population has had no practical experience with these procedures for a long time. In addition, the mechanism for changing one’s voting address is relatively new and was first introduced two months before the start of the 2020 local election process. It was used by approximately 100,000 voters out of more than 35 million included in the Voter Register, which also affects the level of its recognition and understanding. 

Experiences with changing polling places and barriers in this process

A significant share of citizens have experience with changing their voter registration address or temporary polling place: 19.7% of respondents said that they had taken advantage of this option, while 78.5% had no such experience.

This figure can be partly explained by the fact that respondents may have included in their answers experiences of changing their polling place outside of recent election cycles. Specifically, this refers to the procedure for temporarily changing one’s polling place, which has been in use in Ukraine since 2004 through the mechanism of absentee ballots.

Among those who had experience changing their polling place, only 10.7% reported difficulties during this procedure, while the vast majority (84.1%) did not encounter any problems.

Experience in changing the polling place (n=2000 та n=394)

Category	% of the total number of respondents	Category	% among those who had had the experience of changing the polling place
Had prior experience	19.7	Faced difficulties	84.1
No prior experience	78.5	Faced no difficulties	10.7
Unsure	1.8	Unsure	5.2

A more detailed analysis of the responses from those who had difficulty changing their polling place reveals specific informational and practical constraints. Most frequently, respondents cited the following barriers: 

• lack of information about the required documents (32.9%);
• inability to visit the institution in person (26.9%);
• difficulty submitting an application online (19.5%);
• lack of information about where to request (17.4%);
• lack of an electronic signature (15.1%);
• other (42.3%).

The very high proportion of “other” responses (42.3%) is noteworthy —the list of difficulties provided does not fully capture the respondents’ actual experiences. In the open-ended responses, the most frequently mentioned issues were long lines and problems with voter registration. During the last nationwide elections (2019), there were indeed long lines of people wishing to change their polling place, but these arose primarily because citizens submitted their requests at the very end of the application period.

Separately, OPORA analyzed citizens’ expectations regarding the need to change their polling place ahead of the post-war elections. More than half of respondents (53.1%) indicated that they do not anticipate any problems. This may indicate either confidence in the accessibility of the procedure or a limited understanding of potential challenges.

Among those who anticipate possible difficulties, information barriers were most frequently cited: 10.9% pointed to a lack of knowledge about where to go, 8.9% to a lack of information about the required documents, and 8.7% to the risk of not being able to submit the application on time. At the same time, 14.4% expect difficulties due to the inability to visit the institution in person, and 8.4% due to the lack of an electronic signature.

Overall, the results indicate that the procedure for temporarily or permanently changing one’s polling place is perceived as relatively accessible, though not without limitations. There is a significant range of both past and potential (anticipated) barriers, primarily related to access to information, organizational capacity, as well as the physical and digital accessibility of services. It is important to take these aspects into account, as they reflect potential directions for communication and organizational solutions in the context of large-scale population displacement, when such procedures may be needed by a much wider range of voters. 

Voters’ Intentions Regarding Data Update

The accuracy of the State Voter Register will depend largely on the level of voter engagement and willingness to independently verify their information on the voter rolls and, if necessary, change their polling place.

According to the survey results, more than half of voters are ready to check their polling place if elections are announced. Specifically, 36.8% of respondents indicated that they definitely plan to do so, while another 21.5% said they are likely to do so. In contrast, 41.7% (the sum of “probably not” and “no” responses) have no such intention.

Responses to this question vary significantly depending on the type of settlement where respondents live. The highest level of such readiness is observed in large cities —specifically in Kyiv (64.1%) and Oblast centers (62.7%). In contrast, in rural areas, the share of those planning to verify their information is significantly lower (46.8%), and the majority of respondents (53.2%) do not intend to do so.

Additionally, among respondents who had previously heard of the SVR, 64.1% plan to check their polling place if elections are announced; among those who have no idea what the SVR is, only 51.9% plan to do so; and among those who were undecided, 43.5% plan to check.

Furthermore, the intention to update data is higher among respondents with greater trust in the SVR. Specifically, the number of those planning to check their polling place ranges from 53.9% among respondents with low trust in the SVR to 66% among those with moderate trust.

Respondents’ willingness to verify their data in the SVR increases significantly if the government takes the initiative —the share of those willing to update or confirm their data rises to 77.4%. Specifically, 57.4% of respondents indicated they are willing to do so, while another 20% are somewhat willing. The number of those who are not willing, in this case, drops to 22.6%.

Willingness to update the data in the SVR (n=2000)

Personal initiative		Upon government’s request
Yes — 58.3%	No — 41.7%	Yes — 77.4%	No — 22.6%

The highest level of willingness to take such actions is observed among respondents aged 18–59 (over 80%), while among people aged 60 and older, it stands at 66.7%. The willingness to confirm or update their data among respondents with higher education stands at 83.8%, while among those with secondary education, it is only 70.5%. 

Among citizens who have previously heard of the Register, the willingness to take active steps reaches 81.4%, whereas among those who are unaware, it is 73.7%.

Overall, these results demonstrate the significant potential of proactive communication by the state as a tool for improving the accuracy of the SVR data. In the absence of additional incentives or external cues, some citizens may fail to take the necessary steps to update their voter information.

Willingness to Update the Data Among Citizens With Relocation Experience 

The most indicative finding is the correlation between willingness to verify and update SVR data and prior experience with relocation. Among respondents who have relocated, this willingness is higher (83.7%) than among those without such experience (76%). At the same time, among respondents who actually changed their place of residence after the start of the full-scale invasion, the level of willingness is slightly lower (69.1%) than among those who did not relocate (79.3%). 

Readiness to update data based on migration experience (n=1717)

Group	% among different groups of residents with relocation experience
Had relocation experience	83.7
Had no relocation experience	76

Among respondents who are willing to update or verify their information when requested by the government, there is a clear preference for digital communication channels. 76.6% of respondents cited the Diia app as the most convenient method. Other options are significantly less popular: 17.3% chose Administrative Service Centers (ASC), 12.3% — local government bodies, and 11% — the State Voter Register website. Significantly fewer respondents chose post offices (7%) and State Voter Register offices (3.7%).

Among younger respondents (ages 18–35), the use of the Diia app is overwhelmingly dominant —91.2% of respondents chose it. In the 36–59 age group, this figure also remains high (81.7%), while among people over 60, it drops to 49.4%.

In contrast, 27.3% of respondents aged 60 and older cited offline channels —particularly contacting local government bodies —as a convenient option. Among young people, this figure stands at just 5.7%. In other words, digital tools are the primary means of communication for the majority of the population, but there remains a significant need for offline services among older age groups.

Thus, the Diia app should be made the key channel for interacting with voters. About 24 million citizens of Ukraine already use the Diia portal, which creates significant potential for its broader application in procedures related to the SVR. However, it is not a universal solution for all segments of the population. In parallel with digitalization, offline tools should be maintained and developed to prevent the exclusion of certain citizens from the data update process.

Barriers to the Data Update in the SVR

In addition, OPORA analyzed the barriers to updating voter register data among those who are unwilling to verify or confirm their information even when requested to do so by the government. For this group, the barriers are not only practical but also value-based, encompassing issues of trust, security, and overall motivation to participate in the electoral process.

The most common reasons for reluctance to verify data in the SVR are distrust of the state (22.3%), concerns about personal data protection (21.9%), and unwillingness to participate in elections (15.5%). Some respondents pointed to informational barriers —a lack of understanding of how the procedure works (11.2%), or the belief that it would be too time-consuming (8.6%).

Barriers to data update in the SRV (n=527)

Category	% among respondents unwilling to update their in the SVR
Distrust of the state	22.3
Sensitivity to personal data protection	21.9
Unwillingness to participate in the vote	15.5
Lack of understanding of how the procedures work	11.2
Extra time-consuming	8.6

Respondents could select all options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

A more detailed analysis shows that information barriers are significantly more prevalent among older age groups: the proportion of those who do not know how to complete the relevant procedure rises from 3.6% among young people to 15.1% among those aged 60 and older. A similar pattern is observed with regard to financial status —among respondents with lower incomes, this figure is significantly higher (13.9% versus 6% among the affluent).

At the same time, behavioral barriers are more common among younger respondents: they more often indicate that the procedure requires an excessive amount of time (18.8% among those aged 18–35 versus 1.7% among those aged 60 and older). Furthermore, it is among young people that a reluctance to participate in elections is most frequently observed (24.3%).

Distrust of the state as a reason for not updating their data is most often cited by respondents aged 36–59 (29%), which significantly exceeds the figures for other age groups.

Overall, the results indicate significant potential for state-citizen interaction regarding the updating of data in the State Voter Register, though this potential depends on a range of sociodemographic and behavioral factors.

Most notably, citizens with experience of relocation demonstrate the highest willingness to update their data — they are the groups for whom updating their polling place may be most critical. A lower level of willingness is observed among rural residents, older age groups, and people with lower levels of education, indicating a risk of their exclusion from the data update process.

Additionally, a link is evident between the level of understanding of the procedures and the willingness to act: respondents who are more familiar with the mechanisms for changing their polling place are significantly more likely to be willing to update their data. At the same time, some of the barriers to updating data in the SVR are informational, such as a lack of understanding of the procedures and the expectation that the process will be time-consuming. Such risks can potentially be mitigated through a targeted communication campaign. Raising awareness and confidence in the simplicity and accessibility of the relevant procedures can directly influence the level of citizen engagement in updating their data.

Thus, the potential for updating SVR data depends largely on the state’s ability to ensure clear, targeted, and proactive communication, as well as to offer user-friendly interaction tools tailored to different population groups.

Attitudes Toward Automatic Voter Data Updates

One of the potential tools for updating data in the State Voter Register, which is currently being considered by the Working Group tasked with preparing comprehensive legislative proposals regarding the specific procedures for organizing and conducting elections during a state of emergency and/or post-war elections in Ukraine, is the automatic (centralized) updating of voting location information for specific groups of voters based on data available to the state. Specifically, this refers to the possibility of changing the polling place for internally displaced persons (IDPs) whose registered voting address is in temporarily occupied territories, in accordance with the address indicated in the IDP certificate. 

However, this model comes with an important caveat: data on IDPs’ registered addresses do not always reflect their actual locations. This creates a risk of incorrect determination of polling places in the event of automatic data updates.

The previous section of the study showed that citizens’ willingness to update their data independently increases significantly when the government takes proactive measures. The next logical step is to assess citizens’ attitudes toward an automated approach —without requiring their direct participation.

To this end, an experimental approach was used: respondents were divided into three groups and presented with different formulations of the same question —a neutral one, one emphasizing the benefits, and one emphasizing the risks.

In the control group, where the question was phrased without additional explanations, 84.4% of respondents expressed a positive or somewhat positive attitude toward automatic data updates. In the group where the emphasis was on the benefit of saving time, this figure did not change significantly and stood at 85.1%. At the same time, in the group where the emphasis was placed on potential risks (including the likelihood of incorrectly determining the polling place), support dropped sharply: the share of positive and somewhat positive responses was only 42.1%, while negative assessments rose to 57.9%.

This indicates that basic support for automation is largely relative and can change rapidly depending on the level of trust in the accuracy of the data and the correctness of its use. For citizens, the issue of potential errors and incorrect determination of the polling place proves to be a more significant factor than convenience or time savings.

From a practical standpoint, this means that the implementation of mechanisms for automatic data updates requires special attention to the quality of information sources and the transparency of procedures. The key conditions for the acceptability of such solutions to citizens are the mitigation of risks of errors in determining the polling place, the ability to verify and correct automatically updated data, and clear communication regarding the specific data on which the updates are based.

Thus, even with broad support for automation, its practical implementation must be accompanied by control and trust mechanisms. Without this, there is a risk of a significant decline in public support for such solutions, especially among vulnerable voter groups.

Perceptions of the State Voter Register and the Level of Trust in It

A separate section of the study focused on assessing the general perception of the State Voter Register. It is important to underline that this does not refer to citizens’ actual knowledge of the Register’s technical specifications, but rather to their intuitive understanding of it and their level of trust in it.

Respondents were asked to evaluate three statements regarding various aspects of the Voter Register’s operation: its security against cyberattacks, the accuracy of voter count data, and the timeliness of information on polling locations.

The results show a relatively balanced but not unequivocally positive perception of the Register. The proportion of those who agree with the respective statements hovers around half of the respondents, while the rest express doubts or distrust:

• 54.6% of respondents agree that the Voter Register is sufficiently protected against cyberattacks (combined percentage of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” responses);
• 49.1% believe that the Register contains accurate data on the number of voters;
• 58.6% agree that the data on voters’ polling places in the Voter Register is up to date.

At the same time, on each of these issues, approximately 40–50% of respondents expressed some level of distrust or skepticism.

To summarize these assessments, an integrated index of trust in the State Voter Register was created, combining responses to all three questions. This approach allows for measuring citizens’ overall attitude toward the Register as an institution.

The distribution of index values shows that 22.7% of respondents have a high level of trust in the State Voter Register, 39.8% have a moderate level, and 37.5% have a low level. The median value of the index is closer to the position “tend to trust” than to clearly expressed confidence.

From a regional perspective, a slightly higher level of trust in the SVR is observed in the southern regions (29.1% have a high level of trust), while in the West the share of respondents with a low level of trust is relatively higher (43.7%). At the same time, in the Center and the East, a moderate level of trust prevails (43.9% and 40.9%, respectively), indicating a more reserved and uncertain attitude toward the Register.

Residents of rural areas trust the SVR the most —nearly a third of these respondents (31.9%) expressed a high level of trust in the Register. In contrast, in large cities, particularly in Kyiv (19.5%) and regional centers (20.6%), this figure is significantly lower, and the share of respondents with a low level of trust remains relatively high (around 38–40%).

Respondents with higher education are less likely to express a high level of trust in the State Voter Register (14.9% compared to 31.4% among those with secondary education) and are more likely to take the position “I rather trust it” (46.4%).

Thus, the level of trust in the State Voter Register is moderate rather than high, and varies depending on sociodemographic characteristics. Citizens do not express a sharply negative attitude toward the State Voter Register, but they also do not have complete confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the data.

This moderate level of trust in the Register partly explains citizens’ sensitivity to risks associated with automatic data updates and also highlights the potential for effective interaction between the state and voters regarding data updates.

Communication Channels With Voters

A separate section of the study focused on citizens’ media consumption, as the effective updating of data in the State Voter Register will depend not only on the existence of procedures but also on the state’s ability to convey information to voters in a timely and understandable manner.

The results confirm the dominance of the digital environment as the primary channel for obtaining information. Over the past two months, respondents primarily obtained information about developments in Ukraine from social media and messaging apps (77.4%). Significantly fewer respondents cited television (24.1%), online media excluding social media and messaging apps (23.1%), and information from relatives, friends, neighbors, or colleagues (20.6%) as their primary sources of information. Radio (8.5%), print media (2.3%), and the “Yedyni Novyny” telethon (9%) have noticeably lower reach.

This trend generally aligns with a previous OPORA study on media consumption among Ukrainians, where social media also remained the leading source of news, while television, radio, and print media are gradually losing their audience.

Sources for obtaining information about developments in Ukraine over the past two months (n=2000)

Source	% of respondents choosing the source
Social media / messengers	77.4
Television	24.1
Online media	23.1
Relatives/frinds	20.6
Telethon	9
Radio	8.5
Printed media	2.3

Respondents could select max three options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

In particular, among younger respondents (aged 18–35), social media and messaging apps are the primary source of information — 87.9% of those surveyed chose them. In the older age group (60 and older), this figure drops to 60.4%, but even in this category, digital channels remain important. Television, on the other hand, shows the opposite trend: while only 8% of young respondents use it, the figure rises to 50.8% among those aged 60 and older.

Among more affluent respondents, the proportion of those who get their information through social media and messaging apps is higher (86.4%), while among less affluent respondents, it is lower (68.2%). At the same time, television remains a more common source of information specifically among respondents with lower income levels (34.4% versus 15.7% among the well-off).

The “Yedyni Novyny” telethon and radio have limited reach across all age groups, but their use increases somewhat with age: 5% of young people and 13.6% of respondents aged 60 and older cited the telethon as a source of information, while 6.3% and 14% cited radio, respectively.

Informal channels (information from relatives, friends, or acquaintances) are more common among younger respondents — 27.3% among young people versus 17.9% among those aged 60 and older.

Among social networks and messaging apps, Telegram plays the most prominent role — 62.3% of all respondents cited it as a source of information about events in Ukraine (respondents could select any number of options in their answers). Next are YouTube (29%), Facebook (28.6%), Instagram (13.8%), TikTok (11.5%), and Viber (10.7%). Thus, Telegram remains the key channel for information coverage.

The most popular social media in Ukraine to obtain information on the developments in Ukraine over the past two months (n=2000)

Source	% of respondents choosing the source
Telegram	62.3
YouTube	29
Facebook	28.6
Instagram	13.8
TikTok	11.5
Viber	10.7
I do not use any	10.9

Respondents could select max three options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

The data on trust paint a more complex picture. Respondents trust social media and messaging apps the most (34.5%), but nearly the same proportion — 32.4% — does not trust any of the listed sources. This means that high levels of information consumption do not automatically translate into high levels of trust in that information.

Among the institutions trusted for election-related information, the Central Election Commission is most frequently cited (32.6% — the highest figure among all options offered). This creates significant potential for the CEC as the primary communicator on issues related to the electoral process and data updates.

The highest level of trust in the CEC is recorded in the center of the country — 39.6%. In contrast, in the southern and western regions, this figure is lower, at about one-third of respondents (31.0% and 31.4%, respectively), while the lowest level of trust is recorded in the east — only 24.2%.

Trust in the CEC is higher among more affluent citizens: 42.5% of them stated that they trust the CEC. Among those with moderate means, this figure stands at 33.6%, and among those with lower means — 25.4%.

At the same time, a large portion of respondents — 33.7% — do not trust any of the listed institutions.

Local authorities are trusted by 16%, civil society organizations by 14.8%, and other state bodies by 10.9%. Political actors have lower levels of trust: political parties — 5.4%, candidates — 8.1%.

Confidence in sources of information about elections (n=2000)

Source	% of respondents choosing the source
None	33.7
CEC	32.6
Local authorities	16
CSOs	14.8
Other public authorities	10.9
Candidates	8.1
Political Parties	5.4

Respondents could select all options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

The level of trust in civil society organizations deserves special attention, as it is comparable to — or even higher than — that in some government institutions. This points to the potential for engaging the civil sector as an additional channel of communication, particularly for building trust in election information and explaining procedures.

It is also important to consider the combination of national and local levels of communication. Most respondents (56.6%) obtain information in equal measure from national and local sources, while another 29.9% get it mainly from national sources, and 13.5% mainly from local sources. This means that communication campaigns about updating voter registration data cannot be exclusively centralized and must include the local level.

When it comes to the content of election information, the most important thing for respondents is to know information about candidates and parties (50.1%), as well as basic practical information — where and when to vote (43.6%). A significant portion of respondents also want to know how to check if they are on the voter list (24.2%) and how to change their polling place (12.9%).

It is noteworthy that among younger respondents (ages 18–35), 18.2% consider information on changing their polling place to be important, while among those aged 60 and older, only 5.4% do. In contrast, interest in political content—information about candidates and parties —is relatively stable across different age groups, ranging from 44% to 56%.

Respondents most often cited the Diia app (45.2%) as the most convenient channel for obtaining official information about the elections. This is followed by official social media pages (22.6%), television (18.9%), official government websites (18.1%), and SMS messages (16.6%).

Popular channels of obtaining election related information (n=2000)

Channel	% of respondents choosing the channel
Diia	45.2
Social media	22.6
Television	18.9
Official websites of public authorities	18.1
SMS	16.6

Respondents could select all options in the answer that describe their situation; the sum of answers >100%

Among respondents who are willing to update their information if requested by the government, 56.7% chose the Diia app as a convenient channel for receiving voter information, while only 14.2% of those unwilling to do so made the same choice. In contrast, only 20.8% of respondents chose more traditional channels, such as the official websites of government agencies.

Overall, the results indicate that an effective communication campaign to update voter data must be multi-channel. Digital tools — primarily Diia, social media, and messaging apps — can be an important element of this. At the same time, offline channels, television, local authorities, Administrative Service Centers (ASCs), and SMS notifications remain important for reaching groups that use digital services less frequently or do not trust online sources.

METHODOLOGY

A nationwide survey of Ukraine’s adult population was conducted to examine the challenges and ways to update the State Voter Register. The survey was developed by the OPORA Civil Network, which also analyzed the results and drafted this report, while the fieldwork was carried out by the research agency FAMA.

The survey was conducted via telephone interviews (CATI—Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing) using a questionnaire prepared by OPORA experts.

The fieldwork phase lasted from March 21 to April 19, 2026. The total sample size was 2,003 respondents.

Respondents were selected using the Random Digit Dialing (RDD) method. The contact list was generated by generating telephone numbers using software, which ensures the randomness of the selection and coverage of a wide range of potential respondents. This approach is one of the most relevant in the absence of up-to-date population registries, particularly given the changes in the demographic structure caused by internal and external migration following February 24, 2022.

The survey was conducted among respondents aged 18 and older. The sample is approximately representative in terms of key sociodemographic characteristics — gender, age, region of residence, and type of settlement.

After the fieldwork was completed, the dataset was weighted to align the sample structure with that of Ukraine’s adult population based on key sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age, region of residence, and type of settlement). Weighting was performed to correct for possible sample biases associated with the characteristics of telephone surveys and the unequal probability of respondents being included in the sample.

For a sample of 2,003 respondents, the maximum theoretical margin of error for a simple random sample does not exceed approximately ±2.2% for indicators close to 50%, at a 95% confidence level, without applying the design effect. At the same time, the actual deviation of the results may be higher due to the characteristics of the sample design, the application of weighting coefficients, the relatively low response rate, as well as limitations on population coverage under martial law.

The study covers three key dimensions. The first is the experience and prospects of relocation: who moved and why, what influences the decision to return or stay, and whether citizens plan to change their place of residence in the future. The second is interaction with the State Voter Register: citizens’ level of awareness, their understanding of practical mechanisms, and their willingness to update their own data. The third is media consumption and trust in institutions: where citizens obtain information and whom they trust in an electoral context, which is critically important for building an effective communication strategy.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Women accounted for the majority of respondents surveyed as part of this study (54.9%), while men made up 45.1%.

By age, the largest share consists of people aged 36 to 59 (43.4%), respondents over 60 years old — 29.7%, and young people (18–35 years old) — 26.9%.

By macroregion, respondents are distributed as follows: Center — 33.7%, West — 23.6%, South — 22.3%, East — 20.5%.

Most respondents live in cities: 34.3% in regional capitals, 30.6% in other cities within the region. The share of rural residents is 23.6%, and residents of Kyiv account for 11.5%.

In terms of education level, respondents were distributed almost equally: 51.8% have a college degree, while 48.2% have a high school diploma or less.

In terms of financial status, 35.4% of respondents classified themselves as low-income, 38.5% as moderately well-off, and another 26.2% as well-off.

Only one-third of respondents (32%) reported having financial savings, while the majority (68%) do not. Among those with savings, in the event of losing their primary source of income, the majority of respondents (47.3%) could cover their usual expenses for 1 to 6 months, while one-third (32.3%) could do so for more than six months.

The project is implemented by the Civil Network OPORA with the financial support of the German Federal Foreign Office