Collage: Mykola Shymanskyi, “Detector Media”

Russia is interfering with elections in democracies all over the world, resorting to any means, from cyberattacks to direct voter bribery, from sharing disinformation and disrupting society to discrediting candidates who are “unacceptable” for the Russian government. Contrariwise, they support politicians or parties ready to cooperate with the Putin's regime.

The recent elections, in Romania, Moldova, USA, and Georgia, show the possibilities and methods to interfere with democratic processes used by Russia. It is obvious that elections in Ukraine (whenever they take place any time after the end of war), will not be an exception. Ukraine, as the government, and society, shall be prepared for such interference to maintain its sovereignty, democracy, and freedom that Ukrainian people are fighting for and dying for.

Detector Media talked to experts and asked them two questions:

— How likely do you think Russia's interference in the elections in Ukraine is going to be when they take place?

— What efforts should the state and civil society of Ukraine make today to prevent the risks of Russia's interference with the elections taking place after the end of the full-scale war?

All the respondents surveyed by the DM unanimously agree about one aspect: Russia will interfere. The opinions of our respondents differ only about the prevention capacity. If we are able to prevent, how exactly can this be done?

These are answers from Olga Aivazovska, Chair of the Board at Civil Network OPORA, and Andrii Savchuk, the organization's data analyst.  Read the answers from other experts here and here.

It is wrong to hope that Russia is not going to try any possible tools during the post-war elections since it has been attempting to impose its political agenda on Ukraine for years. This attack will be implemented in separate areas: security, politics, finance, and information. Russia will likely continue its typical policy of supporting pro-Russian candidates and parties, financing election campaigns, and investing major resources and people in their implementation. The enemy’s objectives are to raise dissent and discord among people, to desecrate the memory and the role of the living and the dead in the great war for Independence, and to bring Ukraine to ruins. Populism can transform the demand for peace, calm, and well-being into a willingness to forget everything. The mirror for this scenario is Georgia, traumatized by two lost wars and low empathy for their pain from the vast majority of the world, including Europe. Initially, Georgians voted for their "dream" but later it turned out to be a deeply pro-Russian party.

Given that many Ukrainian voters stay abroad, cyber and information interference may assume a new scale. Russia continuously carries out disinformation and cyberattacks all over the world. One of the elements of such hybrid campaigns is interference in the electoral process of democratic countries. Dozens of such cases can be found around the world. Find below some of the recent cases.

Thus, in September 2024, the US Department of Justice reported that Russia Today spent $10 million on “creating and distributing content for the American audience with hidden messages of the Russian government.”

In local elections in Germany, the Kremlin supported the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which promotes a pro-Russian agenda.

In December 2024, Romania's Supreme Security Council declassified documents that the country was the target of “aggressive hybrid Russian attacks” during the recent presidential election.

In November 2024, the Moldovan Foreign Ministry handed a note of protest to the Russian ambassador against “Russia’s illegal interference in the elections and referendum in Moldova in order to distort their results, undermine and delegitimize the democratic process.” According to Cristina Gerasimova, Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova, Russia has spent almost 100 million euros trying to disrupt the presidential election in this country and the referendum on joining the EU.

However, perhaps the most illustrative will be the case of Georgia, where, thanks to the Georgian Dream party and its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, Russia de facto seized power. After the outright falsification of the recent parliamentary elections, protests swept the country, and the pseudo-government definitively turned the vector of development away from the EU. Eventually, mass persecution of activists continues with even greater intensity in Georgia.

At present, it is possible to highlight such possible ways of Russia's influence on the election results and ways to counteract them.

Information-driven influence

One of the key ways of Russia's influence on the elections (and not only) is propaganda and disinformation. This threat is so high that in many security agreements that Ukraine has signed with partners, cooperation in this area is given special attention.

Russia can instigate artificial conflicts in society, hyperbolize certain topics, support candidates they favor in the media, or, conversely, conduct an aggressive “black campaign” against individual politicians or the state as an institution. The Kremlin also has a significant media resource worldwide and can use it to influence millions of voters currently staying abroad.

As  illustrated by the first round of elections in Romania, where Kelin Georgescu, the far-right pro-Russian politician, won with 22.94% of the vote, we can see that social networks can change the election race results. Russia’s powerful ability to use coordinated accounts and promote content using the algorithms of a particular network, coupled with virtually unlimited funding, can have a devastating impact on the democratic expression of will.

To offset Russia's information influence, Ukraine should take the following measures.

1. Adapt Ukrainian legislation to EU legislation in the digital sphere and build a shared information market with the European Union. In the first place, it is about EU regulations on transparency and the targeting of political advertising, the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). These documents protect users’ private data, counteract disinformation and illegal content on social networks, regulate political advertising, etc. Building a common information market will contribute to the establishment of a lasting dialogue with sharing platforms (Meta, Google, X, TikTok).

2. Establishing an ongoing dialogue with social platforms Meta, Google, X, TikTok and foreign countries to counter the spread of Russian narratives and influence the Ukrainian elections. The tools of such information influences can be different and may contain misinformation, particularly AI-⁠generated.

3. Particular attention should be paid to the Telegram platform, one of Ukraine’s most popular sources of information and does not de facto have any content moderation policies, unlike other social networks. This platform is a common platform for Russian and Ukrainian citizens, which additionally affects the amount of disinformation it disseminates.

4. One of the key elements of Ukraine's information-based resilience is also the promotion of media literacy and critical thinking through education, in particular at the level of basic education.  

5. Adaptation of practices of other EU MS and institutions to counter information threats. One example of such adaptation may be the prohibition of the use of TikTok by civil servants, officials, law enforcement officers, and MPs. In the Ukrainian context, a ban on the use of Telegram may also be appropriate.

Political influence

Russia supports pro-Russian projects around the world — from Africa to Europe, and Ukraine is no exception. If we focus on post-war elections, without delving into previous election campaigns, the Kremlin will almost certainly continue to support certain political groups. Given the full-scale Russian invasion, they will most likely not be openly pro-Russian, but may promote narratives of Euroscepticism, rejection of NATO, “reconciliation at any cost with Russia” or even covertly work for the Kremlin. It is possible that even at the state level, the Russian leadership threatens with “consequences for Ukraine in the case of voting for a certain candidate or party.” In other words, there are multiple ways of political influence.

In order to reduce Russia’s influence on the Ukrainian elections, passive suffrage (the right to be elected to government bodies and local self-government) should be restricted at the legislative level for persons involved in international crimes and crimes against the foundations of national security (treason, collaboration, etc.). Additional awareness-raising for people is also needed to increase their political literacy.

Financial influence

During the elections, Russia is likely to continue its policy of supporting pro-Russian candidates by financing their campaigns. For example, before the elections in Moldova, Russia had imported cash and transferred funds to support pro-Russian candidates and falsify the elections. According to the police of Moldova, supporters of the liquidated pro-Russian party “Shor” and Russia, in September and October 2024 alone, transferred $39 million to the country to bribe voters.

Ukraine must do its best to prevent this. Among other things, it is necessary to adopt changes to increase the transparency of financing political parties and reporting on the funds that pass to their accounts. On the other hand, it will increase responsibility for shadow financing of parties and their election campaigns. Currently, one such tool is the Politdata registry developed by the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption.

There is also a need for active monitoring and preventive activities of law enforcement and security agencies to prevent the direct distribution of money and “charitable assistance” to people from pro-Russian organizations of various legal forms used to influence the voting results.

At the same time, it will be more difficult to limit Russian influence abroad, where several million Ukrainian voters stay, because the legislation of Ukraine does not apply there. That is why the Ukrainian state will have to communicate with voters outside the country through educational tools.

Original publication: Media Detector