Shelling, Landmines, Polling Stations, and Roads: Assessing Voting Security in Various Communities

Under the martial law introduced after Russiaʼs full-scale invasion, holding elections in Ukraine is impossible. However, since elections could happen very quickly after the war ends, preparations must be made in advance. The conditions for holding them will also vary significantly among different communities. To make an informed decision on where elections are possible and where they are not, a comprehensive study based on clear and measurable criteria is needed. These indicators, as well as the government bodies responsible for collecting and verifying data, must be defined in law. This approach should protect against political manipulation and ensure transparency through public oversight. This is especially important given past precedents—in 2020, the Central Election Commission (CEC) was forced to not hold elections in 18 communities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions based on conclusions from military-civil administrations that did not contain clear criteria for such a decision.
That is why Civil Network OPORA developed a security audit methodology that provides a comprehensive assessment of the physical security, socioeconomic, and socio-political situation. In March and April 2025, this methodology was piloted in four communities. Read about the results of the pilot studies below.

About the methodology

The security assessment matrix developed by OPORA can be used for both national and local elections. It also makes it possible to determine the readiness for the election process of individual settlements or even specific polling stations, rather than the entire community. This is particularly important for de-occupied communities, where different settlements have suffered varying degrees of destruction or are being rebuilt at different speeds. Conducting a security audit does not mean the start of the election process. The assessment is necessary to identify the challenges that will arise during the organization of the first post-war elections in each community and to determine the specific resources needed to overcome them.

Election security is a much broader issue than simply the absence of shelling. It involves a whole set of conditions necessary for normal voting and the realization of voters' rights. That is why the audit was conducted in three main areas: security, socio-economic situation, and democratic processes. Specifically, within the security block, our analysts studied the work of the law enforcement system, the safety of movement within the community, the state of the threat warning system, and more. The socio-economic assessment allows for an understanding of the real state of the community's infrastructure, services, and daily life, including the functioning of basic institutions like banks, post offices, Administrative Services Centers (TsNAPs), and Pension Fund offices. The assessment also covered the state of the medical and educational sectors, the level of mobile and internet coverage, and the electricity supply situation.

The assessment of democratic processes is important for understanding the overall capacity of the community to hold elections and the level of socio-political activity within it. This section evaluated the state of election infrastructure, the functioning of the State Voter Register departments and general jurisdiction courts, and the potential for recruiting people to work on election commissions.

Which communities were selected for the audit

For the pilot study, analysts selected four diverse communities: Zaporizhzhia, Poltava, Kryvyi Rih, and Snihurivka (Mykolaiv region).
The Zaporizhzhia urban community is close to the frontline (33 km from the line of combat engagement). The Poltava urban community (which includes the city of Poltava and 55 villages) was chosen because of its distance from the border with the Russian Federation (114 km) and the front line (188 km to the city of Vovchansk, Kharkiv region). Most of the Kryvyi Rih community is located within 70 km of the front line, but it is frequently subjected to missile attacks, mostly ballistic ones. The Snihurivka community is de-occupied; most of its territory is located in the zone from 30 to 50 km from the front line. The community has suffered significant damage from shelling, and part of it remains destroyed.

Assessment results

None of the communities passed the audit due to non-compliance with two of the three basic criteria, which are “entry conditions” and must be met 100%. Specifically, the legal regime of martial law is in effect in Ukraine, and the communities studied are subjected to systemic shelling. The only basic criterion that all communities met was being under Ukrainian control.
The next stages of the audit involve assessing mandatory and optional indicators that characterize the state of physical security, socio-economic conditions, and the restoration of democratic processes in the
communities. All communities in the pilot study passed the audit in the areas of socio-economic and democratic processes. Three communities (Zaporizhzhia, Poltava, and Snihurivka) passed the audit in the area of responding to security challenges. The only community that did not receive a satisfactory assessment in this area was Kryvyi Rih—due to an insufficient number of shelters for the population. According to various data, the shelters and protective structures in this community can accommodate between 63,000 and 73,000 people, which is no more than 10% of the population. As part of the study, OPORA also created an interactive dashboard where you can view the communities distance from the front line, the condition of  polling stations, the availability of shelters near them, the functioning of law enforcement and emergency services, the coverage of settlements by a warning system, and the presence of landmines in territories.


Common problems in communities

Destruction of election Infrastructure. The worst situation with election infrastructure is in the Snihurivka community, where, at the time of the audit, eight polling stations (31%) were unfit for voting, four of which were completely destroyed. In Kryvyi Rih, according to the CEC, about 7% of polling stations are unfit for voting—three are completely destroyed, and another 19 are damaged but can be restored. In the Zaporizhzhia community, 4.5% of polling stations are currently unfit for voting—12 polling stations were damaged as a result of Russian shelling, and two more became unusable for reasons not related to shelling. In the Poltava community, only one polling station was damaged (not due to Russian military aggression).


Mine Danger. The worst situation with explosive ordnance was recorded in the Snihurivka community. 43 km 2 of its territory (50% of settlements) are still contaminated/potentially contaminated with explosive ordnance. As a result, there are periodic cases of injury and death due to explosions, which makes it impossible to fully conduct an election campaign without determining safe routes. The Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhzhia communities are regularly shelled, so they also have potential risks of injury and/or death due to explosions of unexploded cluster munitions and other explosive devices in certain areas and on roads.

Warning Systems. The best situation with warning system coverage is in Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhzhia (100% and 96% of the communities, respectively). In the Poltava community, the system functions only in the city of Poltava and two of the 55 surrounding villages, while in Snihurivka, electric sirens cover only the community center. Shelters at Polling Stations. As part of the study, analysts developed a tool to assess the availability and accessibility of shelters within 1.5 km of each regular polling station in the four communities evaluated. A separate condition was that each shelter had to be able to simultaneously accommodate at least 20% of the voters registered at the station. In the Zaporizhzhia community, 90% of stations met this condition; in Kryvyi Rih and Poltava, it was 85%; and in Snihurivka, it was 46%. However, all listed communities are in the range of ballistic missile strikes, which necessitates the development of more detailed safety protocols. In particular, shelters should be located at a much closer distance (up to 500 meters) from polling stations. A specific shelter should also be designated for each regular polling station.

Staffing of National Police units. All four communities show a slight deficit in National Police personnel (due to the sensitivity of this information, the data obtained is not public). However, National Police representatives assure that if elections are scheduled, there will be enough police officers to guard the polling station premises. One additional option could also be to involve personnel from the National Guard of Ukraine.

Educational Process. In all communities, a mixed format of school education has been introduced. Not all schools are operational in the Snihurivka community—only 11 out of 17 (64%). This community was
significantly destroyed as a result of the Russian occupation and shelling. No community has 100% of its schools equipped with shelters. In the Poltava community, 49 (84%) schools have simple shelters, and another 7 (6%) rent premises nearby. In the Kryvyi Rih community, 107 schools (85%) have shelters, and in Zaporizhzhia, there are 82 such schools (75%). The lowest provision of shelters in schools was recorded in the Snihurivka community, where only 10 schools (58%) have protective structures.
 

Recommendations
Based on the results of the security assessment in the four pilot communities, OPORA developed the following recommendations. Election infrastructure facilities that can be restored should be repaired
before the start of the election process. If buildings are beyond repair, polling stations should be moved to other locations. Such changes should be formalized in separate decisions in cooperation between the Central Election Commission and local government bodies.
This implies the need to develop the logistics for election day, especially in communities where certain settlements have been significantly or completely destroyed (as in the Snihurivka community), as well as those that are partially under occupation. This must guarantee all citizens the opportunity to exercise their right to vote. It is also important to ensure a sufficient number of shelters for voters and members of election commissions, and for each polling station—to clearly designate a specific shelter that people can use in case of an emergency. Special attention should be given to public threat warning systems—they need to be modernized in the Poltava and Snihurivka communities. Considering the results of the pilot study, OPORA concluded that a security audit is not needed in all communities of Ukraine. Analysts propose conducting such an assessment in communities that are within a 60-kilometer zone from the line of contact or the border with Russia; that were temporarily occupied for more than a year; and in communities where a certain percentage of polling station premises are unfit for organizing a vote. However, the discussion on this issue is still ongoing.

Source: Glavkom