In transitional societies, to which, as is generally known, is enlisted Ukraine, the system of election bodies (commissions) – is not only an institute of organization and conduction of elections, but also an effective political technology. The technology, which gives noncompetitive advantages for some political forces, and confines electoral perspectives of the others. Principles of functioning of election bodies for constant democracy is a secondary technical problem, which has no political hue. In societies where democratic practices are not formed yet, peculiarities of the electoral bodies directly affect the quality and results of elections.

In Ukraine before each election arises the question: who and how will conduct them. Although legislators and experts are trying to find new approaches formation and activities of election commissions, the problem still remains on the political agenda. The issue is unsettled because of two main reasons. Firstly, civilized practices of campaigning are still not formed between the political elite, that’s why proving its effectiveness will be difficult even for the best legislative novations. Secondly, there are no standard approaches to the formation and functioning of the electoral bodies, that's why national political and legal system needs to find its own solution of this problem.

There are no absolutely identical administrative bodies of the election process in the international practices, and all approaches to its formation and legislative design are different. The electoral bodies may be integrated into sole hierarchy or to be decentralized, belong to governmental structures or to have independent status, have temporary or permanent authority etc.  

The Code of good practice in electoral matters states, that in countries with insufficient experience of conducting pluralistic elections is better to form independent, impartial electoral commissions. In says, where administrative bodies are traditionally independent from the political authorities, conduction of election by the government is acceptable.

At the beginning of the 2000-ies was conducted an international research of institutional models of electoral administration, which are mostly used in the world[1].

Institutional model of electoral administration

North America and West Europe (%)

Latin America and Caribbean region (%)

Asia and

Pacific

region (%)

Middle East and

Maghreb (%)

Eastern and Central

Europe (%)

Africa

to the south of the Sahara (%)

Total (%)

Number of cases studied

Elections are administrated by the government

43

12

30

45

-

8

20

29

Elections are administrated by the government

under the supervision of collective or controlling bodies

43

18

7

33

33

39

27

40

Independent election commissions

14

70

63

22

67

53

53

79

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

148

Number of cases studied in the region

21

34

30

9

18

36

148

 

Generally, in 148 of examined countries most frequently is practiced formation of independent election bodies (53%). However, the results of investigation show an interesting tendency: in world regions where exist stable democratic traditions, elections are more often managed by the government, then by independent commissions.

In North America and Western Europe is equally practiced administration of elections by the governmental structures with attraction of controlling bodies or subjects (judicial institutions, national supervisory bodies, representation of political parties, etc.) or without them. For example, there are no special election bodies in Great Britain. Their functions perform officials of MIA and local authorities. Besides that, in France election administration is also performed by MIA, but with special commissions of control over voting and campaigning, national accounting commission, etc Only Canada, Iceland and Malta have hierarchy of independent bodies which are responsible for the election administration.

Other world regions practice establishing a system of independent electoral bodies. The best example is Eastern and Central Europe, where in 67% electoral institutions are created independently from the administrative hierarchy.

The connection between stable democratic practices and institutional model of election administrative bodies proves the adequacy of the effective approach to the formation of election commissions in Ukraine.

When forming electoral practices, the system of election commissions must secure not only qualitative accomplishment of procedures, but it also should be based on the principles of mutual control of political competitors.

At the present stage of the political development of Ukraine, initiative on the establishment of “permanent” or “professional” commissions is premature and risky, because functions of mutual control of political forces may be weakened.

On the parliamentary elections in Ukraine the system of election commissions consists of three levels: the Central Election Commission, district and precinct election commissions. These commissions are special independent collegial bodies, which are aimed at the equal application of the election legislation in Ukraine.

The system of election commissions which functions during the parliamentary elections in Ukraine passed the following stages of its formation:

Exclusive influence of executive bodies on the commission formation and the absence of mechanisms for taking into consideration interests of election competitors (1990-1994).

On 1990 elections district and precinct election commissions were formed by local councils through nomination of candidates by labor collectives, civic organizations, street committees, educational institutions, voter meetings etc. Election commissions for 1994 elections were also formed by local councils, but already through nomination by the heads of these councils with declarative consideration of proposals from political parties, labor collectives, and groups of voters.

This approach to the election commission formation is still supported by certain people which speak in its favor. (non-politicization and the stability of commissions, supposed absence of systematic violations). However, we should take into account, that in 1990-1994 were established new cardinal practices, and election administration wasn’t a new technology for political competitors at that time.

Introduction of representation of political parties in election commissions, and preservation of impact of local councils on their formation (1998)

When the mixed-proportional election system was introduced in 1998, political parties became valuable subjects of election commission formation. To the staff of election commissions, formed by local councils, was necessarily included one representative from each political party and electoral bloc which party lists were registered in the nationwide multi-mandate district. At the same time, the minimal number of commission members determined by the law – 8 people.

In 1998 district election commissions formed local councils by the submission of village, town and city mayors, but necessarily including one representative from each party or bloc which had lists of candidates in the nationwide district. Other subjects of election commission formation were also provided by the law: submission of the fifth part from the deputies of the corresponding local council, offers from enterprises, bodies of self-organization of population, public organizations of national minorities at their place of compact residence.

On elections 1998 a number of representatives from parties and blocs in election commissions was correlated with their activeness in the nomination of candidates in single-mandate and nationwide districts. It means, that it was possible to determine mediated tendency: the more candidates, the stronger representation of parties and blocs in commissions.

The division of parties and blocs into “parliamentary" and “extra-parliamentary” subjects of election commission formation (2002-2006). Empowering CEC to form district election commissions.

On 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine was firstly introduced a compulsory quota for consideration of in the district and precinct election commissions parliamentary political forces.

grafikgrafik 1

In 2002 when forming precinct election commissions parties (blocs), which overcame 4% election threshold on previous elections, and parties and blocs which had own factions in then-current complement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, received compulsory quota (one representative). Other subjects of elections were chosen to election commissions by sortition. However, all parties and blocs, which bad for the representation in precinct commissions, should have had registered organizations in the region where single-mandate district was formed.

On 2006 election a preference for enrolling one representative to the staff of election commissions had parties and blocs which had own factions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. In contrast to 2002, when parliamentary, extra-parliamentary forces and majoritarian candidates had equal rights, on these elections the compulsory quota for parliamentary parties and blocs concerned also this level.

The monopoly of parliamentary parties and blocs in election commission (2007)            

In 2007 the parliamentary majority and parliamentary opposition equally divided precinct and district election commissions. Other 15 subjects of the extraordinary elections didn't have legislative possibility to have representation in these commissions. On the example of this approach to the election commission formation, political elites showed high level of mutual distrust and attempts to receive noncompetitive advantages, but other subjects of election suffered from this situation.

grafik 2

Transitional statements of the ruling majority of the bill 9265-1 (by VR deputy O.Yefremov and others) provided that to the staff of precinct and district election commissions must be enrolled:

  • political party, deputy faction of which is registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the current convocation (not more than three members of the commission);
  • political parties, members of the bloc, deputy faction of which is registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the current convocation (not more than three members of the commission).

Thus, there was proposed a scheme 15/3, when parliamentary political parties received 15 seats in precinct and district election commissions, and other 3 seats should have been divided by sortition.

The bill by the ruling majority was profoundly criticized on groundless preferences for parliamentary forces when forming commissions, subjective criteria when including submissions from political parties for their membership in commissions and nomination of executives, and also problematic realization of their quotas in election commissions by the opposition. Taking into consideration that oppositional factions consist of some parties, it was very difficult for them to determine single candidacies for the membership of election commissions. Election blocs in the parliament don’t present real arrangement of political forces, so there was a risk of usage the fact of their formal existence for domination in election commissions.  

The draft project by Yefremov provided only one criterion for determination of election commission members – experience of work in election commissions. This extremely abstract criterion was actively used during 2010 local elections, when the majority in commissions was received by political forces which only nominally participated in elections. For example, Donetsk territorial election commission formed that time district election commissions by the submission of political parties, which had almost no candidates on the elections to the city council.

grafik 3

Distribution of executive positions in Donetsk district election commissions.

Local civic observers and oppositional forces draw attention of mass media and wide publicity on this doubtful situation, but the judicial institutions have confirmed the legality of the territorial commission decision, which was based on provided by the law criterion - experience of work in election commissions.

Draft Law of Ukraine “On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine”, which was introduced by the deputy Kniazevych and successfully supported in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was essentially different from the Yefremov Project in the part concerning formation of election commissions.  It provides, that one representative from each deputy faction registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the current convocation will surely be enrolled to all precinct and district commissions at the beginning of the election process. Other members of election commissions are chosen by sortition.

Taking into consideration the maximum membership of district (18 people) and precinct election commissions (24 people), this to their formation is more democratic than provided by the Yefremov bill. Positive is the fact that deputies refused from their intention to forbid prohibit the recall and replacement by the political parties their representatives in election commissions In conditions of Ukrainian electoral practices formation, this prohibition would increase possibilities for shadow influencing commission members which represent other subjects by the certain political forces.

Conclusion

  • In transitional societies, independent election commissions with proportional representation from the political forces more adequately correspond more adequately meet the objectives of democratic development than administration of elections by the governmental structures;
  • Election formation practice in Ukraine went through different stages of it’s development: from ignoring interests of subjects of elections to domination of parliamentary forces in this process;
  • Independent election commissions with representation from parties comes along with several considerable problems in Ukraine. Nevertheless, establishment of "permanent" or "professional" election commissions is premature and risky, because now we are talking primarily about the establishment of democratic practices;
  • In order to improve approach to the formation of election commission, all preferences for parliamentary forces should be cancelled.
  • Perspective for legislative regulation may become complex system for training election commission members, and introducing compulsory advance preparation of candidates by parties.

[1] Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance

Material is prepared for the website “How do we choose the Verkhovna Rada?”