Analytical note on alternative legislative initiatives to change electoral systems for local and parliamentary elections

This article was created within the "Advancing Democratic Integrity and Governance in Ukraine” project, which is implemented by Civil Network OPORA with the support of the EU. Its contents are the sole responsibility of  Civil Network OPORA and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

On July 10, 2025, a group of people's deputies from the “Batkivshchyna” and “Servant of the People” factions registered draft law No. 13464, which provides for changes in the organization of the preparation and conduct of elections of people's deputies of Ukraine and local elections. Civil Network OPORA has prepared an analysis of this legislative initiative, assessing the potential consequences of the proposed changes.

After the registration of the main draft law, five more alternative draft laws were registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which propose different, sometimes radically different, approaches to the organization of parliamentary and local elections. OPORA has prepared an overview of these proposals.

A general analysis of the alternative draft laws allowed us to identify several systemic trends and common shortcomings. First, it is critically important that the vast majority of initiatives do not take into account the consequences of full-scale war, particularly the multi-million internal and external migrations, as well as the security challenges (terrorist threats, the risk of mine-laying at polling stations, the prevalence of disinformation, and cyberattacks).

Instead, these draft laws are aimed at finding situational advantages for certain political players, either by guaranteeing mandates for candidates important to the party and popular personalities, or by trying to return to the majoritarian system. At the same time, some of the proposed models are formally based on proportional representation, but contain mechanisms that allow parties to gain disproportionate advantages. Second, these draft laws were developed without proper communication and consultation with civil society and among the parliamentary political forces themselves. As a result, almost all draft laws (except for No. 13464-1) do not comply with the political agreements on electoral systems (post-war elections should be held on the basis of the current Electoral Code, with the preservation of the systems provided for national and local elections as a basis), reached during the IX Jean Monnet Dialogue.

The proposals regarding changes to the thresholds for applying electoral systems at the local level, as well as the determination of the number of candidates in electoral districts proportional to the number of voters, are not based on current or representative data and are not supported by appropriate modelling.

Additionally, the draft laws do not provide effective solutions to ensure the participation of independent candidates under the proportional system, which contradicts the Venice Commission's recommendations and overlooks the popularity of self-nomination. In the 2020 local elections in communities with up to 10,000 voters, 32% of all candidates ran as self-nominated.

Electoral engineering in the context of a full-scale war should be based on realistic assessments, scenario modelling, and an analysis of long-term consequences. 

Legislative initiatives in the electoral sphere should be part of a systematic and inclusive preparation process, not the result of situational political interests. Only high-quality, depoliticized, and professional work on reforming the legal framework will meet international standards, public expectations, and contribute to increased trust in the electoral process.

Below, we will examine the innovations of the alternative draft laws and the aspects of the electoral process they address, and assess the potential consequences of the proposed changes.

What do alternative draft laws provide for?

• In general, alternatives to draft law №13464 (proposed by the group of MPs from the “Batkivshchyna” and “Servant of the People” factions) focus primarily on modifying the electoral systems for parliamentary and local elections. The proposed novelties influence the mechanics of these systems, particularly by regulating the distribution of mandates, electoral thresholds, the openness of party lists, and the advancement of candidates within them in various ways.
• In terms of regulating parliamentary elections, a common feature of all draft laws is their focus on personalities who have their own electoral base in the regions. On the one hand, the authors likely seek to consider the interests of “majoritarians” (MPs elected through the majoritarian system), who comprise half of the current parliament, and to garner their support when revising the electoral legislation for the post-war elections. On the other hand, it may be about creating conditions under which the electoral system will be attractive to potential candidates with high ratings and financial means who can join the new political projects of the authors of the initiatives. In addition, most draft laws include mechanisms that provide parties with disproportionate advantages for controlling the distribution of mandates
• Draft law No. 13464-1, authored by Oleksandr Kachura ("Servant of the People" faction), proposes to maintain the proportional system with open lists but to lower the electoral threshold for parties from 5% to 3%. This step can lead to greater fragmentation of parliament, but would promote a broader representation of political forces. Additionally, it abolishes the nine guaranteed mandates on the nationwide list, leaving only one. This means that only the top candidates from parties that clear the threshold will receive guaranteed mandates, while other candidates will enter parliament either through competition in regional lists or by their position on the nationwide list. The role of the nationwide list is also strengthened, as the author proposes counting votes cast without specifying a candidate for the nationwide list, similar to the main draft law No. 13464. This reduces the influence of voters on the distribution of mandates in the regions. Furthermore, the draft law eliminates the threshold for a candidate's advancement in the regional lists; instead, candidates will be ranked based on the number of votes they receive.
• Anton Yatsenko, a non-affiliated MP, has registered two draft laws (No. 13464-2 and No. 13464-3), which, although opposite in form, have some common features. Both strengthen personal competition, but at the same time could return the electoral process to a contest of personalities, resources, and party brands.
• Draft law No. 13464-3, authored by unaffiliated MP Anton Yatsenko, proposes a return to a mixed electoral system: 225 deputies would be elected through a majoritarian system in single-member districts, and the remaining 225 through a proportional system with closed party lists. This is an almost complete reproduction of the model used to elect the current parliament in 2019. The only difference is the retention of the current territorial organization for the proportional component (with a nationwide list and regional lists) and the impossibility of self-nomination in majoritarian districts. Under the proportional component for forming the parliament, a voter would lose the ability to influence the order of candidates on the regional list, as they would only be able to vote for a party, not for a specific person. As a result, the party would determine the candidate rankings, rather than the voters. Furthermore, the nationwide list would contain 9 guaranteed mandates for parties that pass the threshold.
• In turn, draft law No. 13464-2 (registered by Anton Yatsenko, unaffiliated MP) proposes a model that could be called “quasi-proportional” with elements of “hidden majoritarianism” and a “flawed” mechanism for distributing the mandates. Despite preserving the current structure of electoral districts, it significantly changes the logic of mandate distribution. In addition to parties that overcome the 5% threshold, individual candidates can also receive seats if they get votes equal to or greater than the electoral quota. In other words, regardless of the party's result, personal support is enough to get into parliament. The structure of the ballot paper will contribute to gaining this level of support, as the voter will only be able to vote for a specific candidate on a party's regional list. The 25% quota for advancing candidates on this list is also abolished, which will have effects similar to a majoritarian system of relative majority. At the same time, the party will retain partial control over the distribution of seats: if the candidate at the top of the regional list does not receive votes at the level of the electoral quota, they will still remain first among those who will participate in the ranking. Separately, the draft law introduces a complex mechanism for the equal redistribution of “unused” votes in favour of all parties that have entered parliament, which reinforces the weight of the national list. As a result, under the guise of a proportional system, a modified model is proposed that will lead to effects characteristic of a majoritarian system and party control over the distribution of seats.
• Draft law No. 13464-5 (by Ihor Vasyliev, “Servant of the People”) follows a similar logic. It proposes giving a seat to candidates from any party who receive at least 1.5 electoral quotas. This approach enables recognizable and popular candidates to capitalize on their support and secure a parliamentary seat, regardless of the outcome of the party they ran with.
• Draft laws No. 13464-2 (by Anton Yatsenko, unaffiliated) and No. 13464-5 (by Ihor Vasyliev, “Servant of the People”) propose a legally ambiguous mechanism for the priority (guaranteed) allocation of seats to candidates who received support at the level of one or one and a half electoral quotas. This construction is likely to contain a critical mathematical error that could lead to parties claiming more seats in the national district than are available for distribution, thereby increasing the potential for conflict in the electoral system.
• For local elections, the alternative draft laws also propose different approaches to the electoral system. The 2020 local elections were held under a proportional system with (partially) open lists — it was used for regional, district, and local councils in communities with more than 10,000 voters. In communities with fewer voters, a majoritarian system was used in multi-member districts, where two to four deputies were elected by a simple majority.
• The authors of the draft laws propose either extending the proportional system with open lists to all levels of local councils, or fully switching to a majoritarian model, or raising the threshold for using the majoritarian system from 10,000 to 30,000 or even 50,000 voters in a community.
• Draft law No. 13464-2 (by Anton Yatsenko, unaffiliated) provides for the exclusive use of a proportional electoral system. Additionally, it mentions the abolition of the guaranteed mandate on a unified partisan list and the abolition of the 25% threshold that candidates must overcome on a territorial list to advance.
• Draft laws No. 13464-1 (by Oleksandr Kachura, :”Servant of the People”) and No. 13464-5 (by Ihor Vasyliev, “Servant of the People”) have similar approaches. Their only difference is the proposed threshold level for applying the majoritarian system: Oleksandr Kachura suggests setting it at up to 30,000 voters, while Ihor Vasyliev suggests up to 50,000. At the same time, both draft laws provide for lowering the electoral threshold for parties from 5% to 3% under a proportional system.
• In contrast, draft law No. 13464-4 (by Alina Zahoruiko, Oksana Dmytriieva, Mariana Bezuhla, Hanna Bondar) provides for a single majoritarian system for all local councils. Nomination in majoritarian multi-member districts is guaranteed for both parties and independent candidates. Parties will be able to nominate candidates to the council in the form of a list specifying the number of the multi-member electoral district in which each candidate is nominated. Additionally, the draft law regulates several organizational aspects, including the possibility of financing by-elections from the state budget's reserve fund, setting different amounts of monetary deposits depending on the level of the council, clarifying the list of necessary documents for candidate registration, and other provisions.

Detailed Analysis of Draft Laws and Assessment of the Potential Consequences of Their Adoption 

Draft Law No, 13464-1

Author: Oleksandr Kachura (“Servant of the People”)

Proposed Changes

Parliamentary election:

• Lowering the electoral threshold: parties whose regional lists of candidates have received 3% or more of the total number of votes within the national constituency acquire the right to participate in the distribution of parliamentary seats.
• Regional lists will consist of the candidates from the nationwide list, except for the party’s No. 1. At the same time, the provision regarding nine guaranteed mandates at the national level is cancelled: only one guaranteed mandate for the No. 1 from the nationwide list is left. 
• Candidates on the regional electoral list will be placed in alphabetical order. At the same time, the 25% threshold of the electoral quota, which is necessary for advancement on the list, is abolished.
• The ballot will contain the name of the party, the last name of the first candidate from the national list, and a full list of candidates from the corresponding regional list with their numbers. Two fields are provided for voting: one for marking the party, the other (with a stencil) for writing the number of the desired candidate from the same party's regional list. The fields are located to the right of the full name of each party—in the same way as the main draft law proposes.
• As in the main draft law, the distribution of seats in the region depends not on the total number of votes for that list, but on the total number of votes cast for individual candidates from that list. Votes cast for a party's regional list without specifying a candidate's number will be distributed at the level of the corresponding party's national list.
• When distributing seats on a party's regional lists, candidates are ranked in descending order by the number of votes they received. If the number of votes is equal, the candidate with a better position on the national list takes a higher place.
• State funding for the statutory activities of parties is extended to parties that received 3% or more of the voter votes in the last parliamentary elections..

Local elections:

• It is proposed to raise the threshold for applying the majoritarian electoral system, extending it to communities with up to 50,000 voters.
• For the proportional system with open lists, the electoral barrier for parties is also lowered to 3%.

OPORA’s Assessment:

• Lowering the barrier to 3% will increase the chances of smaller, new, or niche parties (i.e., those representing specific ideological, professional, or social interests) to enter parliament and local councils. This could lead to greater political pluralism, but at the same time cause fragmentation of parliament, making it difficult to form stable coalitions (majority) and a government. In contrast, a larger number of parties in local councils could lead to their excessive fragmentation, which will complicate the coordination of joint decisions, increase dependence on situational alliances, and raise the risk of delaying or blocking important local issues.
• The abolition of “guaranteed” seats (except for the first candidate on the list) is a positive step toward strengthening the voter's role in determining the personal composition of the council and avoiding an artificial increase of the electoral quota. However, the rule that votes for a party's regional list without specifying a candidate's number are counted as residual and distributed at the national level could increase party control and reduce voters' influence on the distribution of seats in the regions.
• The abolition of the 25% quota for advancement on regional lists, as proposed in the main draft law, could lead to excessive intra-party competition. Establishing a certain minimum “legitimacy barrier” would be a more justified step.
• Discrepancy between gender representation requirements and the alphabetical order of candidates on regional lists. The draft law does not propose changes to the approach to gender quota, as, for example, is provided in the main draft law. This makes adherence to the so-called “zipper quota” (at least two people of each gender in every five-person block of the list) practically impossible when candidates are placed alphabetically on the regional list. This forces parties to select candidates not only by gender but also by last name.
• One of the arguments in favour of using a majoritarian electoral system for local elections in communities with up to 50,000 voters is the position of the Civil Network OPORA, which, back in 2020, opposed the introduction of a proportional system in communities with more than 10,000 voters. At the same time, the author does not consider the consequences of full-scale war, such as the migration of millions and an increase in the number of temporarily occupied communities. In the absence of up-to-date data and modelling, these factors do not provide a proper justification for raising the threshold for using the majoritarian system.
• According to available but potentially outdated data, 95.6% of communities in the territory of Ukraine fully under government control have up to 50,000 voters. About half of all the country's voters are registered in such communities. Raising the threshold for applying the majoritarian electoral system to this level could have systemic negative consequences, including the degradation of the party system at the local level.

Therefore, this draft law encompasses the overwhelming majority of the advantages and disadvantages of the main project, as reflected in the Analytical Note on legislative initiatives to change electoral systems for local and parliamentary elections. In addition, the inconsistency of gender representation requirements with the alphabetical order of candidates on regional lists may be due to haste in its preparation, which only proves the need for a systematic and inclusive (rather than politically situational) approach to the development of post-war electoral legislation.

Draft Law No. 13464-2

Author: Anton Yatsenko (unaffiliated MP)

Proposed Changes

Parliamentary elections:

• The right to participate in the distribution of seats is granted not only to parties that have overcome the 5% barrier but also to individual candidates who have received a number of votes equal to or exceeding the electoral quota—even if they were nominated by parties that did not overcome the threshold.
• A different upper limit on the number of candidates on a regional list is established for each electoral region, but the requirement for a minimum number is abolished.
• Every candidate included on the national electoral list must also be included on one of the regional electoral lists. The 9 guaranteed seats on the national list are abolished.
• The order of candidates on the national list is determined by the party, while candidates on the regional electoral list are placed in alphabetical order.
• Gender requirements. The “zipper quota” approach is maintained for the national list: each group of five candidates must include at least two candidates of each gender. For regional lists, since candidates are placed in alphabetical order and parties no longer determine the sequence, it is proposed to change the “zipper quota” approach and establish a requirement for the representation of one gender at a minimum of 30%.
• Reduction of the monetary deposit for parties from 1,000 minimum wages to 250 minimum wages. A change is introduced so that a deposit made in a smaller amount (with violations) is returned to the party's account instead of being collected by the budget, as provided for in the current legislation. The monetary deposit is also returned to parties if the party and/or a candidate has acquired the right to participate in the distribution of parliamentary seats.
• The ballot will be in the form of a booklet. On one side, the voter will cast their vote, while the other side will contain the name of the party and information about the candidates included in that party's regional electoral list.
• In the ballot for voting within Ukraine, an empty square will be placed to the left of the surname of each candidate included in the party's regional electoral list. In the foreign electoral district, the empty square will be to the left of the full name of each party.
• This means that a voter in Ukraine votes only for a specific candidate. The exceptions are voting in the foreign electoral district, where the ballot will not contain a regional list, and situations where a voter marks more than one candidate from the same party's regional list; in this case, the vote will be counted for the entire regional list of the party.
• The electoral quota is calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast for all electoral lists of candidates from all parties within the national constituency by the number of members of the Verkhovna Rada.
• The number of seats a party receives in the electoral regions is determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in an electoral region for each of the candidates on the corresponding regional electoral list by the electoral quota.
• Distribution of seats on the regional lists of parties that passed the threshold: Candidates on the regional lists who have received a number of votes equal to or greater than the electoral quota are guaranteed to receive a seat as a priority, without participating in further ranking.
• Additionally, candidates from parties that did not pass the threshold but received the same number of votes are entitled to participate in the distribution of parliamentary seats. The total number of unused votes, after accounting for this seat allocation mechanism, is distributed equally among the parties that passed the threshold.
• Distribution of seats on regional lists: The candidate ranked first on the regional list who did not receive a number of votes equal to or greater than the electoral quota is still placed first among those who will participate in the subsequent ranking. Other candidates are ranked based on the number of votes they received. If the number of votes is equal, the candidate determined by the central governing body of the party through a lottery, conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the Central Election Commission (CEC), takes the higher position. The 25% threshold for the electoral quota to change the order of candidates on the regional list is abolished.
• To determine the number of seats to be distributed from the national list, the sum of unused votes at the regional level, votes for the party without support for a specific candidate, and votes from the foreign electoral district is used. The resulting value is divided by the electoral quota.

Local elections:

• Elections for deputies of all local councils (village, settlement, city, district, regional, and deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) are to be held under a proportional system with open party lists. The majoritarian system for communities with up to 10,000 voters is abolished.
• Elections for village, town, and city mayors (in cities with up to 150,000 voters) are to be held under a majoritarian electoral system of relative majority. Elections for city mayors (in cities with 150,000 or more voters) are to be held under a majoritarian electoral system of absolute majority.
• The draft law unifies the approach to nominating candidates: a person running for the office of mayor of a village, town, or city can simultaneously run for the post of deputy of the respective local council and/or district or regional council. Current legislation provides for different conditions of candidates' nomination in communities with more and fewer than 75,000 voters. 
• All candidates from the unified list are distributed among the territorial lists, including the first number. A guaranteed seat for the first number on the unified list is cancelled. The order of candidates on the unified list is determined by the party; in the territorial lists, candidates are placed in alphabetical order. 
• Gender requirements. The “zipper quota” approach is maintained on the unified list: each group of five candidates must include at least two candidates of each gender. For territorial lists, given that candidates are placed in alphabetical order and the party no longer determines their sequence, it is proposed to change the “zipper quota” approach and set a requirement for the representation of one gender at no less than 30%.
• The monetary deposit is being reduced, but two contradictory rules are proposed. On one hand, parties must pay 10% (down from 20%) of the minimum wage for each candidate in elections for village, town, and city councils. On the other hand, it is stipulated that candidates for regional, district, and city district councils, as well as city, town, and village councils, and candidates for city mayor (in cities with over 150,000 voters) must pay a deposit of two (down from four) minimum wages for every 90,000 voters in the respective district.
• It is established that an internally displaced person does not have the right to vote in local elections unless they have changed their electoral address.
• The 25% threshold of the electoral quota for advancement on territorial electoral lists is abolished. Candidates are placed on the territorial electoral list of the corresponding party organization in descending order of the number of votes they received. If the number of votes is equal, the higher position is given to the candidate determined by the central governing body of the party through a lottery conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the CEC.

OPORA’s Assessment: 

• The key shortcoming of this draft law is the complexity and legal ambiguity of the procedure for distributing votes in parliamentary elections, which could lead to a misunderstanding and incorrect application of the proposed changes.
• Candidates who have received a number of votes equal to or exceeding the electoral quota are also granted the right to participate in the distribution of parliamentary seats, even if they were nominated by parties that did not overcome the 5% electoral threshold. The draft law also stipulates that the total number of unused votes, after accounting for this seat allocation mechanism, is distributed in equal parts among the parties that passed the threshold. However, the draft law does not specify at what stage this redistribution of unused votes should occur: during the determination of the number of seats on regional lists or at the level of the nationwide list.
• This approach could lead to parties claiming more seats in the national constituency than are actually available for distribution. This would increase the conflict potential of the electoral system. This situation is caused, in part, by the fact that votes cast for candidates who did not receive a number of votes equivalent to the electoral quota but who are still eligible for seats in the regions through ranking on the relevant list are, in effect, counted twice for the parties that passed the threshold. The first time is during the distribution of seats on regional lists if the party has earned the right to a seat in the region. The second time is when “unused” votes, according to the proposed formula, are distributed equally among the parties that overcame the 5% barrier.
• In addition, the mechanism by which votes for parties that did not pass the threshold are artificially distributed among the winners is disproportionate. This will lead to parties receiving additional votes that are not backed by real voter support, which will distort the election results.
• The draft law effectively introduces a modified parliamentary model that will lead to effects characteristic of a majoritarian system. Candidates from both parties that passed the threshold and those that did not will be able to get seats if they have support at the level of the electoral quota. Therefore, regardless of the party's result, personal support is enough to get into parliament. The structure of the ballot, which will allow voters to vote only for a specific candidate on a party's regional list, will contribute to gaining this level of support. With the abolition of the threshold for advancing other candidates on the list, such a personalized choice will stimulate competition of resources and personalities.
• At the same time, the proposed method of voting for a candidate by placing a mark next to their surname, rather than writing a number, can be considered optimal. According to OPORA’s study “How voters perceive different types of ballot papers to improve the election process”, respondents rated this approach as simpler and easier to understand.
• Like the main draft law No. 13464, the alternative one does not set a minimum limit for the nomination of candidates in the regions, which gives parties the opportunity to manipulate the number of candidates to increase the number of “residual” votes that will be distributed via the closed national list. At the same time, the candidate at the top of the regional list who does not receive a number of votes equal to or greater than the electoral quota is still placed first among those who will participate in the subsequent ranking. This strengthens the party's control over the distribution of seats, negates the voter's influence on the advancement of candidates, and creates conditions for forming the “leader-type” regional lists, where the main focus is placed on the first candidate.
• Similar to the main draft law No. 13464, a complete “proportionalisation” of local elections is proposed, which would significantly increase the influence of political parties even in the smallest communities and limit the participation of non-party local leaders. This approach contradicts Ukraine's international obligations to ensure the possibility of candidate self-nomination. It also does not meet public expectations, as self-nomination in local elections is a widespread practice consistently supported by voters. In most European countries, even under proportional systems, self-nomination is possible, for example, through lists of independent candidates. Adopting such a model in Ukraine would allow for filling vacant deputy seats without holding by-elections, which is especially important during wartime. This would help preserve the functionality of local self-government bodies and prevent excessive centralization of power through military administrations in situations where intermediate elections cannot be held.
• The draft law contains no mechanisms to prevent circumvention of the gender quota for either local or parliamentary elections—specifically in cases where candidates withdraw after registration or when elected candidates fail to submit the necessary documents for registration. This creates a risk of formal compliance with the quota while actually avoiding balanced gender representation.
• The rushed preparation of this draft is evident from the inconsistency in the proposed changes of the size of the monetary deposit for elections of deputies to village, town, and city councils. As noted earlier, the author proposes two different deposit amounts for the same elections: 10% of the monthly minimum wage per candidate, as established on the first day of the election process (paragraph 1, part 2, article 225), and two monthly minimum wages for every 90,000 voters in the respective single territorial electoral district for each type of election separately (paragraph 3, part 2, article 225).
• Singling out internally displaced persons as those who do not have the right to vote in local elections without changing their electoral address is a form of discrimination. Given the forced nature of their displacement, the focus should instead be on creating conditions for this vulnerable group to exercise their voting rights, not on imposing restrictions. Moreover, even under current legislation, having legally confirmed IDP status does not automatically lead to a change of electoral address.

The proposed system for parliamentary election could become extremely confusing for voters and commission members. Complex non-transparent vote-counting procedures, especially during the redistribution of “unused” votes, create significant risks for errors, deliberate manipulation, and the distortion of election results. Although the proposed system strengthens the role of the individual and allows for strong candidates from parties that did not pass the threshold to be elected, it creates preconditions for the “lone wolf” MPs. Such deputies, without factional support, will have limited influence on the legislative process and may demonstrate a lower level of political accountability.

In turn, complete proportionalisation of local council elections will strengthen the influence and role of political parties even in the smallest communities, where local non-party leaders previously dominated. The proposed model contradicts Ukraine's international obligations to ensure the possibility of candidate self-nomination and also does not meet public expectations: the practice of self-nomination in local elections is widespread and consistently supported by voters.

Both proposed systems contradict the political agreements reached during the Jean Monnet Dialogues, which aimed to hold post-war parliamentary and local elections while retaining the currently existing electoral models as the foundation.

Draft Law No, 13464-3

Author: Anton Yatsenko (unaffiliated MP)

Proposed Changes

Parliamentary Elections:

• A mixed electoral system is proposed, under which 225 deputies are elected by a proportional system with closed lists, and 225 are elected by a majoritarian system of relative majority in single-mandate districts.
• Under the proportional system, national party lists are formed (with no more than 450 candidates). Regional lists are then formed from the candidates on the national list, excluding the first nine. Nomination is only possible through parties, including for the majoritarian system in single-mandate districts.
• The electoral threshold for the proportional system remains at 5%. For the majoritarian component, there is no threshold, and the candidate who receives more votes than any other candidate running in that district is considered elected. If two or more candidates receive the largest and an equal number of votes, repeat elections are scheduled.
• A candidate nominated in a territorial district cannot be included on the national and/or regional electoral lists.
• The monetary deposit for the proportional system is reduced to 250 minimum wages. For the majoritarian system in single-mandate districts, the author proposes setting the monetary deposit at 10 times the minimum wage for each candidate. A deposit made in a smaller amount (with violations) is returned to the party's account instead of being collected by the state budget, as is the case under current law. The monetary deposit is also returned to parties if the party and/or a candidate nominated by the party has acquired the right to participate in the distribution of parliamentary seats.
• In the ballot for voting for a party, the following information is included: the number assigned to each party, the full name of the party, the last names and initials of the first nine candidates on the national list, and the sequential numbers, surnames, and initials of all candidates on the party's regional electoral list. An empty square is placed to the left of the full name of each party.
• In the ballot for voting for a candidate nominated by a party in a territorial district, the following information is listed in alphabetical order: the last name, all given names, and patronymic (if any) of the candidates registered in that district, along with their year of birth, education, position (occupation), place of work, place of residence, party affiliation, and the nominating entity. To the left of this information is a square for the voter's mark.
• A voter will have two votes: one under the proportional system with closed lists, meaning they will only vote for a party and will not influence the order of candidates on the regional electoral list; and a second vote under the majoritarian system in single-mandate districts (allowing them to support one of the candidates nominated by a party in the respective territorial (single-mandate) district).
• The electoral quota (only for the proportional system) is calculated as the integer part of the total number of votes for parties that passed the threshold, divided by the result of subtracting the guaranteed mandates from 225 deputy seats (half of the parliament's composition).
• To determine the number of seats on a party’s regional lists, the number of votes for the party in that region is divided by the electoral quota. The integer part of this result represents the number of parliamentary seats. The seats on regional lists are distributed according to the order set by the party.
• Undistributed votes in the regions and votes from the foreign electoral district are allocated at the national level. Seats on a party's national list are also distributed according to the order set by the party.

OPORA’s Assessment:

• The author proposes a system that they incorrectly compare to the German model (a mixed-member proportional system), where the outcome of the proportional component depends on the majoritarian results, and voting is done with a single ballot. However, based on the proposed changes, draft law №13464-3's electoral system is an “unlinked” parallel system. Under this model, half of the parliament is elected through a proportional system with closed (national and regional) lists, and the other half is elected through a majoritarian relative-majority system in territorial (single-mandate) electoral districts.
• The proposed model does not align with the political agreements reached during the 9th Jean Monnet Dialogue on November 10–12, 2023, which stipulated that post-war parliamentary elections would be held while retaining the currently established electoral system as the basis. In fact, the draft law proposes a return to a model similar to the one used in the 2019 elections, but without the possibility of self-nomination. Additionally, closed regional electoral lists are proposed in addition to the national list. As has been stated repeatedly, failing to provide for the participation of independent candidates will not be in line with international standards and the recommendations given to Ukraine by the OSCE/ODIHR.
• The proposed electoral system could contain all the key shortcomings of the mixed model. It combines the vulnerabilities of the majoritarian component—corruption, vote-buying, administrative resources, and “spoiler” candidates—with the limitations of a closed proportional system, where voters have no influence over the order of candidates and the candidates themselves remain under the control of party leadership. Furthermore, in the context of a significant part of the territory being temporarily occupied, this system would not allow for the full formation of parliament. In turn, closed lists do not promote the development of intra-party democracy, create conditions for “trading” places on the lists, and could allow members of parliament with insufficient qualifications or voter support to get into office. In this model, electoral competition is reduced to a battle of financial and party brands, rather than a competition of ideas or candidate platforms.
• Guaranteeing seats to 9 candidates on the national list artificially inflates the electoral quota for regional lists, resulting in a reduction in the number of seats allocated regionally. This approach effectively guarantees the election of party leaders and further diminishes the voters' influence on the personal composition of parliament.

The electoral model proposed in the draft law No. 13464-3 is an “unlinked” parallel system that combines the disadvantages of both the majoritarian and closed-list proportional systems. It doesn't align with the political agreements from the 9th Jean Monnet Dialogue and deviates from the current electoral system. This system limits the participation of independent candidates, which contradicts international standards and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. It also reintroduces the risks of corruption, vote-buying, administrative pressure, and other manipulations characteristic of a majoritarian system. The closed national and regional lists increase the party leadership's control over who becomes a deputy, reduce voter influence on the personal composition of parliament, and create conditions for candidates without sufficient support or professional qualifications to be elected. In a situation where a significant part of the territory is temporarily occupied, this model makes it impossible to form a full parliament. Ultimately, political competition is reduced to a contest of financial resources and brands, rather than programs and ideas.

Draft Law No, 13464-4

Authors: Alina Zahoruiko (“Servant of the People”), Oksana Dmytriieva (“Servant of the People”), Hanna Bondar (“Servant of the People”), Mariana Bezuhla (unaffiliated). 

Proposed Changes

Local elections:

• The draft law proposes a single majoritarian electoral system for all councils. Deputies of village, town, city, district, regional councils, and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are to be elected by a majoritarian relative-majority system in multi-member electoral districts. The proportional system with open party lists, which was previously used for elections in communities with 10,000 or more voters, is abolished.
• The territorial organization for the election to the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is clarified in accordance with the electoral system, specifically the procedure for forming multi-member districts, their boundaries, number, and formation principles. The principles for forming multi-member districts for other levels of local councils have also been clarified.
• Additions have been made regarding the financing of by-elections or repeat local elections from the state budget's reserve fund, as well as the procedure for allocating the corresponding financial support.
• Nomination of candidates can be done by political parties or through self-nomination. A party organization nominates candidates for the respective council in a list, specifying the number of the multi-member electoral district where each candidate is running. The candidates are listed in alphabetical order.
• The number of candidates cannot be less than the number of districts and cannot exceed the total number of seats to be distributed.
• The gender quota is increased to 40%.
• The list of documents for registering a candidate nominated by a political party includes the party's election program, a list with information about the candidates, and a statement on the presence (or absence) of alimony payment arrears. For candidates for the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a statement on the cessation of activities incompatible with a deputy's mandate, or a declaration that no such activities exist, is also required.
• The monetary deposit is set at different amounts depending on the level of the local council: 5 minimum wages for the Kyiv and Sevastopol city councils and regional councils; 1 minimum wage for city council deputy elections; and 20% of the minimum wage for elections of deputies to district, city-district, village, and settlement councils. A monetary deposit of 2 minimum wages is also proposed for city mayor elections, and 1 minimum wage for village and town mayor elections.
• A requirement is established to have no more than two proxies for each candidate.
• When determining the voting results, in case the protocols on the vote count are not received, the relevant election commission takes over the powers of the territorial election commission to determine the vote count within the corresponding multi-member electoral district.

OPORA’s Assessment:

• The introduction of a majoritarian system for all local elections will lead to drastic changes in the political landscape of communities. This is already an unnatural fit for large cities with established political groups. A key effect could be the de-partisation of local councils: the role of national party brands and ideologies will significantly decrease, while elections will turn into a competition of personalities and financial resources. In many communities where local parties are already closely tied to business or special interest groups, this will not create a fundamentally new system but will only reinforce personalized and group-based tendencies, reducing even formal party accountability.
• This approach will strengthen the influence of local elites, who will be able to form councils based on personal connections rather than development plans and control communities without regard to national processes. While such a system is easier for voters to understand and increases a deputy's direct accountability to their district, it creates the risk of disproportionate representation. Political forces with significant but geographically dispersed support within a community may not get any seats at all.
• Overall, this approach is a step back from common European practices and could lead to the loss of the ideological element in local politics, turning it into a fight for control over a community's resources.
• Another vulnerability of the proposed model is the mechanism for replacing deputies, as it is impossible to hold by-elections in majoritarian districts during martial law. Security risks, including the possibility of renewed Russian aggression, will remain even after the active phase of the war ends, which threatens the stable operation of representative bodies.
• A positive aspect of the draft law is the improvement of the procedure for financing by-elections to prevent them from being blocked by councils, as well as the increase of the gender quota to 40%.

Like the others, this alternative draft law does not align with the political agreements from the 9th Jean Monnet Dialogue, which stipulate that post-war elections should be based on the systems currently established in the Electoral Code, particularly for local elections. The proposed changes significantly deviate from the electoral model now in effect. This system reintroduces the risks of corruption, vote-buying, administrative pressure, and other manipulations characteristic of a majoritarian system. Furthermore, in the context of a permanent security threat from Russia, even after the active phase of hostilities ends, it is vulnerable when it comes to replacing deputies, as it's impossible to hold by-elections during special legal regimes.

Draft Law No, 13464-5

Author: Ihor Vasyliiev (“Servant of the People”)

Proposed Changes

Parliamentary elections:

• A candidate included in the regional list of any party (both those that passed the threshold and those that did not) that participated in the parliamentary elections automatically receives a seat without participating in further ranking, provided they receive a number of votes equal to 1.5 times the electoral quota.
• Such seats are taken into account when determining the number of seats to be distributed in the national electoral district among the parties that overcame the electoral barrier. The number of such seats is subtracted from the total number of vacant seats available for distribution.

Local elections:

• The draft law proposes to raise the threshold for the application of the majoritarian electoral system in multi-member electoral districts in communities with up to 30,000 voters.
• For the proportional system with open party lists, the electoral barrier that parties must overcome to participate in the distribution of seats is lowered to 3%.

OPORA’s Assessment:

• The proposed mechanism for distributing seats in parliamentary elections likely contains a critical mathematical error. This could lead to parties claiming more seats in the national constituency than are actually available for distribution, thereby increasing the conflict potential of the electoral system. The problem lies in the fact that the electoral quota is calculated based on the votes cast for parties that have passed the electoral barrier. This quota determines the total number of seats to be distributed among the parties and is intended to ensure that the parliament is filled within its constitutionally set number of members. However, candidates from parties that did not pass the threshold can still receive a seat if they get more than 1.5 times the electoral quota, even though the votes for their parties are not included in the quota calculation formula. As a result, they would take seats from the total pool without their votes being accounted for in the size of the pool. This creates a situation where the number of candidates entitled to a seat exceeds the number of seats that can be legally distributed.
• The author of the draft law attempted to compensate for this defect by stipulating that the number of seats on the national list would be reduced by the number of seats won by candidates with more than 1.5 quotas. However, the formula for calculating the number of seats on the national list for each party that passed the threshold remained unchanged. It is still based on the share of votes received in the foreign electoral district and the undistributed votes in the regions, all divided by the electoral quota. Thus, the proposed compensatory mechanism is internally contradictory and does not solve the overall problem.
• Additionally, the proposed system could lead to a significant distortion of the election results due to the unregulated distribution of seats in the regions. This is because votes cast for candidates who have already been guaranteed a place in parliament will continue to count toward the overall result of their party in that region. The process for determining elected candidates in the electoral regions does not specify an order for receiving seats that accounts for those candidates who automatically secured their mandates. This creates a risk of a disproportionate increase in party representation.
• The emergence of “superstars” and the rise of populism. The ability to win a seat regardless of a party's overall result will encourage overly expensive personal campaigns and populist rhetoric, as popular individuals will be able to get into parliament even with a political force that didn't pass the electoral threshold.
• As with draft laws No. 13419 and No. 13464-1, the proposed changes to the electoral legislation to raise the threshold for using a majoritarian system in local elections lack proper justification and do not account for the consequences of the full-scale invasion or the potential long-term effects of such innovations. For more details, see the Analytical Note on legislative initiatives to change electoral systems for local and parliamentary elections.

Draft law No. 13464-5 contains both positive and risky innovations, but its key problem is the mechanism for distributing parliamentary seats, which shows signs of a mathematical error and internal contradictions. The proposed rule for the automatic allocation of a seat to candidates who receive more than 1.5 times the electoral quota could lead to parties claiming a number of seats that exceeds the constitutionally established number of deputy seats in parliament. It also risks distorting the election results, creating disproportionate party representation, and strengthening the role of personalized populist campaigns. The provided compensatory mechanism does not eliminate these risks, and the changes to the local election system—specifically, raising the threshold for the majoritarian system and lowering the electoral barrier—lack proper justification and do not adequately consider the specifics of martial law or the potential long-term consequences.

General Conclusion
The analyzed main and alternative draft laws have significant shortcomings in terms of their compliance with international standards and fail to provide a systemic solution to the challenges caused by the full-scale Russian aggression. Both the content and form of these documents indicate that they were likely prepared in haste. However, some of the proposed provisions—specifically, the abolition of guaranteed seats and the lowering of the threshold for advancement on electoral lists—could be taken into account during the preparation of comprehensive changes to electoral legislation for holding post-war elections. We emphasize that the creation of an effective and sustainable legal framework is possible only through an inclusive dialogue that provides for open parliamentary cooperation with the involvement of civil society, the expert community, and representatives of the most vulnerable groups.

Comparative Table of Alternative Legislative Initiatives for the Legal Regulation of Local and Parliamentary Elections