This material was produced as part of the project “Promoting Democratic Integrity and Governance in Ukraine”, implemented by the Civil Network OPORA with the support of the EU. Its content is the sole responsibility of the Civil Network OPORA and does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union.

 

The ban on pro-Russian parties has not led to a governance crisis in local councils where such political forces had significant representation. However, given that it is impossible to replace the expelled deputies from these parties, some communities have already found themselves in a situation of an unstable quorum, which sometimes significantly complicates decision-making. Such a “staff shortage” increases the value of every vote, making councils vulnerable to ad-hoc agreements, which may affect the quality of governance in wartime.

Local authorities in Ukraine have been operating for over five years since their election in 2020. The continuity of their work is part of the state’s overall policy to preserve democratic governance and fulfil European integration commitments. Although the Verkhovna Rada has, by a separate resolution, confirmed the authority of local councils in wartime, the prolonged failure to refresh their composition is leading to institutional fatigue. Security challenges and the reduction in the number of deputies limit the functionality of local self-government bodies.

The timing of the next local elections remains uncertain. Current approaches to organising the post-war electoral process provide for the scheduling of nationwide elections no earlier than six months after the termination or cancellation of martial law. This period is reasonable given the security and organisational challenges, but it also means that local councils will continue to operate in their current composition for an indefinite amount of time.

This is precisely why legislative initiatives are emerging aimed at ensuring the stability of local government bodies. In particular, draft law No. 14405 proposes establishing specific provisions governing the activities of councils during martial law for a period of six months following its termination.

The civil society network OPORA has investigated how local authorities are exercising their powers under martial law. The analysis focused on the legitimacy and actual functionality of 46 local councils formed under the proportional representation system, which include a significant number of deputy members elected representing currently banned parties.

Key findings

  • In the 2020 local elections, 4,188 deputy members of various levels of council were elected from parties that are now banned — around 10% of all elected deputy members.

  • Of the banned parties, “Opposition Platform – For Life” had the largest number of local deputies — 3,893. The Opposition Bloc had 198 deputies elected, the Party of Shariy — 45, the Volodymyr Saldo Bloc — 35, the Left Opposition — 12, and the Nashi party — 5. Overall, following the 2020 elections, in 30 local councils, 50% or more of the councillors were elected from currently banned parties. In a further 84 councils, such councillors accounted for between 33% and 50%.
  • Of the 30 councils where the presence of councillors from currently banned parties was highest, only 6 remain operational. Of the 84 councils where the proportion of such councillors ranged from 33% to 50%, 39 continue to operate. In most cases, the suspension of work is either due to the occupation of the community or the inability of the council members to gather for meetings. Under such circumstances, the functions of community administration are entrusted to military administrations.
  • OPORA examined the work of 46 local councils in 14 regions (mainly administrative centres of districts), where the number of councillors from banned political parties stood at 11% or more. Councils that are not functioning due to occupation or the transfer of powers to military administrations were excluded from the sample, as was the Kharkiv City Council due to a failure to provide aggregated data.
  • None of the 46 councils studied had fewer than half of their total membership serving as councillors. The lowest numbers of councillors were in the Konotop (73%), Bashtanka (80%) and Pokrovsk (85%) city councils.
  • The ban on pro-Russian parties did not lead to a mass resignation of councillors: approximately a quarter of councillors elected from banned parties in the councils analysed have had their terms terminated.
  • In total, 305 councillors (19% of the total) in the councils analysed have had their mandates terminated prematurely since the start of the term.
  • The highest proportion of early terminations of mandates in the selected councils belongs to "Opozytsiina platforma – Za zhyttia" (27.9%), "Sluha narodu" (15.4%), "Evropeiska solidarnist" (9.8%), "Za maibutnie" (6.9%) and "Batkivshchyna" (6.2%).
  • The peak in early termination of mandates was recorded in 2023. This is likely linked to the ban on pro-Russian political parties and the introduction of restrictions on councillors travelling abroad. In the vast majority of cases, the mandates of deputies are terminated through voluntary resignation. Other grounds (incompatibility of positions, death or fatality, recall, court rulings) are rare.
  • The mechanism for replacing councillors plays a key role in maintaining the legitimacy of councils. At the time of the study, 97 councillors (around 6%) were needed to complete the full composition of the councils. During the term of office, there were 210 replacements, with the highest numbers in the Bohodukhiv and Konotop (16 each), Zaporizhzhia (12), Novhorod-Siverskyi (11) and Kelmentsi (10) councils. The fewest replacements were recorded in 2022 (22), and the most in 2023 (52).
  • Despite the councils under review retaining their full powers, in practice some councillors do not attend meetings: on average, around two-thirds of councillors were present at meetings in 2025. In 12 communities, attendance exceeds 70%; in 29, it ranges between 60% and 70%; and in 5, it is below 60%.
  • The lowest rates of average councillor attendance at sessions were recorded in the Bessarabska (54.81%), Konotop (57.37%), Vilniansk (57.69%), Berestyn (58.30%) and Chernihiv (58.93%) councils, where attendance levels are approaching the minimum quorum required.
  • In some communities, the attendance issue is already turning into a crisis in decision-making: in the Mykolaiv, Chernihiv and Vilniansk city councils, meetings are being cancelled or postponed due to a lack of quorum.
  • Most councils continue to operate in-person, with limited use of remote and hybrid formats. Often, online participation in council meetings is not regulated by their rules of procedure, which complicates the work of councillors who reside outside the community, particularly those serving in the Defence Forces.
  • The different approach adopted by the Central Election Commission regarding the replacement of councillors in the event of a ban on or the self-dissolution of parties contributes to the preservation of the majority of councils’ powers under martial law; however, it does not fill the legislative gap which, in accordance with Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, can only be resolved by a decision of parliament.
  • The legal status of parliamentary factions of banned parties in local government bodies is undefined. The study revealed varying practices regarding the functioning of such factions: ranging from self-dissolution to de facto preservation or an undefined status.

Research methodology and geography

Following the 2020 local elections in Ukraine, two types of local councils emerged: those elected under a first-past-the-post system and those elected under a proportional representation system with open lists. The first-past-the-post system was used in communities where the number of voters did not exceed 10,000. OPORA has already analysed the specific features of how such councils operate under martial law, using the examples of the Odesa, Chernihiv and Volyn regions.

Other local councils — in communities with more than 10,000 voters, as well as district and regional councils — were formed under a proportional system with open party lists. One of the key advantages of this model is its greater resilience in emergency situations, particularly under martial law, as it allows for the replacement of expelled deputies without holding by-elections.

At the same time, following the ban on the activities of a number of political parties, the rotation of some deputies became impossible. When forming the study sample, the main criterion for selecting communities was a high proportion of councillors elected from banned political parties, as it is in such councils that the risks of losing authority and reduced functional capacity are most likely.

To analyse the impact of the ban on political parties on local governance, the sample included local councils where the proportion of councillors from banned parties was 11% or more of the total membership. We have also included in the sample two councils with a slightly lower proportion of such councillors — the Chernihiv City Council (9.52% of councillors from the Opposition Platform – For Life party) and the Koriukivka City Council (7.69% of councillors from the Opposition Platform – For Life party) — as their administrative centres have the status of district centres.

The highest proportion of councillors from banned political parties among the councils studied was in the Poliana village community (Zakarpattia Oblast), the Bereznehuvate settlement community (Mykolaiv Oblast) and the Bolhrad city community (Odesa Oblast), where such councillors accounted for 46%, as well as the Mykolaiv City Council, where 40% of councillors were from banned parties.

Geographically, the study’s sample covers the entire territory of Ukraine, focusing on communities — district administrative centres — whose councils include 11% or more councillors from banned political parties. The sample was expanded to include other communities with a high concentration of such councillors. As a result, the sample consists of 46 communities covering 14 regions of Ukraine: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kirovohrad, Chernivtsi, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi and Zakarpattia regions. Forty of the communities in the sample are urban, four are settlement communities, and two are rural communities. A full list of all councils included in the study sample is provided in the appendix.

The sample does not include local councils that are not functioning due to the temporary occupation of territories or whose powers have been transferred to military administrations.

The study was conducted between October and November 2025 by obtaining responses to official requests for access to public information, communicating with local government officials, and analysing information from open sources.

Overall, the vast majority of local authorities responded appropriately to OPORA’s requests and provided the necessary information. The exception was Kharkiv City Council, which stated that a significant portion of the requested information was contained in the minutes of the council’s plenary sessions, so providing the information would require copying a substantial volume of materials. Therefore, the council stated that it required reimbursement for the costs of copying, printing, scanning and computer processing of the documents. As other local authorities provided the aggregated statistical information without any obstacles in response to identical requests, we excluded the Kharkiv City Council from the sample.

Representation of banned parties in local councils

In the 2020 local elections, 4,188 councillors from parties now banned were elected to councils at various levels — around 10% of the total. At the time of election, the gender distribution showed a predominance of men (63%) over women (37%). However, due to rotations within the council membership, the quantitative and gender structure of the councils has undergone significant changes.

Of the banned parties, “Opozytsiina platforma – Za zhyttia" had the largest number of local councillors — 3,893. The Opposition Bloc had 198 deputies elected, the Party of Shariy — 45, the Volodymyr Saldo Bloc — 35, the Left Opposition — 12, and the Nashi party — 5.

Overall, representatives of banned parties serve on councils at various levels across 22 regions of Ukraine, that is, in all regions except Volyn, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk. The highest number of such councillors is in the councils of Donetsk (538), Odesa (504), Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions (486 each).

In terms of the number of councils to which deputies from banned parties were elected, this figure is as high as 741 — around 47% of the total. These include 229 city councils, 193 settlement councils, 185 rural councils, 91 district councils, 16 regional councils and 14 district councils within cities.

The largest number of councillors from banned parties were elected to the Kostiantynivka City Council — 30, the Kramatorsk District Council — 29, the Volnovakha and Siverskodonetsk District Councils — 28 each, and the Pokrovsk District Council — 26.

In total, following the 2020 local elections, there were 30 councils in Ukraine where 50% or more of the councillors were elected from parties that are now banned. In a further 84 councils, such councillors accounted for between 33% and 50%. However, the full-scale war has brought about significant changes in the functioning of local government bodies: a number of communities are under temporary occupation, and in some communities military administrations have been established, with the powers of the relevant councils transferred to them.

Of the 30 councils where the proportion of councillors from now-banned parties was highest, only 6 remain operational, whereas 39 of the councils with a proportion of such councillors ranging from 33% to 50% continue to function. As we can see, the number of local councils where deputies from banned parties are still serving remains significant.

Legal aspects of the dissolution of political parties

Between 2022 and 2023, a number of political parties, including "Opozytsiina platforma – Za zhyttia", "Partiia Shariia" and "Opozytsiinyi Bloc", were banned by the courts due to their pro-Russian orientation. Consequently, following the termination of the mandates of local councillors elected from such parties, it became impossible to replace them with the next candidates on the list. However, following the self-dissolution of the Our Land party on 27 August 2025, the Central Election Commission adopted a decision taking a different approach to this issue.

In the event of a political party being banned by a court order, which occurs on the basis of Article 37 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 21 of the Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties in Ukraine”, this constitutes a compulsory measure by the state relating to the illegal activities of the party. As stated in Resolution No. 25 of the Central Election Commission dated 13 April 2023, the existence of a court decision banning the activities of a party, which has entered into legal force, constitutes a substantial and exceptional circumstance that precludes the application of the procedure for replacing deputies elected from the electoral lists of the relevant party.

The CEC’s reasoning is based on the concept of an indirect link between a deputy and a political party, through which the right to be elected was exercised. Since the banning of a party entails the cessation of its activities as a participant in the electoral process and the dissolution of its organisational structures, the application of the mechanism for replacing the next candidate on the list is regarded as a continuation of the banned party’s political presence in the representative body. This is precisely why territorial election commissions have no legal grounds to recognise the next candidates on the lists of such parties as elected.

The practical consequence of this approach has been the “freezing” of the party lists of banned political forces: in the event of the early termination of a deputy’s powers from such a party, their mandate is not replaced, leading to a gradual reduction in the number of deputies. This circumstance directly affects the legitimacy and functionality of local councils, particularly in communities where the proportion of elected representatives from banned parties was significant.

The CEC adopted a different approach in the case of the voluntary dissolution of a political party, specifically the cessation of activities of the political party “Our Land”. In Resolution No. 57 of 28 October 2025, the Commission noted that self-dissolution and judicial prohibition are different legal mechanisms in terms of their nature, procedure and consequences. Self-dissolution is voluntary and is not linked to a finding that the party’s activities are unlawful.

The Electoral Code of Ukraine does not provide for the dissolution (voluntary dissolution) of a party as grounds for annulling its electoral lists or for refusing to replace a deputy. Given this, the Central Election Commission has ruled that in the event of a party’s self-dissolution, territorial election commissions are obliged to apply the general procedure set out in Article 284 of the Electoral Code and to declare the next candidate in order of precedence on the relevant party list as elected.

Thus, a fundamental difference in the application of the law has emerged:

  • in the event of a court ban on a party, deputies are not replaced;
  • in the event of a party’s voluntary dissolution, deputies are replaced in accordance with the general procedure.

This difference has a systemic impact on the capacity of local self-government. Whilst a ban on a party leads to a gradual reduction in the council’s membership and a potential risk of losing a quorum, self-dissolution, on the contrary, allows the body of councillors to be preserved and the council’s authority to be maintained.

This practice has revealed a gap in legislative regulation, which the Central Election Commission has attempted to address by adopting the aforementioned resolutions. At the same time, there are concerns about this method of addressing the regulatory gap, as, according to Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the principles of local self-government, as well as the organisation and conduct of elections (an integral aspect of which is the procedure for replacing local councillors), are determined solely by the laws of Ukraine. Adopting an interpretative and law-application approach to address this gap creates risks of legal challenges and undermines the legitimacy of decisions made by local authorities, particularly given that the scheduled local elections did not take place due to Russian aggression and the imposition of martial law. In view of this, it would be appropriate for parliament to amend electoral and party legislation in the foreseeable future to clearly regulate the procedure for replacing councillors in the event of a party’s dissolution, regardless of the manner of such dissolution.

Dissolution of parliamentary factions following the banning of parties

The suspension or prohibition of political parties by court order does not automatically entail the termination of the powers of local councillors or the dissolution of factions formed by representatives of the relevant parties. At the same time, current legislation does not clearly regulate the status and functioning of factions in local councils following the prohibition of a political party.

Councillors have the right to freely form and leave factions; however, the specific procedures for their formation, operation or dissolution are determined by the rules of procedure of local councils. As practice shows, these documents generally do not contain provisions for the dissolution of factions in the event of a party being banned. As a result, the practice of dissolution or continuation of parliamentary factions formed by representatives of banned political parties varies significantly from one local authority to another.

In general, the factions of banned political parties were predominantly represented by the “Opozytsiina platforma – Za zhyttia”. It is these factions that account for the vast majority of recorded cases of dissolution or cessation of activities. Factions of the “Partiia Shariia”, the “Opozitsiyniy blok” and the “Liva opozytsiia” operated in a significantly smaller number of councils. It is noteworthy that in the Bashtanka and Zviahel city councils, the activities of the “Nash krai” faction were suspended even before the conclusion of the final judicial review of the ban on this party (from 20 June to 2 July 2025, the party appealed the decision to ban its activities in the Supreme Court), which may indicate the deputies’ desire to minimise political and reputational risks.

In some councils (the Berestyn and Zhmerynka city councils, the Kelmentsi and Novopokrovka settlement councils, and the Poliana village council), the question of dissolving factions did not arise, as such groups had not been formed, despite the election of councillors from political forces that were subsequently banned.

There are also councils where the factions of banned pro-Russian parties have not been disbanded or their status remains undefined. The most telling example is that of the Izmail City Council, where, based on the response to a request from OPORA and an analysis of voting results at plenary sessions, the Opposition Platform – For Life party faction effectively continues to exist. The Opposition Platform – For Life factions in the Konotop and Bohodukhiv City Councils have not been disbanded; however, there is generally no publicly available information on the formation and functioning of these factions, and the relevant councillors are listed as non-affiliated on the councils’ official websites.

Factions in the other communities studied were disbanded during 2022 — the vast majority of these decisions were taken between March and June 2022. An analysis of the grounds for the dissolution of factions shows that self-dissolution became the dominant model. In most cases, the dissolution was formalised by a decision of the faction itself, the minutes of a meeting of councillors, statements or letters from the faction leader to the council chair, as well as the withdrawal of all councillors from the faction, which, according to council regulations, constitutes grounds for its dissolution.

An important, albeit indirect, factor in these processes was Presidential Decree No. 153/2022, which enacted the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine regarding the suspension of the activities of certain political parties. At least 12 factions ceased to exist, citing this very Decree as the reason for their self-dissolution or cessation of activities, whilst a court ban on the activities of the relevant party was either not mentioned at all or had not yet been issued at the time the decision was taken.

It is important to emphasise that local councils generally did not take decisions to disband factions. Instead, the decisions were taken by the councillors themselves or by the factions, which interpreted the aforementioned Presidential Decree as grounds for ceasing their activities.

The rules of procedure of local councils played a largely technical role in these processes. They were used to record the fact of deputies leaving a faction, to confirm its self-dissolution, or to announce the cessation of the faction’s activities at a plenary session. At the same time, most rules of procedure did not contain specific provisions directly regulating the procedure to be followed in the event of a political party being banned, which further reinforced the inconsistency of practice.

The situation in the Mykolaiv City Council deserves special mention, where the head of the Opposition Platform – For Life faction, Artem Iliuk, insisted that following the NSDC’s decision, the faction he led no longer existed — neither de facto nor de jure. He therefore sent a letter to the Mykolaiv City Council stating that the faction no longer existed following the party’s ban, thereby establishing the approach of automatically disbanding the faction without a collective decision by the faction or the council.

In the Korosten City Council, however, it was decided to suspend the faction’s activities. Unlike other grounds for terminating a faction’s activities, the suspension of their activities is not regulated either by legislation or by the rules of procedure of the Korosten City Council. All this points to the lack of a unified approach and the inconsistency in the functioning of factions formed from banned parties.

The legitimacy of councils in the context of a reduction in the number of councillors

A reduction in the number of councillors to less than half of the council’s total membership means that the council loses its ability to make decisions. Such a situation provides grounds for the early termination of the council’s powers under Article 78 of the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine”. In the context of a protracted war and uncertainty regarding the timing of the next elections, the risks of a deterioration in the functioning of local self-government bodies are increasing.

At the same time, the results of our study show that none of the councils analysed lost their powers as a result of the number of councillors falling to less than half of the total membership.

The lowest proportion of serving councillors was recorded in the councils of three urban communities: Konotop (73%), Bashtanka (80%) and Pokrovsk (85%). In 31 communities, the proportion of serving councillors ranges from 85% to 99%, whilst a further 12 councils continue to operate with a full complement of members.

In total, across all the councils studied, the total number of councillors at the time of election was 1,614, and as of the time of the study, 1,517 councillors retained their powers. Thus, 97 councillors are needed to bring the councils up to full strength — approximately 6% of their original number.

In total, since the councils under review began operating, a total of 305 of their councillors have prematurely resigned. The clear leader in terms of the number of mandates relinquished is the Opposition Platform – For Life party — 86 councillors, accounting for 27.9% of the total number of resignations. Second place is held by the Servant of the People party with 47 councillors who resigned (15.4%). Third according to this indicator is the European Solidarity party — 30 deputies (9.8%), followed by For the Future (21 deputies, 6.9%) and Fatherland (19 deputies, 6.2%).

Collectively, these five political forces account for 202 cases of early termination of mandates, or 66.2% of the total number of mandates relinquished in the councils studied. Councillors from other parties rarely relinquished their mandates.

Table 1. Termination of mandates of deputies in the councils studied by their party affiliation (top five parties)

Party

Number of deputies
Opozytsiina platforma – Za zhyttia

86

Sluha narodu

47
Evropeiska solidarnist

30
Za maibutnie

21
Batkivshchyna

19

It is worth noting that the total number of early terminations of mandates is also influenced by the representation of parties in the councils: those political forces with fewer elected representatives consequently had fewer terminations in the overall statistics.

Almost a third of cases of early termination of mandates in the elected councils involved councillors elected from political parties whose activities were subsequently banned. However, this did not become a critical factor for the functional capacity of local self-government.

In the councils studied, following the 2020 election results, there were 422 councillors elected from political parties whose activities were subsequently banned. As of the time of the study, 97 councillors elected from these parties had terminated their mandates prematurely, or 23% of their original number.

Thus, despite the banning of the relevant political forces, the vast majority of councillors elected from those parties retain their seats. This indicates that the mere fact of a party being banned did not lead to the mass termination of local councillors’ mandates.

Features of the early termination of deputies’ mandates: dynamics, structure and grounds

The overall dynamics of the early termination of deputy mandates in the councils studied largely mirror the dynamics of the resignation of mandates by deputies from banned political parties. In 2020–2021, the total number of such cases remained relatively moderate (33 and 44 respectively), with 9 and 16 cases involving councillors from banned parties. In 2022, amid the outbreak of full-scale war, the total number of early terminations of mandates temporarily fell to 26 cases — alongside a reduction in resignations among councillors from banned parties to 6.

Table 2. Termination of mandates in the councils under study by gender of councillors and year

Year of termination of mandate

Women

Men

Total number of terminations

2020

11

22

33

2021

17

27

44

2022

9

17

26

2023

33

58

91

2024

23

43

66

2025

11

29

40

Overall result

105

200

305

From 2023, there was a simultaneous increase in both indicators: the total number of terminations rose to 91 cases in 2023 and 66 in 2024, whilst there were 27 and 28 cases respectively among councillors from banned parties, which are the highest figures for the entire observation period. In 2025, both figures fell (40 cases in total, including 9 among members of banned parties).

This correlation demonstrates that the banning of certain political parties has been one of the key factors behind the rise in the number of early terminations of deputy mandates since 2022. It is worth noting that the increase in the number of resigned mandates may also be linked to the restrictions on deputies travelling abroad, introduced in 2023. As with councillors in small communities, the peak in resignations occurred in 2023 — following amendments to the Rules on Crossing the State Border, under which local councillors could only leave Ukraine on the basis of decisions authorising official business trips. Such restrictions may have further encouraged early termination of mandates.

The gender distribution of councillors who terminated their mandates early revealed a significant imbalance between men and women. In the councils studied, the majority of cases of mandate termination involved men — 200 out of 305, or 65.6%. The predominance of men is evident throughout the entire observation period — this partly disproves the thesis that the main reason for resigning is the desire of female councillors to travel abroad unhindered.

Based on council decisions and resolutions of electoral commissions, several main groups of grounds for the early termination of deputy mandates can be identified. These include the termination of a mandate upon the deputy’s own request; appointment or election to positions incompatible with the deputy’s mandate (deputy city mayors, village heads, officials of local government bodies); the death or demise of a deputy; recall by popular initiative; as well as isolated cases of termination of powers in connection with a court conviction coming into legal force or other grounds provided for by law.

The vast majority of recorded cases of early termination of powers are linked to the resignation of a deputy’s mandate upon their own request. Notable examples include the Vilniansk, Berestyn, Sumy and Rozdilna city communities, where all recorded cases of early termination of deputy powers occurred on the basis of personal requests from the deputies.

Replacement of councillors as a means of maintaining the quorum of local councils

The high quorum levels of the councils studied demonstrate the resilience of the proportional electoral system compared to the first-past-the-post system under martial law. Under such conditions, it is easier for councils to maintain the necessary composition of the council through the mechanism of replacing councillors.

At the same time, the rate of termination of powers in some councils is significantly higher. In particular, more than a quarter of all cases of early termination of councillors’ mandates (83 out of 305) occur in five communities — Konotop (25), Bohodukhiv (17), Odesa (15), Zaporizhzhia (14) and Shostka (12).

Table 3. Number of early terminations of mandates and replacements of councillors by local councils (top five councils by number of terminations)

Community

Number of terminations of mandates

Number of replacements 

Konotop

25

16

Bohodukhiv

17

16

Odesa

15

6

Zaporizhzhia

14

12

Shostka

12

9

However, thanks to the replacement mechanism, these councils retain a sufficient level of authority. And although the replacement of councillors elected from banned political parties has become impossible, this has not had a critical impact on the work of local government bodies.

Since the election, there have been 210 replacements of local councillors in the communities studied. The highest number of replacements was recorded in the Bohodukhiv and Konotop city communities (16 each), the Zaporizhzhia (12), Novhorod-Siverskyi (11) city and Kelmentsi settlement communities (10). Together, these five communities account for almost a third of all replacements.

No replacements of councillors took place in the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi City Council alone. Consequently, it continues to operate with its original membership.

Table 4. Replacements of councillors by year and gender

Year of taking office

Women

Men

Total number of replacements

2020

12

11

23

2021

22

26

48

2022

9

13

22

2023

23

29

52

2024

17

17

34

2025

14

11

25

Overall result

100

110

210

The gender distribution of replaced deputies is relatively balanced: 100 women (around 48%) and 110 men (around 52%). Thus, the replacement mechanism has not fundamentally altered the existing structure of the parliamentary body.

The fewest replacements were recorded in 2022 — 22 cases, which is significantly fewer than in the previous and subsequent years. This decline may, in particular, be linked to the outbreak of full-scale war, as well as to the limited ability of local electoral commissions to carry out their duties, particularly to conduct replacement procedures, due to security risks.

In contrast, in 2023 the number of replacements rose to 52 cases, indicating a gradual resumption of political processes and the adaptation of electoral commissions to working under new conditions. In 2024–2025, the dynamics of replacements stabilised (34 and 25 cases respectively), indicating a more systematic application of the replacement mechanism as a tool for maintaining the legitimacy of local councils.

In terms of political parties, the acquisition of seats involved a relatively limited range of political forces. The highest number of replacements was recorded among councillors elected from "Sluha narodu" — 43 cases, "Evropeiska solidarnist" — 30, "Opozytsiina platforma – Za zhyttia" — 21, "Za maibutnie" — 18, and "Batkivshchyna" — 15. Collectively, these five political forces account for 127 replacements, or over 60% of the total number of cases of deputies taking up their seats in the councils studied.

Table 5. Replacements of councillors in the councils studied by party affiliation (top five parties)

Party

Total number of replacements

Servant of the People

43

European Solidarity

30

Opposition Platform – For Life

21

For the Future

18

Fatherland

15

Conducting sessions and actual participation of councillors in the work of councils

The formal authority of local councils does not always correspond to their actual institutional capacity. Even if the membership of the council remains unchanged, the council may lose its ability to make decisions if councillors do not attend meetings. In the context of a long-running war, the mobilisation of some councillors, their relocation and general political fatigue, it is precisely the level of councillor attendance that becomes a key indicator of the actual effectiveness of local government bodies.

An analysis of the work of the 46 councils included in this study’s sample shows that, on average, around two-thirds of councillors from the total membership attended plenary sessions in 2025. Over 70% of councillors attended council meetings in 12 communities, between 60–70% in 29 communities, and less than 60% in 5 communities. The highest attendance rates are recorded by the Dnipro (76.88%), Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (76.47%), Podilsk (75.29%), Sumy (74.21%) and Boryspil (72.37%) city councils.

In contrast, in the Bessarabska (54.81%), Konotop (57.37%), Vilniansk (57.69%), Berestyn (58.30%) and Chernihiv (58.93%) councils, attendance rates are approaching critical levels. Under such conditions, even the temporary absence of some councillors could block decision-making.

Table 6. Average attendance rate of councillors at meetings of the councils studied (the five councils with the highest attendance)

Council name

Average attendance rate for 2025 (of the established number of councillors)

Dnipro

76.88%

Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi

76.47%

Podilsk

75.29%

Sumy

74.21%

Boryspil

72.37%

Table 7. Average attendance rate of councillors at meetings of the councils studied (the five councils with the lowest attendance)

Council name

Average attendance rate for 2025 (of the established number of councillors)

Chernihiv

58.93%

Berestyn

58.30%

Vilniansk

57.69%

Konotop

57.37%

Bessarabska

54.81%

The practical consequences of low attendance are already becoming apparent in the work of certain councils. For example, in the Mykolaiv City Council (average attendance — 64.13%), meetings were repeatedly disrupted, suspended, or postponed during 2025 due to a lack of votes or a quorum. In particular, in June 2025, a plenary session was ended prematurely due to the lack of the necessary number of votes to pass resolutions. In September 2025, councillors were unable to continue the session on several occasions due to an insufficient number of members present. At the end of 2025, the session was extended due to the lack of a quorum, and in January 2026, a break was announced during the meeting for the same reason.

We recorded similar cases in the Chernihiv and Vilniansk city communities, where individual sessions did not take place due to the lack of a quorum. This indicates that even a formally competent council may temporarily lose its ability to perform its representative functions.

The situation in the Bessarabska settlement council requires a separate legal analysis. According to the materials provided, at least three of its plenary sessions took place with only half of the council members present. As stated in the minutes of the meetings, the quorum was effectively ensured by counting the presence of the settlement head. At the same time, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine”, a council session is deemed to have a quorum provided that more than half of the total number of councillors are present at the plenary meeting, rather than the councillors together with the council head. This practice may indicate that meetings are being held without the quorum required by law, and decisions adopted at such meetings may be challenged or cancelled.

An analysis of meeting formats shows that most councils operate in an offline mode. Fully remote sessions are held only occasionally (for example, by the Sumy and Novhorod-Siverskyi councils). Some councils (Dnipro, Bohodukhiv, Okhtyrka) use a hybrid format, whilst others (Mykolaiv) are gradually transitioning from online meetings to a hybrid format.

The Zaporizhzhia City Council provides for the possibility of determining an alternative venue for a session by council decision, depending on the security situation. This approach allows the representative body to continue working in person even under the threat of shelling and effectively serves as an alternative to a complete switch to online mode.

A separate group consists of councils that practise a hybrid approach: some meetings are held in person, and others remotely or in a hybrid format. These include, for example, the councils of the Podilsk and Bolhrad communities. At the same time, a significant proportion of council regulations still do not provide for remote participation by councillors or restrict it. As a result, ensuring the attendance of councillors, particularly those serving in the Ukrainian Defence Forces, can be extremely difficult.

The data obtained indicates that some councils are operating with an unstable quorum, and in certain communities situations are already arising where it is impossible to make decisions. Thus, a key challenge for local government in the context of a long-running war remains not only the preservation of mandates, but also ensuring that councillors participate in the work of representative bodies.

APPENDIX. List of councils studied

Chernihiv Oblast: Koriukivka, Nizhyn, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv city councils.

Chernivtsi Oblast: Kelmentsi Settlement Council.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: Dnipro, Kamianske, Pavlohrad, Pokrovsk, Samariv, and Synelnykove City Councils.

Kharkiv Oblast: Berestyn, Bohodukhiv, Zlatopil, Zmiiv, and Lozova City Councils; Novopokrovka Settlement Council.

Khmelnytskyi Oblast: Shepetivka City Council.

Kirovohrad Oblast: Oleksandriia City Council.

Kyiv Oblast: Boryspil City Council.

Mykolaiv Oblast: Bashtanka, Mykolaiv and Pervomaisk City Councils; Bereznehuvate Settlement Council.

Odesa Oblast: Berezivka, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, Biliaivka, Bolhrad, Izmail, Odesa, Podilsk, Rozdilna, and Chornomorsk city councils; Bessarabska settlement council; Shabo village council.

Sumy Oblast: Konotop, Okhtyrka, Romny, Sumy, and Shostka City Councils.

Vinnytsia Oblast: Zhmerynka City Council.

Zakarpattia Oblast: Poliana Village Council.

Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Vilniansk and Zaporizhzhia City Councils.

Zhytomyr Oblast: Zviahel and Korosten City Councils.