Rhetoric of Violence in Ukrainian Telegram Channels: Report

Methodology

This study is based on the systematic monitoring of public communication within Ukrainian Telegram channels, aimed at identifying signs of violent, discriminatory, and dehumanizing rhetoric.

The monitoring took place from July to September 2025 and covered 67 channels across three categories: 15 national anonymous news channels with the largest audiences, 6 channels of popular bloggers, and 46 regional anonymous news channels (two from each region, excluding temporarily occupied territories).

Prior to classification, the data were cleaned of service notifications (e.g., air raid alerts) to reduce noise in the analysis. To automatically detect signs of violent and toxic rhetoric in texts, large language models (LLMs) were used, configured to classify messages according to relevant criteria.

Within the scope of this study, violent rhetoric is understood as public content that, directly or indirectly, contributes to the legitimation, normalization, or incitement of violence against individuals, groups, or institutions for political motives or to achieve political goals. This encompasses not only direct calls for physical force but also a broader spectrum of discursive practices that create an environment conducive to violent actions.

The analysis focused on messages containing, in particular:

Hate speech and dehumanization of individuals or groups;
Calls for violence or the toleration of aggression as a means of influence;
The creation of an "other" image that fosters social exclusion;
The undermining of trust in the state or institutions, potentially legitimizing resistance or aggression.

This methodology allows for more than just the quantitative recording of risky rhetoric; it enables a systemic description of which specific narratives and topics are involved and how they may influence public discourse during wartime.

A detailed description of the manifestations of the studied content, including the specific words and linguistic structures used, is presented in the monthly reports for July, August, and September.

Key Trends

During the monitoring process, we recorded content that contributes to the radicalization of its consumers, normalizes or legitimizes manifestations of discrimination and/or violence to achieve political goals, restricts the rights of various population groups or their representatives, and includes instances of hate speech, dehumanization, advocacy for discrimination, and more.

During the first quarter of observation, we identified 6 key trends:

Delegitimization of government institutions.
Constructing the image of the state as an enemy of its citizens.
Normalization of acts of violence in the public space.
Stigmatization of various social groups.
A trend toward populism: pitting "greedy elites" against "ordinary people."
Dehumanization of politicians and their supporters.

Overall, content exhibiting signs of violent rhetoric was infrequent—on average, it accounted for approximately 4.3% of all messages published by the studied channels. The highest volume of posts with signs of violent rhetoric was recorded in July, at 5.6% of the total dataset. This increase was driven by the way some channels commented on the protests that sought to preserve the independence of NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) and SAPO (Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office) during that month, as well as by the formal notification of suspicion served to the civic activist and head of the AntAC (Anti-Corruption Action Center), Vitalii Shabunin.

At the same time, the presence of violent rhetoric was systematic, as the frequency of these posts remained evenly distributed across all three months of observation (except for spikes associated with high-profile news events such as the NABU and SAPO protests).

Trend 1. Delegitimization of government institutions

One of the few axioms of political life is that politicians are held to significantly higher standards of behavior, ethics, professional competency, and other skills than the public. Government officials and elected representatives are under the constant “magnifying glass” of the information environment—and rarely in a positive light. As Michael Walzer explains, we criticize politicians more harshly than others because, first, they act on our behalf; we partially project their actions and deeds onto ourselves, feeling that they tarnish not only their own reputation but ours as well. Second, a politician’s persona personifies the restrictions and compulsions imposed on us by the state system—civic duties, taxes, courts, the law enforcement system, and more.

In this study, we are mindful of this phenomenon and recognize criticism of authority as a norm, even a necessity of democracy. However, a portion of the narratives we identified represents a fundamentally different phenomenon than the “dislike of politicians” described by Walzer. These narratives have a destructive impact on the relationship between citizens and the state system.

During our observation period, the delegitimization of government institutions emerged as a key trend, posing significant risks for a country at war. By delegitimization, we mean systemic discursive practices aimed at both undermining the actual legitimacy of government bodies and state officials through their discredit before the audience, and forming a narrative regarding a lack of support and acceptance of the government by its citizens, particularly for international partners and external observers. Unlike the criticism of specific actions, words, or decisions of government officials, delegitimization involves framing representatives of authority as those who possess no legal or moral right to act on behalf of the people, as their actions, words, or decisions do not represent the will of the citizens who originally empowered them.

Such narratives amplify distrust in authority and diminish citizens' sense of their own political agency. This can manifest in legal nihilism and sabotage of civic duties, e.g. the principled non-payment of taxes, illegal evasion of military service, corruption, and other legal violations, as well as in the radicalization of certain individuals or even social groups. If achieving one's interests or protecting one's rights seems impossible within the framework of existing social institutions, manifestations of extra-institutional politics of dissent—such as obstructions, protests, coup attempts, terrorist acts, politicized assassinations, self-immolations, and more—become more attractive and subjectively beneficial.

Thus, the key tactics for the delegitimization of authority identified in the Ukrainian segment of Telegram include:

The humiliation and ridicule of government representatives at various levels;
Accusations of sabotaging official duties or an inability to perform their work due to a lack of skills, education, intelligence, and other factors.

Humiliation and Ridicule. In the studied Telegram channels, representatives of local and national authorities were systematically portrayed as inept, comical, and incapable of adequately assessing reality or acting rationally.

Most often, such rhetoric targeted the President and his Office. Anonymous channels and bloggers sarcastically referenced Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s past in show business and labeled the President’s Office as a “clown show,” a “circus,” and similar terms. Simultaneously, the President was depicted as weak—intimidated by Putin, Trump, and especially by the risk of losing power (though the authors rarely specified exactly how). The actions, decisions, and statements of the President and his team were presented as reactionary and driven by the fear of being embarrassed before the U.S. President or European politicians. Narratives about the government sliding into authoritarianism, heavily seasoned with phrases like "concentration camp" or "Zelenskyy's North Korea," were accompanied by accusations of cowardice. Additionally, Zelenskyy was sporadically accused of substance abuse, cited as the alleged reason for the inadequacy and unpredictability of his decisions.

Notably, this narrative targeted not only the figure of the President and his inner circle but also any public figures or ordinary commenters who expressed support for the current executive branch and policies associated with the Office of the President. For favorable comments or calls for solidarity with the authorities, people were branded as “roosters” (pivni), “troubadours of the Office,” “the herd,” or “serfs.” This indicates not only their public persecution but also more complex processes. First, political views or preferences for specific political forces—or even an entire policy vector—are thus framed as a collective identity, something that defines a person as an individual. Second, a stigmatization of such views is observed: the humiliation and stigma directed at officials are automatically extended to their supporters, becoming a source of political polarization in society.

Certain bloggers utilized homophobic vocabulary to discredit the President and his team. Calculating on their audience's biased attitude toward the LGBTQ+ community, the authors used slurs to portray representatives of the executive branch as weak and immoral.

Accusations of sabotage of official duties or incapacity to perform their work. The second narrative we recorded portrays the authorities as unreliable and dishonest. Officials were predominantly accused of corruption and the pursuit of personal gain, and consequently—a lack of interest in the long-term development of Ukraine. This includes, specifically, the theses that the Government and the Office of the President are merely imitating the negotiation process for peace or even the efforts to defeat Russia at the frontline—solely to maintain power in their hands for as long as possible. In contrast to the previous tactic, here the lust for power is explained not by psycho-emotional characteristics but by a pragmatic interest in plundering the state for as long as possible and controlling law enforcement agencies and courts to prevent themselves or their inner circle from being held accountable. The government was accused of creating and “protecting” (kryshuvannia) various schemes involving violations of tender procedures, the import and sale of contraband, illicit enrichment, criminal conspiracy with big business, and other methods of “profiteering from the war.”

The authors of the studied Telegram channels were most critical of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and Science, and the Ministry of Defense. Most frequently, their officials were accused of seeking to ensure a comfortable, and sometimes even luxurious, life for themselves in Ukraine or abroad against a backdrop of indifference toward their subordinate institutions and the implementation of sector-specific policies.

Given the information landscape of the study period, anti-corruption agencies such as NABU, SAPO, and BES (Bureau of Economic Security) attracted significant attention. Many national channels participated in a discreditation campaign against NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov, who was being held in custody at the time. According to Ukrainian media reports, he had played an active role in investigating corruption within the energy sector—an operation code-named “Midas.” At the same time, accusations of profiting from corruption instead of fighting it were directed not only at Maahmedrasulov but also at his colleagues from NABU and other agencies.

In contrast, Ukrainian parliamentarians were portrayed as intellectually underdeveloped “freaks” or “clowns,” lacking agency and incapable of making decisions. Overall, the parliament was mentioned much less frequently than the President, the government as a whole, or specific ministries. However, personalized accusations against individual MPs did occur in some posts.

Trend 2. Constructing the image of the state as an enemy of its citizens

The second trend we identified is the systematic construction of an image of the state as hostile and predatory toward its own citizens. While the first trend portrayed state authorities and their representatives as untrustworthy, incompetent, or passive, here they are presented as dangerous and hostile toward ordinary people. In narratives of this type, the state is depicted as intentionally inflicting suffering upon its citizens.

In some cases, the motivation (or rather, the cause) for such hostility from specific officials was attributed to various psychological disorders: sadism, psychopathy, cruelty, and narcissism. Most frequently, TCC (Territorial Recruitment Center) personnel were described in these categories. They were labeled “cannibals,” “man-catchers,” and “bandits” who torment draft-eligible men on the streets and within TCC facilities simply because they can do so without fear of punishment. Similar rhetoric was used regarding Zelenskyy and his team: claiming that he deliberately sabotages peace negotiations because he wants to and is able to “dispose of the lives of ordinary Ukrainians,” and that during his years in office, he has become a power-drunk “usurper.”

To reinforce this image, the posts mentioned the figures of ultimate evil and cruelty familiar to most users—the Nazi regime in mid-20th century Germany, the communist regime in the USSR, the current government of the Russian Federation, and the regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT). For example, the TCC were called “Gestapo” and “Buryats,” while the executive branch was labeled “occupiers” who are building a “concentration camp,” a “GULAG,” or “North Korea” in Ukraine. Corruption-fighting bodies were accused of working for the FSB. In general, accusations of ties to Russia or affinity for Russian ideology became a widespread practice used to discredit government agencies, politicians, opinion leaders, or even volunteers.

By appealing to these well-known images of evil, content creators attempted to cement an emotional association between the subject being covered and the emotion evoked by these images. Such comparisons implicitly—and sometimes explicitly—justify the sabotage of legal compliance and non-participation in the implementation of state policies. At their most extreme, they justify resistance or even "preemptive strikes" against state representatives in their various capacities.

This trend is most eloquently demonstrated by the example of the TCC. Local channels, when describing civilian attacks on TCC representatives, interpreted such actions as attempts to “rescue” those subject to military service. Moreover, one of the bloggers under study explicitly asked, “is it possible to resist” and “is it possible to shoot” when you are being “kidnapped” by “bandits from the TCC Gestapo.”

Narratives aimed at encouraging resistance to the state and its representatives, as well as the depiction of the state as an enemy, were not massive in scale during the observation period, but they nonetheless appeared systematically across the studied channels. This consistency was maintained both at the level of the overall study period—meaning they appeared in each of the three months—and within each month individually; that is, the number of posts was small, but they were published regularly.

Trend 3. Normalization of acts of violence in the public space

Much more frequently than content about politicians and politics, we recorded coverage of various forms of non-politicized violence: individual conflicts in public places, beatings, rapes, murders, and domestic violence that lack a political basis. At first glance, such cases should fall outside the scope of this study; however, their sheer volume and the manner in which they are covered compel us to highlight these aspects.

The coverage of “everyday” violence became one of the most widespread content groups throughout all months of the study. This ubiquity, combined with the popularity of so-called “trash content,” effectively normalizes aggression in the eyes of the audience—an issue that is particularly critical for a society in the hot phase of a war. In such posts, violent acts appear not as a subject for reporting or public oversight of the law enforcement system, but rather as everyday entertainment. Fights, aggressive verbal altercations, sexual violence, or beatings are depicted out of context and accompanied by brief descriptions in which Telegram channel editors do not shy away from using various emojis, such as laughter (🤣), "fire" (🔥), popcorn (🍿), or shock (😱).

Positioning such content as entertainment significantly lowers public attention toward the violation of fellow citizens' rights and the necessity of holding offenders accountable. In conditions of diminished public oversight and the unstable functioning of human rights institutions, it becomes significantly more difficult for victims to protect their rights within a legal framework.

Moreover, “trash content” becomes a commodity. First, it attracts user attention, increasing engagement and, consequently, the channel's reach and advertising rates. Occasionally, channel administrators (more often on local channels) explicitly stated that they would willingly purchase photos and videos of violence from their subscribers. Second, “trash content” is used to advertise third-party Telegram channels: readers are urged to subscribe to see uncensored images of violence. It is worth recalling that although Telegram's official policies state the messenger is for users aged 16 and older, in Ukraine, Telegram is used by 82% of children aged 13–15 and 63% of children aged 10–12. While we cannot have detailed demographic data on the audiences of the studied channels, since the sample included the most popular national and local channels, the likelihood of a systemic impact of such trash content on children is quite high.

Another important aspect is the framing of violence as justified or “deserved” by the victims. The creators of the content in the studied channels justified psychological or physical violence against people who behave in an undesirable or unacceptable manner in public places: those who use drugs or alcohol, are intoxicated, commit theft or violence against other people or animals, or refuse to stop communicating in Russian or listening to Russian music. We also recorded numerous instances where Telegram channels actively encouraged vigilante justice against those suspected of cruelty to children and animals, or other crimes deemed particularly outrageous. There were also cases of unequivocal public approval of violence against people who speak Russian and do not switch to Ukrainian in their private lives (for example, calls to “smash their faces”). Additionally, we sporadically found approval of “disciplining through force” those who show disrespect to military personnel, whether publicly or in private interaction.

Although such cases mostly lack a political objective, this framing of violent acts contributes to the erosion of general legal culture and devalues the importance of human rights. This positioning of content by the media (in our case, Telegram channels that de facto operate as media) lowers the threshold of unacceptability of violent actions—especially if, in the opinion of the perpetrator, the victim deserves punishment and the perpetrator is doing a “good deed” for the community.

Trend 4. Stigmatization of various social groups

We recorded systemic manifestations of the “othering” of various social groups across all studied Telegram channels throughout the entire observation period. By “othering,” we mean content that separates certain people from the rest of society solely based on their belonging to a specific social group. Such separation could manifest both as the stigmatization of these groups and as their particular elevation compared to others, which frames their status in society as exceptional and privileged. This category did not include posts with criticism or recognition of the personal achievements, actions, and decisions of specific individuals or groups, nor descriptions of the specific needs of different groups of people.

During the observation period, we less frequently recorded posts featuring “classic” prejudices common in Ukraine—such as sexism, discrimination against people with disabilities, homophobia, etc. Such content did not exceed a few dozen posts for each category per month, and thus was not systemic (our sample consisted of 67 Telegram channels). Much more widespread were manifestations of othering based on the different lived experiences of the full-scale war.

Russian-speakers vs. Ukrainian-speakers

The studied channels were most consistent in their “othering” of Russian-speakers. The channels covered conflicts in public places—parks, trains, supermarkets, playgrounds, etc.—stemming from a refusal to switch to Ukrainian. We did not include in this category any posts regarding violations of the law, such as requirements to use Ukrainian as the language of service in catering establishments or for instruction in higher education institutions. Instead, this category comprised ironic or clickbait-emotional posts about random conflicts between passersby or people who happened to be near one another by chance.

The framing of such incidents differed somewhat from channel to channel. In one cluster of posts, the authors remained nominally neutral: they did not express direct sympathy for either side and simply described the conflict. Other channels, however, cautiously approved of verbal or even physical aggression against people who refused to switch to Ukrainian or turn off Russian music.

The editorial role of anonymous Telegram channels as agents in shaping the information agenda deserves separate mention. Amid the vast number of events occurring in a country at war, they select those they deem worthy of highlighting to their audience. In the analyzed content, Russian-speakers were often portrayed as “inferior” members of the community, carriers of a threat, or as people who deliberately ignore the war and the social context. Such framing manifested both in direct stigmatization and indirectly—through the dissemination of quotes from public figures about the necessity of ignoring Russian-speakers, the justification of social pressure on them, or, as mentioned above, acts of violence against them.

Some channels took the opposite side of the conflict and, conversely, portrayed Ukrainian-speaking participants as aggressive, unpredictable, or emotionally unstable individuals who deliberately provoke those around them, seek out conflict, or strive to publicly humiliate Russian-speakers. The behavior of such people was described as impulsive, aggressive, or irrational, while the conflicts themselves were framed as the result of “hysteria,” “radicalism,” or the “imposition of one's own views.” Ukrainian-speaking identity was reduced to an individual behavioral characteristic that supposedly indicated psychological instability, intolerance, or a propensity for violence. As we can see, Ukrainian-speakers were framed not merely as a party to a linguistic conflict, but as an independent “problem”—people who disrupt social peace and pose a threat to others.

Military vs. Civilians

Another persistent line of “othering” that was reproduced throughout the entire observation period was the juxtaposition of the military and civilians. In the analyzed content, this line did not form a single dominant narrative; however, it manifested through repeating plot lines in which one of the groups was consistently portrayed as morally or socially problematic, while the other was cast as a victim or the bearer of “true” legitimacy.

Some Telegram channels framed military personnel—specifically those stationed in the rear—as a privileged group that possesses a special status and abuses it in everyday life. In such posts, the military were portrayed as aggressive, uncontrolled, or prone to deviant behavior, such as alcohol abuse, conflicts, or the use of force. Isolated incidents were presented as symptoms of a broader problem, forming a generalized image of the soldier as a potential threat to public order.

Another portion of the content offered the opposite logic: civilians were portrayed as morally weak, infantile, or indifferent to the war. The narrative suggested that civilians “live their normal lives,” have fun, complain, or evade responsibility while the military bear the primary burden of the war. This juxtaposition was often reinforced by rhetoric regarding the unfair distribution of the war's burdens: some risk their lives, while others maintain their comfort.

Crucially, in both cases, the war ceases to be a shared experience and is instead used as a tool for moral hierarchization. The military and civilians are framed not as interdependent groups, but as competitors for the right to define “correct” behavior and permissible emotions. This presentation displaces the complex realities of rotations, injuries, rear-line service, or civilian losses, and reduces both groups to simplified roles.

Although we did not record systemic calls for discrimination or violence between the military and civilians in the studied content, the regular reproduction of this line of opposition normalizes the perception of such conflict as a “natural” state of society during wartime. In the long term, such narratives undermine horizontal solidarity, reduce mutual trust between groups, and create the groundwork for more radical forms of “othering”—especially when combined with narratives about mobilization, “draft dodgers,” and those with “reserved” (deferred) status.

“Draft dodgers” vs. the state

A separate but closely related to the military-civilian opposition line of “othering” was the framing of draft-eligible men who avoid mobilization—the so-called “draft dodgers” (“ukhylianty”) In the analyzed content, they were consistently portrayed as a socially undesirable group that deliberately places itself above the state and the military, as cowardly, selfish, or parasitic. They were contrasted with military personnel who bear the main burden of the war. Various attempts to avoid military service—the infamous “swimming across the Tysa river,” staying at home, or refusing to use public transport—were mocked, sometimes with direct calls to humiliate or at least condemn the men who make such decisions.

The boundaries of what Telegram channels considered purposeful, selfish avoidance of military service turned out to be quite broad. During the reporting period, various well-known men faced accusations for not being in the military, while women, older men, or those unfit for service were targeted because of their relatives or loved ones. Such accusations were directed, for example, at civic activist Vitalii Shabunin (despite his service in the AFU), bloggers Ihor Lachenkov and Serhii Sternenko, the brother of Yuliia Svyrydenko, and the son of Petro Poroshenko.

In such cases, specific accusations or probable evidence of draft evasion rarely appear. The mere fact of a person's public profile was enough to spark speculation regarding special grounds on which these individuals are not serving in the military. This method, to some extent, reinforces the previously described Trend 2—shaping the image of the state as an enemy and justifying resistance to mobilization—as it emphasizes the perceived unfairness of military duty being fulfilled by “ordinary people” while public, more privileged individuals supposedly do not comply.

Opposite narratives also occurred in the studied content: “draft dodgers” were presented as victims of a repressive, unjust state that acts through violent and humiliating methods, particularly via the TCC. In these posts, “draft dodgers” appeared not as immoral individuals, but as people trying to protect themselves from state arbitrariness.

These opposing narratives—the condemnation of “draft dodgers” by the military and a portion of civilians, and their victimization within the context of state criticism—coexist in the information space. Both, however, contribute to the “othering” of “draft dodgers” as a group: in the first case through stigmatization, and in the second by cementing the image of a victim deprived of agency.

Trend 5. Populism: pitting "greedy elites" against "ordinary people"

Throughout the entire observation period, a persistent presence of populist framing of socio-economic and political processes was traced in the studied Telegram content through the binary opposition of “the ordinary people” and “the elites.” This logic did not always manifest directly, yet it was systematically reproduced through narratives of unfair resource distribution, privileges for specific groups, and a chasm in mutual understanding between representatives of different socio-economic classes.

The juxtaposition of the poor and the wealthy echoed across entirely different topics: from romantic relationships between men and women to cases of top-level corruption. In an attempt to discredit representatives of the Ukrainian authorities, the civil sector, the military, and volunteers, the authors of the studied channels drew attention to their clothing, accessories, or other property. The mere fact of private use of expensive cars, watches, or even sneakers was characterized as indecent and insensitive behavior during a full-scale war.

This division was reinforced through regular mentions of the luxurious lifestyles of government representatives and their circles—expensive cars, real estate, travel, and children studying abroad. Such examples were used not for the analysis of specific corruption cases or institutional failures, but as emotional markers of the “elites” being detached from “real life.” As a result, even isolated or unverified stories were embedded into a broader narrative of systemic injustice and the moral degradation of the political leadership.

In such posts, we frequently see a juxtaposition: while “ordinary people” are becoming poorer due to the economic downturn caused by the war, “donating their last penny” and “struggling for survival,” the so-called “elites” are getting richer. In some cases, this contrast was used to fuel the narrative of a deliberate “protraction” of the war and the sabotage of any peace negotiations, so that the elites could allegedly continue to profit from the conflict. The external attributes of wealth among public figures were framed as an indicator that they do not sufficiently share the burden of war with others.

Populist rhetoric was closely intertwined with the themes of mobilization and war. The “elite vs. the people” opposition took on a particular intensity: the authorities and wealthy citizens were portrayed as those who avoid service, maintain privileges, or have the means to "fix the problem," while "ordinary people" were cast as the primary resource of the war. This framing especially frequently accompanied cases of illicit enrichment: the embezzlement of state funds, dishonest tenders, bribery, etc. To raise the emotional stakes, these posts were vividly illustrated with descriptions of the grueling daily lives of soldiers at the front. This manner of presentation heightens social tension and cements the perception of the war as an unequal exchange, in which sacrifice and responsibility are distributed asymmetrically.

Trend 6. Dehumanization of politicians and their supporters

Dehumanizing rhetoric is one of the most radical methods of discredit in public communication. Unlike the criticism of decisions, competence, or the integrity of politicians, dehumanization involves stripping a person or group of their human traits. In such statements, politicians and their circles are portrayed not as subjects of the political process, but as “non-humans,” “animals,” “livestock,” “creatures,” “parasites,” “trash,” or “sh*t.” Demonization operates on a related logic: portraying people or institutions as absolute evil, an existential threat, or an “enemy” with whom it is impossible to coexist or engage in dialogue. Throughout the three months of monitoring, dehumanization and demonization were present in the studied content regularly, though unevenly: their intensity and target objects depended significantly on the type of channel and authorship. In total, 192 cases of public dehumanization were recorded during the observation period.

In the analyzed content, dehumanizing rhetoric manifested most systematically toward the executive branch and specific political figures. Humiliation was used as a way to explain the motives behind state decisions as a result of total immorality, cruelty, or the “inhuman” nature of officials. Representatives of the authorities appeared not as humans who make mistakes, abuse their powers, sabotage them, or act dishonestly—meaning those to whom tools of oversight and accountability are applicable—but as a qualitatively different type of actor against whom “ordinary” rules of political interaction do not work. The only way to improve the situation proposed by the authors of such posts is to “purge” the system of these personalities.

Crucially, dehumanization was not limited to targeted attacks on specific politicians. In a series of posts, it extended to broader groups—public figures, activists, journalists, volunteers, or even ordinary commenters who openly expressed support for government representatives or even for the decisions and policies that are currently a priority for them. Political stances became markers of personal inferiority, “stupidity,” venality, or immorality, and the humiliation of the honor and dignity of specific politicians was extended to their supporters as well. Through the infrequent but systemic presence of such parallels, the studied channels established persistent links between a person's identity and their political choices. Furthermore, public support for politicians or the policies they developed or backed was branded as a sign of being “cattle” or “animals” who “mindlessly” follow a chosen leader. Notably, the stigma of conformity was applied to supporters of both the current government and the opposition.

A distinct manifestation of dehumanization was its use against employees of state bodies performing enforcement and control functions, primarily in the context of mobilization. They were described as “non-humans,” “dogs of the regime,” etc., combining dehumanization with the previously described construction of the state as hostile to its own citizens. In this logic, state institutions are not merely criticized for abuse or inefficiency—humiliation and aggression toward them are justified as deserved or warranted, and therefore, as a “permissible” social action.

Alongside political dehumanization, dehumanizing vocabulary occurred situationally within the studied dataset outside of a political context, primarily regarding those suspected of serious crimes, violence, or animal cruelty. Although these cases differ in content, they form a broader background of reduced sensitivity to the language of humiliation, where dehumanizing labels become a “normal” tool for describing undesirable phenomena.

Despite we did not record systemic direct calls for physical violence against politicians or their supporters, dehumanization and demonization perform another dangerous function: they lower the empathy threshold, normalize humiliation, and shift political competition into the realm of moral exclusion. Combined with other trends—the delegitimization of institutions, the image of the state as an enemy, the populist “elite vs. people” dichotomy, and the “othering” of social groups—this reinforces the logic of an “internal enemy” and narrows the space for public dialogue.

Recommended Changes to Public Policy

Moving state communication to moderated platforms. As of 2025, Telegram remains the key platform for media consumption among Ukrainians. At the same time, the platform's architecture and its fundamental refusal to moderate—including politicized violent rhetoric—create a favorable environment for the spread of content that undermines public trust, normalizes violence, and increases the risks of radicalization. The public stance of the platform's owners, which reduces to a priority of “absolute protection of freedom of speech,” effectively means an absence of tools to respond to destructive content. The high level of anonymity and the technical limitations of de-anonymization significantly narrow the capabilities of Ukrainian regulators and law enforcement agencies, especially under martial law and hybrid threats. Despite this, Telegram is currently the primary communication channel for state and local government bodies, officials, politicians, and state and communal institutions. Such practice de facto legitimizes the platform as the “official” space for public interaction and shapes the digital habits of users, directing them toward an environment with minimal safety and accountability standards. Therefore, it is advisable to gradually move official state communications to moderated platforms that provide transparent rules for content management, the ability to respond to hate speech and other forms of destructive rhetoric, and cooperation with national regulators. This transition should occur synchronously with coordinated actions by the media, responsible businesses, and public opinion leaders. Such a transit of key actors in the information space will not only reduce the state's dependence on a toxic platform but also gradually reshape the information pathways of citizens, ensuring the audience's transition to safer and more accountable communication channels without directly restricting access to Telegram.
Regulation of large Telegram channels as subjects of media legislation. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Telegram has steadily held a leading position among the platforms where Ukrainians get their news (72%). Although a wide variety of actors—state representatives, politicians, state institutions, local government bodies, media, bloggers, etc.—conduct public activities on the Telegram platform, online aggregators remain the primary source of news. Anonymous or semi-anonymous Telegram channels perform the same social functions as subjects in the media sector; however, they do not fall under the relevant regulation and, therefore, do not bear the same level of social responsibility. Currently, the only tool for regulating Telegram channels remains the mechanism of voluntary registration as a media entity, which, among channels with millions of subscribers, has already been used by "Trukha Ukraine," for example. Neither anonymous channels nor bloggers are rushing to register, remaining in the gray zone of Ukrainian legislation while communicating daily to hundreds of thousands of users. Currently, the national media regulator is empowered to apply sanctions for the spread of hate speech, inappropriate coverage of violence, ensuring proper protection of children, etc. However, the issue of the social responsibility of bloggers and large online channels requires proper legislative regulation.
Improving Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of hate speech. Although Ukrainian law currently prohibits the incitement of enmity and the advocacy of discrimination, the existing legal framework for responding to violent rhetoric remains fragmented and insufficiently adapted to the realities of the modern information environment. First, legislative regulation and potential sanctions from law enforcement and regulators are primarily focused on isolated acts of expression or individual discriminatory actions; they do not account for the biased formation of a broader discourse of violence. Within such a discourse, no single post may be radicalizing on its own, yet their regular reproduction creates a cumulative effect that normalizes violence, dehumanizes targets, and legitimizes extra-institutional forms of coercion. Second, the current regulatory framework relies mainly on punitive response mechanisms in the realm of administrative or criminal liability ex post (after the fact) and lacks preventive tools aimed at reducing systemic risks in public communication. This approach does not meet modern European standards, which emphasize the early detection of risky narratives, differentiated responses based on the scale, repetition, and reach of content, and the accountability of actors who ensure its mass dissemination. In this context, it is advisable to revise legislation to combine criminal-law instruments with regulatory and preventive mechanisms. These should allow for a response not only to isolated posts but also to the systemic reproduction of violent and dehumanizing rhetoric in the online environment.
Development of a self-regulation code for candidates and parties regarding the use of violent rhetoric within election campaigns and political communication in general. To reduce the risks of radicalization and the normalization of violence in the political process, it is advisable to introduce a self-regulation code for candidates and political parties. This code would define standards for responsible political communication during election campaigns and in the inter-electoral period. Such a code should be aimed not at restricting political competition or the criticism of opponents, but at preventing violent, dehumanizing, and delegitimizing rhetoric that undermines trust in democratic institutions and legitimizes extra-institutional forms of political action. The code should be developed in the format of a voluntary commitment involving the Central Election Commission, relevant state authorities, political parties, civil society, and media organizations. Its content should provide a clear distinction between permissible political criticism and rhetoric that normalizes violence, dehumanization, or incitement to enmity; it should also include a commitment to refrain from using discriminatory discursive practices and a rejection of dehumanizing, degrading, and stigmatizing markers in election campaigning.
Development of sanctions for the dissemination of hate speech and the advocacy of discrimination by electoral process participants. To ensure the integrity of the electoral process and reduce the risks of radicalizing political competition, it is advisable to introduce special sanctions for the dissemination of hate speech and dehumanizing rhetoric, and for the advocacy of discrimination by participants in the electoral process. Such sanctions should be aimed not at the criminalization of political rhetoric, but at protecting the democratic nature of elections and preventing practices that undermine equality, safety, and trust in electoral institutions. The sanctioning mechanism should be structured within electoral and media legislation, applying the principles of graduality and proportionality. Crucially, the application of sanctions must be based not on an assessment of political views, but on clearly defined criteria: the presence of dehumanization, incitement to enmity, the legitimation of violence, or the systemic othering of social groups. Decisions regarding the application of sanctions should be made transparently, with the possibility of prompt appeal, ensuring a balance between the freedom of political competition and the protection of human rights.

This material has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.