Summary. Conclusions and Recommendations

Since the end of World War II and the signing of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties, there have been no instances in the history of resolving international armed conflicts where interstate peace agreements or treaties involving one state ceding part of its territory to another party in the conflict were approved via referendum. Any legitimization of the use of force to seize another state's territory would encourage potential aggressors to expand their borders through military means and to secure legal recognition of those gains from the victim of aggression under duress. This would set a dangerous precedent, likely leading to violations of the UN Charter and states' international obligations regarding good-neighborly relations, borders, and security. Such a development threatens the European and global security architecture, undermining the principle of the inviolability of borders enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. 

Ukraine's Constitution allows changes to its territory, subject to approval by the all-Ukrainian referendum. It also enshrines the principle of territorial integrity and prohibits any encroachment on it. Since only the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has the authority to provide official interpretations of the Constitution, it must clarify whether an international treaty can formalize Ukraine's cession of part of its territory. The Court's ruling on the relevant constitutional provisions must precede the signing of any international treaties that would limit Ukraine's sovereignty over part of its territory.

Beyond resolving ambiguities in interpreting these provisions, the Constitution and the Law "On the All-Ukrainian Referendum" assign the Constitutional Court a leading role at all stages of scheduling and conducting a nationwide referendum, enabling constitutional oversight. At the request of the President, at least 45 MPs, or the Cabinet of Ministers, the Court can issue an opinion on whether an international treaty involving territorial changes complies with the Constitution. If constitutional proceedings are opened, the referendum process including its scheduling are suspended until the Court delivers its opinion. The Court can also declare unconstitutional a law ratifying such a treaty after referendum approval, a Verkhovna Rada resolution scheduling the referendum, or the law governing the referendum procedures itself. Any such ruling would halt the referendum or effectively invalidate its outcome. 

However, the Constitutional Court faces an institutional crisis that casts doubt on its ability to issue timely decisions. Five of its 18 judicial positions remain vacant. By November 2026, vacancies could rise to six due to one judge's term expiring. Decisions require support from at least 10 judges. Sharp divisions among judges on politically sensitive issues (including the content of a territorial treaty) could delay or prevent a ruling on the treaty's constitutionality (legally due within 30 days of receipt). In the latter case, a referendum on territorial changes would simply become impossible. Thus, filling all five vacant judicial positions is the essential first step before signing any international treaty on territorial changes. 

A law ratifying an international treaty on territorial issues must be adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, signed by the President, and enter legal force only after referendum approval. 

A nationwide referendum on territorial changes cannot meet international standards without a sustained ceasefire. Ongoing Russian military aggression destroys electoral and other infrastructure, leads to mass displacement of voters, prevents accurate counting of Ukrainian voters abroad, blocks the creation of additional election precincts abroad, and hinders voting for millions of displaced citizens. It also precludes security risk assessments, redrawing of precinct boundaries (to limit each to no more than 2,500 voters), safe campaigning, as well as voting for approximately 300,000 service members on active duty. 

A sustained ceasefire must cover the entire referendum process (60 days before voting and at least 30 days afterward to establish results) and preparatory measures lasting approximately 6 to 9 months. Amid security threats, infrastructure damage, and mass displacement, conducting these preparations and securing budget funding would be difficult. Even with a sustained ceasefire, a referendum held under martial law and its associated restrictions on rights and freedoms would only partially meet international standards. Full compliance requires lifting martial law-related curbs on political and civil rights. 

Preparations must include either comprehensive amendments to the Law "On the All-Ukrainian Referendums" or a one-time ad hoc law tailored to a territorial referendum. In either case, changes must address war-related challenges (e.g., risks of information interference by the aggressor state into referendum campaigning, including through disinformation, cyberattacks, and security threats) while upholding universal and equal suffrage and conditions for free expression of voters' will. 

Introducing postal or electronic voting under martial law and ongoing threats is premature and unjustified. If multi-day in-person voting is legislated, its constitutionality - along with other possible controversial provisions - should be reviewed by the Constitutional Court well in advance of the beginning of the referendum process. 

In preparation, the Central Election Commission (CEC) must update and audit the State Voter Register (SVR). Without this, voter lists will be incomplete or inaccurate, and results unreliable as referendum is deemed valid only if at least 50% of registered voters voted. Given current discrepancies due to displacement, achieving such turnout is unlikely and risks invalidating the referendum. The CEC must also assess voting risks, infrastructure status, redraw precinct boundaries and create new precincts (including abroad), estimate costs, and run voter information campaigns. These preparations will take at least 6 - 9 months.

The existing turnout quorum (requiring participation by at least half of registered voters for validity) does not fully align with Venice Commission recommendations. However, high risks of aggressor-state interference and potential public rejection of a minority-approved outcome provide strong arguments for retaining it.

The ratification process and referendum scheduling/conduct could be blocked by Parliament (failing to pass the ratification law or scheduling resolution) or by the Constitutional Court (delaying or withholding a constitutionality opinion, or striking down the scheduling resolution, provisions of the referendum law, ad hoc legislation, or the ratified treaty). Negotiators, Parliament, and the Court must ensure timely compliance with legal procedures. 

Holding the referendum concurrently with presidential elections is possible but carries both benefits and significant risks. Legislation must maximize procedural alignment, synchronize scheduling decisions, prevent administrative resource abuse, and guarantee equal opportunities for supporters and opponents of the referendum question. 

 

The overall sequence for preparing, signing, ratifying, and holding a referendum on territorial changes should include the following steps: 

 

  1. Filling the five (potentially even six) vacant judge positions at the Constitutional Court of Ukraine by the President, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Congress of Judges of Ukraine.
  2. Filing a constitutional petition by the President of Ukraine, at least 45 MPs, the Supreme Court, or the Ombudsman to the Constitutional Court seeking for official clarification of the Constitution's provisions on changes to Ukraine's territory, particularly regarding the possibility of concluding an international treaty renouncing such territory; adoption of the decision on the official clarification of the relevant constitutional provisions by the Constitutional Court.
  3. Preparation of legislative amendments to address war-related challenges for holding a nationwide referendum on territorial change in an open and inclusive manner; adoption of these amendments by Parliament and signing by the President; preparation of a draft international treaty on territorial change by members of Ukraine's negotiating team; holding preliminary consultations with constitutional law experts on its constitutionality, and coordination of the draft treaty with leaders of parliamentary factions and groups to ensure ratification.
  4. Signing of the international treaty on territorial change and an agreement on a sustainable and complete ceasefire (for the entire period of treaty ratification, referendum preparation and conduct, and determination of its results) by authorized representatives of Ukraine and Russia; commencement of preparatory measures for the referendum by the Central Election Commission and other state authorities (updating and auditing the SRV, conducting security and electoral infrastructure assessments, reviewing the referendum precinct boundaries and establishing precincts abroad, etc.).
  5. Submission of a draft law on ratification of the international treaty by the President or the Cabinet of Ministers to the Verkhovna Rada; filing a request to the Constitutional Court for an opinion on its constitutionality by at least 45 MPs, by President or Cabinet of Ministers; completion of referendum preliminary preparations by the CEC and other state bodies; adoption of the ratification law by the Verkhovna Rada (once Constitutional Court's opinion on constitutionality of the treaty is delivered); signing the ratification law by the President; scheduling the all-Ukrainian referendum by Parliament.
  6. Organization of the referendum campaign by the CEC, voting, vote counting and establishment of referendum results; official publication and entry into force of the international treaty on territorial change in case of approval of the ratification law in the referendum.
  7. Implementation of the ratified international treaty approved by all-Ukrainian referendum.

 

Introduction

For a long time, Ukraine's official stance was that elections cannot be held under martial law, as they are explicitly prohibited by the Constitution or laws. This position was repeatedly stated by the President in press conferences, interviews, and the November 19, 2024, annual address to Parliament; endorsed by all parliamentary factions in the 2023 Jean Monnet Dialogue conclusions; and reflected in two Verkhovna Rada resolutions.

In December 2025, under U.S. pressure, the President shifted, acknowledging the possibility of presidential elections under martial law if "proper, dignified, and democratic" conditions and voter safety can be ensured. Between December 23 and 27, 2025, amid talks on a 20-point Peace Plan to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, the President made statements to journalists and in interviews about a possible referendum on a peace agreement, including territorial issues. His position boiled down to:

  • no referendum needed if fighting stops and de facto borders along the current line of contact are fixed;
  • a free economic zone under international control would require referendum approval;
  • ratification by Parliament could serve as an alternative to a referendum;
  • a referendum would require at least a 60-day ceasefire and secure organization; and
  • it could be held simultaneously with presidential elections. 

 

On December 28, 2025, the President also floated the idea of a referendum on the 20-point "Peace Plan" as the basis for a Ukraine-Russia agreement.

The Law "On the All-Ukrainian Referendums" defines four types of the referendums: on constitutional amendments, on territorial changes, on issues of national importance, and on repealing a particular law or its specific provisions.

A Peace Plan or its provisions could qualify as issues of national importance. This referendum can only be initiated by voters who must collect at least 3 million voter signatures to have the referendum scheduled by president. However, even if the "Peace Plan" is approved by referendum, Parliament would still need to schedule a separate referendum to ratify a territorial treaty. Holding a separate preliminary referendum on the "Peace Plan" can hardly be considered feasible approach for several other reasons:

  •  the Law "On the All-Ukrainian Referendum" allows for the simultaneous creation of multiple referendum initiative groups, each of which may propose one referendum on differently worded questions. For example, one group could collect signatures in support of putting the Peace Plan to a referendum, while another could oppose specific points in the Plan. If each group collects at least 3,000,000 signatures, the President would be obligated to call one referendum on each initiative. In addition to that, an initiative supporting the Peace Plan might collect the required signatures later than competing ones and referendum on Peace Plan in this case would be held later than a competing referendum. Furthermore, if referendums are held on mutually exclusive initiatives, they may end up with contradictory decisions (e.g., approving the Peace Plan in one referendum while rejecting a specific point of the Plan in another);
  • if the Peace Plan is rejected in a referendum or the referendum is deemed invalid due to failure to meet a turnout quorum (50% of all the voters registered in the State Registry of Voters, SRV), peace negotiations would effectively be blocked;
  • after approval of the plan by referendum, participants in the negotiation process may need to make certain amendments. Holding new referendums after every clarification or change to the Plan would be simply impractical; and
  • approval of the Peace Plan in a referendum does not necessarily means that Parliament will ratify the resulting peace treaty by of 226 MP votes. The content of a peace treaty is politically sensitive, and securing 226 votes for its ratification is not assured.

Therefore, territorial changes can only be confirmed via referendum approval of a parliamentary-passed, presidential-signed ratification law for the relevant international treaty.

The main challenges related to preparing, conducting, and validating such a referendum are explained below.

 

1. Lack of Legal Clarity on the Possibility of Ukraine Voluntarily Renouncing Territory

In its September 2025 opinion prepared by the OPORA Civil Network on the possibility of Ukraine voluntarily renouncing part of its territory, it was noted that the Constitution does not provide a clear answer to whether Ukraine may voluntarily give up its territory.

Under the Constitution and the Law “On Nationwide Referendum,” the issue of changing Ukraine’s territory is decided exclusively by nationwide referendum. On the other hand, the Constitution declares Ukraine’s territory whole and inviolable, bases the country’s territorial structure on the principle of integrity of state territory, and prohibits constitutional amendments that violate territorial integrity. The Law “On Nationwide Referendum” states that issues aimed at violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity cannot be put to referendum. If violating territorial integrity cannot be the subject of draft constitutional amendments, it cannot be the subject of any normative legal acts, including international treaties.

Therefore, the relationship between the concepts of “change of territory” (which may be put to referendum) and “violation of territorial integrity” (which may not) remains unresolved.

Possible interpretations include:

  • permitting territorial exchanges or expansion but not secession or transfer of territory; or
  • permitting any changes to territory (exchange, expansion, reduction) but not unlawful changes carried out without following the established procedure (which would constitute “violation of territorial integrity”).

Only the Constitutional Court has the authority to provide an official interpretation of these concepts. Without its decision, the ambiguity creates several risks:

  • the risk that an international treaty on territorial change, once signed, is declared unconstitutional - if the Court decides that the Constitution allows expansion or exchange but not reduction or loss of sovereignty over territory; and
  • the risk of criminal liability under Article 110 of the Criminal Code for the person signing the treaty on behalf of Ukraine (the President or an authorized representative) for encroachment on territorial integrity.

Before signing an international treaty on changing Ukraine’s territory, the President, at least 45 MPs, the Supreme Court, or the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights must request the Constitutional Court’s official interpretation of the terms “change of Ukraine’s territory” and “violation of territorial integrity.” The treaty may be signed on behalf of Ukraine only after receiving the Court’s decision. 

 

2. Dysfunctionality of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine

The Constitution and the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” assign the Constitutional Court a key role at all stages of resolving issues related to changing Ukraine’s territory. In addition to providing official interpretation of the permissibility of voluntary cession of territory, the Court is also authorized to assess the constitutionality of: 

  • the signed international treaty on territorial change submitted for parliamentary ratification (request of the Court’s opinion on its constitutionality is mandatory);
  • the parliament’s resolution scheduling the nationwide referendum (if challenged);
  • the ratification law after referendum approval (if challenged); and
  • the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” or any special law governing the referendum on territorial change (if challenged).

Without the Constitutional Court’s opinion on the treaty’s compliance with the Constitution, the ratification law cannot be considered, and the referendum cannot be scheduled or held. If the Court declares the parliamentary resolution scheduling the referendum unconstitutional (e.g., due to procedural violations), the entire preparation process is halted and can only restart after a new resolution. If the Court declares the referendum-approved ratification law unconstitutional, it effectively annuls the referendum result, forcing Parliament to restart the ratification process anew.

Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court is in an institutional crisis: it operates with only 13 of 18 judges with possible new vacant seat emerging in November 2026. Decisions require support from at least 10 judges. The likelihood of losing quorum and the risk of inability to decide complex or politically sensitive issues (including voluntary cession of territory, treaty constitutionality, or scheduling the referendum) are high with nearly one-third of seats vacant.

Resolving key issues related to territorial change requires completing the appointment of vacant judges under the quotas of the President (1 seat), Verkhovna Rada, and Congress of Judges (2 seats each). The Court’s full composition must be in place before it receives a constitutional request seeking to officially interpret territorial provisions and before any treaty on territorial change is signed.

 

3. Procedural Challenges Related to Scheduling and Holding the Nationwide Referendum

3.1. Lengthy Preliminary Preparations 

In the Conclusions of the Ninth Jean Monnet Dialogue in 2023, representatives of parliamentary factions and groups agreed that national elections should have sufficient preparation time - at least 6 months after the end of martial law. Since election and referendum procedures are similar, referendum preparations will also require at least 6 months, unless held simultaneously with presidential elections. At minimum, the following are needed:

  • adopting necessary legislation:
  • preparing and passing amendments to the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” (or a special one-time law) that address war-related challenges;
  • adopting a law specifying grounds for not holding the referendum in certain areas due to lack of security or other conditions, for suspending preparations in certain areas, or for annulling results if they cannot be reliably established;
  • updating and auditing the SRV database;
  • assessing security and other risks for holding the referendum across Ukraine, auditing polling station premises and equipment needs;
  • based on updated SRV data - reviewing precinct boundaries, terminating non-functional precincts (i.e. precincts without voters and/or electoral infrastructure), and creating new precincts (including abroad);
  • estimating referendum costs and preparing budget amendments (to be adopted when the referendum is scheduled); and
  • conducting a voter awareness campaign on the importance of participation (the referendum is valid only if at least half of registered voters take part), registration procedures, and other key processes.

These measures cannot be completed quickly, and most require a sustained ceasefire. 

Work on possible amendments to the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” has not yet begun. On 22 December 2025, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada established a Working Group to prepare changes to presidential election legislation. Even if the group simultaneously prepares referendum changes, such work - based on past experience - will take at least two months (with Working Group meetings held every two weeks) plus at least one month for parliamentary consideration and adoption.

The CEC restored full operation of the State Register of Voters on 23 December 2025, allowing voters to update their details online. However, systematic updating still requires:

  • restoration of state bodies that provide voter data in areas where their operations were suspended;
  • updating data for voters on temporarily occupied territories after 24 February 2022;
  • an active CEC awareness campaigns encouraging voters to update their own data; and
  • determining electoral addresses for nearly 1.4 million voters whose addresses are unknown and who therefore cannot vote.

The European Commission has stressed the need for a public audit of the register - one of four electoral reform priorities. Without updating and auditing the SRV, the CEC cannot adjust precinct boundaries or create new precincts, and referendum results cannot be reliably established as to be valid referendum requires participation of at least 50% of the registered voters. Problems with voter registration or significant inaccuracies on voter lists on voting day could undermine the results and discredit the CEC itself. Updating and auditing will likely take at least 6 months and require a ceasefire.

Boundary adjustments and new precinct creation can only follow Register updating and may be combined with security and infrastructure assessments. Even with efficient coordination between the CEC and other state agencies, these measures will take at least 3 months and also require a sustained ceasefire.

Overall, preparatory measures will take at least 6 to 9 months and must be completed before the official referendum campaign starts. 

 

3.2. Possibilities for Blocking the Scheduling and Holding of the Referendum After Signing an International Treaty on Territorial Change

After signing a treaty on territorial change, the President or Government must submit the ratification bill to Parliament simultaneously with a request to the Constitutional Court on the treaty’s constitutionality. The procedure is complicated but generally meets international standards (including the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums). Details are provided in Annex 1.

Key blocking risks include:

  • failure or significant delay by the Constitutional Court in issuing an opinion on the treaty’s constitutionality (statutory 30-day deadline is not guaranteed, especially with five vacant seats and previous track record whereby Court failed to consider 70+ cases prior to 6-month deadline, with 20+ cases pending since 2015-2020);
  • declaring the treaty unconstitutional (e.g., due to possible wording inconsistent with the Constitution or due to possible violation of the constitutional rights by the treaty);
  • declaring amendments to the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” or a special law unconstitutional (in particular if they introduce multiple voting days or other new procedures with questionable constitutionality);
  • parliament refusing to adopt the ratification law or scheduling resolution (territorial concessions are politically sensitive, while certain opposition factions do not support territorial concessions);
  • lack of adequate funding due to ineffective planning or for other reasons;
  • declaring the scheduling resolution unconstitutional (unlikely but possible due to procedural violations); and
  • declaring the referendum-approved ratification law unconstitutional (unlikely unless procedural violations occur).

Mitigating these risks requires transparency in negotiations, public awareness campaigns, filling Court vacant seats, prioritizing relevant cases by the Constitutional Court, pre-signing consultations with constitutional law experts and former Constitutional Court judges, ceasefire for preparation and funding, and strict adherence to constitutional and parliamentary procedures while considering and adopting ratification law. 

 

4. Compliance of the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” with War-Related Challenges

The Constitution does not prohibit holding a referendum under martial law - the prohibition is provided for by the Law “On Martial Law” and the Law “On Nationwide Referendum.” Removing these prohibitions from the both law would pave the way to a referendum under martial law.

According to the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums, referendums must follow the same principles as elections, i.e. universal, equal, free, and secret suffrage, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and procedural guarantees.

The Law “On Nationwide Referendum” was adopted before Russia’s full-scale invasion and does not address war-related challenges, casting doubt on whether a referendum can meet international standards and enjoy trust domestically and internationally.

 

4.1. Ensuring Universal and Equal Suffrage

Estimates indicate 5–7.5 million Ukrainian citizens are abroad, 880,000–990,000 are in the Armed Forces, 4.6 million are internally displaced, and over 3.4 million have disabilities (up 600,000 since the full-scale invasion). Without their participation, the referendum cannot be considered compliant with universal and equal suffrage.

Current law allows overseas polling stations only at diplomatic missions and military units abroad. Despite sharp increases in Ukrainian citizens in countries like Germany, Poland, and Czechia, the number of overseas stations has not changed (e.g., 1.5 million Ukrainians in Poland share four stations - nearly 375,000 per station). Physically enabling voting for such numbers on one day is impossible. Creating additional stations outside diplomatic premises requires host country consent, time, funding, security, and logistical arrangements - difficult amid active combat and migration. 

Service members (over 300,000 on combat duties) cannot leave positions to vote at regular stations, and creating special stations at their locations would make them targets and lack transparency, contrary to European practice and the Venice Commission Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters. 

Internally displaced persons and others face overcrowded precincts (some exceeding the 2,500-voter limit) and accessibility issues. Voters without registered addresses (1.4 million) need simplified address change procedures to be able to vote. Persons with disabilities face worsened station accessibility.

Ensuring universal and equal suffrage during active hostilities with current procedures is impossible; even with a ceasefire but retained martial-law constitutional rights restrictions, it would still be limited. In addition, postal or electronic voting lacks necessary security and other preconditions (see below).

Failure to enable participation by millions of voters in referendum could render the referendum invalid due to failure to meet turnout quorum or make its results highly questionable.

 

4.2. Ensuring Fundamental Rights and Conditions for Free Expression of Will

Martial law restricts the key constitutional rights such as freedom of movement, expression, and peaceful assembly. The European Commission’s 2025 report found these restrictions proportionate and did not question their continuation. Lifting them amid active combat, deteriorating security, shelling, disinformation, and cyberattacks is not feasible. These restrictions severely limit campaigning - public events, media use, meetings - hindering free formation of voters’ will. A referendum held under martial law, even with a ceasefire, would still contradict international standards and raise doubts about result credibility. 

 

4.3. Lack of Security and Other Conditions for Introducing Alternative Voting Methods (Postal, Electronic, etc.)

Given difficulties enabling in-person voting for service members and voters abroad under martial law, some politicians have proposed postal or electronic voting. In December 2025, the President expressed support for electronic voting in the context of possible presidential elections. However:

  • such methods under retained fundamental rights restrictions would still not ensure free campaigning or overall referendum compliance with international standards;
  • high cyber and external interference risks could distort referendum results;
  • certain voter groups (elderly) may struggle with new methods, requiring extensive awareness traditional-media campaigns targeting respective groups;
  • public acceptance is mixed (38% supported electronic voting nationally in 2024; abroad, 68% trusted electronic, 48% postal in 2023);
  • offering postal/electronic voting abroad but not to voters in Russia or occupied territories would violate equal suffrage; allowing it risks manipulation and fraud;
  • electronic voting is rare in Europe (only Estonia); others have abandoned pilots due to trust and verifiability issues; and
  • Ukraine lacks conditions for secure, reliable postal or electronic voting meeting Venice Commission standards (no intimidation or fraud for postal; secure, secret, transparent, verifiable for electronic).

Multi-day in-person voting can be a solution for voters who will not be able to vote in one day (refugees, military personnel etc.) but it casts constitutional doubts (elections must be held in one day on Sunday; this requirement is not applied to referendum by the Constitution, but the Constitutional Court may rule that rules for voting in one day on Sunday must apply to both elections and referenda) and new challenges (secure storage during multiple days, need to compile vote counting protocols every day etc.) difficult to address without a ceasefire. 

 

4.4. Other Challenges

The current law does not address possible difficulties in staffing referendum commissions due to the lack of candidacies to fill the commission seats, training members (the law has never been applied since adoptions), providing suitable premises, equipment, power backups, internet, etc. to the commissions. Risks also include voting disruptions due to security deterioration, aggressor-state information interference (disinformation, cyberattacks), insecure ballot transport, misuse of administrative resources, or lack of observation conditions. This is not an exhaustive list.

Creating proper conditions requires either comprehensive amendments to the Law “On Nationwide Referendum” or a special one-time law. The latter seems more justified, as war-related challenges will diminish after hostilities end. However, even with a special law, holding a referendum aligned with the international standards during active combat is almost impossible; with a ceasefire but retained martial-law rights restrictions, it remains very difficult. 

 

5. Challenges Related to Declaring the Nationwide Referendum Invalid

Under the current law, the ratification law is not approved if fewer than half of registered voters participate (referendum invalid) or if fewer than most of participants vote in favour. Accurate voter numbers require prior comprehensive SRV updating and audit.

The turnout quorum does not fully align with Venice Commission guidance, which discourages turnout thresholds and allows approval thresholds only for issues of fundamental constitutional importance. Most European states have no turnout quorum for national referendums (only seven do, with three having abolished or reduced them). 

Retaining the quorum has pros and cons. Recent polls show mixed public views on territorial concessions. Therefore, the main risk is a high chance of invalidity due to boycott by opponents of territorial concessions.

Although retaining the turnout quorum does not fully meet international standards, risks of aggressor-state interference and potential societal rejection of a low-turnout result are strong arguments for keeping it at least for a territorial-change referendum. Parliament, the President, and CEC should conduct an information campaign on the importance of participation and consequences of abstention. The Law “On Nationwide Referendum” should be amended to allow a repeat referendum on the same issue sooner than one year after an invalid result. Peace negotiations must also address the risk of non-approval of territorial concessions, uncertainty from unpredictable outcome, and next steps if the referendum is invalid.

 

6. Challenges Associated with Approving Territorial Change on a Nationwide Referendum

Since the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties, border revisions following armed conflicts have been exceptional (1979 Egypt-Israel, 1951 San Francisco, 1990 Two Plus Four Treaty on Germany). Most major 20th-century interstate conflicts ended with return to pre-war borders, minor exchanges, or de facto lines without mutual legal recognition.

Fixing Ukraine’s territorial losses in a treaty approved by referendum would create two major precedents:

  • return to interwar practice of stronger states forcing territorial concessions or partitioning weaker ones; and
  • departure from recognized principles of border inviolability, prohibition of threat or use of force against territorial integrity, and illegality of territorial acquisitions by force (UN Charter Article 2(4), 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1990 Charter of Paris).

Therefore, internationally, referendum approval of territorial change in a peace settlement would mean:

  • undermining the European security architecture built on the 1975 Helsinki principle of border inviolability;
  • creating conditions for future UN Charter violations and further erosion of the international law;
  • allowing impunity for use of force against any state’s territorial integrity; and
  • enabling coerced legalization of border revisions through pressure on one party to legally recognize them. 

 

7. Challenges Associated with Holding Presidential Elections and the Nationwide Referendum on Territorial Change Simultaneously

Commenting on possible presidential elections under martial law, the President did not rule out holding them together with the territorial referendum. Simultaneous conduct has advantages and disadvantages.

Key advantages include:

  • cost savings through shared procedures;
  • joint resolution of organizational challenges;
  • simultaneous certainty on presidential legitimacy and peace settlement outcome;
  • potential higher turnout on each due to the other;
  • reduced campaign costs for presidential candidates; and
  • single ceasefire agreement covering both.

 

Key disadvantages include:

  • increased workload for commissions and courts;
  • synchronization difficulties (referendum can be scheduled only if the international treaty on territorial cession is recognized constitutional by the Constitutional Court; no such requirements are in place for scheduling presidential election);
  • prolonged vote counting and interdependent results (e.g. if presidential voting results are invalidated at certain polling station, invalidation would likely affect referendum results);
  • difficulty ensuring balanced commission representation from among presidential candidates’ nominees, supporters and opponents to referendum question;
  • doubled individual voting time, risking queues, fraud and secrecy breaches;
  • overcrowded polling stations;
  • doubled counting time;
  • heightened risk of administrative resource misuse (incumbent as both candidate and treaty signatory); and
  • complicated oversight, including oversight of campaign finance. 

Key advantages are higher likelihood of ceasefire for both election and referendum, as well as budget savings. However, simultaneous conduct requires legal safeguards minimizing administrative resource influence and ensuring international standards.

 

Annex 1. Procedure for Scheduling, Holding, and Establishing Results of a Nationwide Referendum on Changing Ukraine’s Territory under the Constitution and Current Ukrainian Laws

  1. Signing by the President or authorized representative of an international treaty on territorial change.
  2. Submission by the President or Government of the ratification bill to Parliament together with a mandatory request to the Constitutional Court on the treaty’s constitutionality.
  3. The Court opens proceedings and automatically suspends scheduling until its opinion. Parliament may also postpone consideration.
  4. The Court must issue its opinion within 30 days.
  5.  If positive—Parliament considers and adopts the ratification law, signed by the Speaker and sent to the President. If negative—process terminates.
  6. After presidential signature—Parliament immediately adopts resolution scheduling the referendum
  7. Parliament immediately adopts budget amendments for funding no later than next day after resolution is adopted.
  8. Referendum process begins next day after publication of the resolution. Any authorized subject may challenge the resolution’s constitutionality; if declared unconstitutional, process halts.
  9. Voting occurs on the last Sunday of the 60-day period.
  10. CEC establishes results and declares the ratification law approved or not (not approved if turnout <50% or <50%+1 vote in support).
  11. Results announced within 5 days unless challenged.
  12. Approved law published within 5 days.
  13. Approved law enters into force 10 days later or as specified in the law itself.
  14. Challenge to the approved law’s constitutionality possible at any time.
  15. Repeat referendum on the same issue only after one year if previously not approved.

This material was funded under the international development programme of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; however, the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.