OPORA Designs a Dashboard Following the Pilot Security Audit in 4 Hromadas

OPORA is happy to present the outcomes of the pilot for the upgraded methodology of security audit we ran in four Hromadas. The Hromadas have a different scale, security context, and the recovery levels but each of them was assessed under the unified method based on our tool. In addition, to make the data and results comparable, Civil Network OPORA created a dashboard.

“In March and April 2025, Civil Network OPORA run security audits in 4 Hromadas: Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, and Snihurivska (Mykolaiv Oblast). The findings and recommendations of OPORA experts can be viewed in an easy to comprehend and brief presentation on the dashboard. In addition, the page presents the profiles for each Hromada. You can also check their proximity to the frontline," says Andriy Savchuk, data analyst at OPORA.

The interactive report accumulated diverse information about Hromadas: the frontline Zaporizhzhia City territorial Hromada; Kryvyi Rih city territorial Hromada often suffering from Russian attacks; the rearward Poltava city territorial Hromada; and the de-occupied Snihurivska city Hromada in Mykolaiv Oblast.

The info panel presents the data collected by OPORA team through official requests for public information from the CEC, local councils / military administrations, SESU, National Police, National Council for Television and Radio; field study; OSINT; and in-depth interviews. Data visualization will help better navigate it.

View the dashboard: Security Assessment for Hromadas

No shelling in the Hromada’s territory is a major precondition for the organization of safe and democratic elections. It is impossible to freely build the government in the settings of continuous threat to life and health of voters, candidates, observers, and other electoral actors.

Even after the shelling ends and the martial law is lifted, the Russian threat does not disappear. That is why it is critical to have and properly maintain the warning systems in Hromadas. Proper functioning of the system allows to promptly respond to threats and ensure the security for citizens in case of repeated attacks or other emergencies.

OPORA verified the information about the number of attacks over the past three months from several official sources, and analyzed the coverage of territories with the warning systems. The audit revealed that all Hromadas under assessment suffered Russian strikes, while the alert warning systems do not cover the entire territory of the settlements.

The key challenge is elated to financial capacity of the Hromadas. In particular, in Snihurivska and Poltava Hromadas, the warning systems need to be extended to fully cover the entire areas. These Hromadas already have the design specifications and estimates drafted to create the automated centralized warning systems.

Free movement within the Hromadas is another significant precondition to resume the social, economic, and political processes. However, because of the Russian aggression, the problem of mine contamination of territories has been most pertinent. In Ukraine, there is an allegedlymined area of 139,000 square km, which is about 23% of the country’s territory.

The fact emphasizes the scale of the problem and the urgency of accounting for mine threat during the security audit in Hromadas. Specifically, we must assess the mine contamination degree in the Hromadas, any identified dangerous/potentially dangerous areas, possibility to move between settlements within the Hromadas, and incidents of death or injury due to detonation of explosive ordnance.

Snihurivska hromada faces the most perilous situation, since during the occupation, the Russian troops were using a huge number of different types of mines and munition. The demining of the Hromada has been estimated as most complicated. On the other hand, Zaporizhzhia and Kryvyi Rih Hromadas suffer from continuous shelling and missile attacks causing potential risks to contaminating the area and roadways with the unexploded cluster munition and other explosive ordnance.

Situation with mines calls for a comprehensive approach, such as to engage international assistance, introduce modern technology, and closely coordinate the effort, nationally and locally.

Proper functioning of units of the SESU and the National Police in a Hromada is critical for the organization of election process, and for the general security level. These services are first responders in emergencies. They maintain public order, exert preventive control, and prevent disruptions, which is especially relevant in wartime.

During the pilot audit, analysts explored the arrival time to the scene of SESU and National Police units, the staffing levels necessary for response in the Hromadas under scrutiny, and the functioning of emergency numbers in the Hromadas (102 and 101/112).

Despite the challenges, both SESU and the National Police show a high level of operational organization. SESU units respond to calls promtply and within the established standards, such as when they arrive to manage the sites after Russian strikes. The police are actively maintaining public order, and arrive to the scene within the expected rules. It is true that all the Hromadas face staffing deficit in the NPU, but the available staff is generally sufficient to maintain the order.

Availability and condition of electoral infrastructure is an indispensary precondition to run the elections. OPORA analysts were assessing whether the territories of the Hromadas under study had any destroyed or damaged electoral facilities, whether the premises have been rennovated or whether it is feasible to open polling stations in other buildings.

The most critical situation has been found in Snihurivska Hromada, where 7 of 25 stations (28%) are not ready for the organization of the vote. Among other things, the village of Bezimenne has been completely destroyed and depopulated, whereas its recovery has been estimated as economically inefficient.

Kryvyi Rih has 3 voting facilities destroyed, and 19 polling stations have been damaged (to be rennovated). In Zaporizhzhia, 12 polling stations have been affected (windows and panes have been damaged). In addition, alternative premises need to be found for two polling stations currently located in the unfit building. Poltava Hromada faces a similar predicament, where one polling station needs to be relocated to a new building (the old building has been worn down with time).

The organization of post-war elections in Ukraine, even when they come in a distant future, demands ample time for a complex preparation, including also the arrangement of sufficient number of bomb shelters near the polling stations, especially in the frontline Hromadas. At the same time, the full-scale Russian invasion shows that we do not have any absolutely safe regions.

During the pilot run, OPORA analysts assessed the availability of defense fortifications within the 1.5 km radus of each regular polling station capable of sheltering at least 20% of registered voters. Zaporizhzhia hromada has 90% of such polling stations, Kryvyi Rih and Poltava Hromadas have 85%, Snihurivska Hromada has 46%. Another challenge will also be the need to assign the bomb shelter to each polling station.

OPORA’s conclusions following the pilot study and reports:

The audit shall help addressing the challenges and eliminating the shortcomings. It needs to be conducted on a regular and timely basis. It makes sense to run the pilot still during the martial law.
The audit criteria shall be set in the law.
The assessment matrix may be aplied for national and local elections alike. The audit can be run in individual settlements or polling stations, not necesserily in the entire Hromadas.
In all Hromadas under assessment, the SESU and Police show a high level of operational organization and adherence to established standards.
The most critical situation in terms of safe reach and mine contamination is found in Snihurivska Hromada, where safe routes need to be certified in advance to ensure electoral logistics, and mine threat awareness campaigns must continue.
Following the Russian full-scale invasion, Snihurivska Hromada has 60% of critical infrastructure and 30% of polling stations affected. Their recovery calls for additional fundings.
A sufficient number of bomb shelters needs to be arranged near the polling stations in Snihurivska Hromada. The situation in other Hromadas is not as dire.
In Poltava and Snihurivska Hromadas, a system of public warning needs to be extended to cover the entire territory.

OPORA Designs a Dashboard Following the Pilot Security Audit in 4 Hromadas

View the dashboard: Security Assessment for Hromadas

Read more: dashboard Security Assessment for Hromadas