How oppositionist is the Russian “Opposition”? What ideas do they share in the media, also in Ukrainian media where they are invited even after more than a year into the full-scale war? How does their activity impact the international opinion, and therefore the attitude to the Russian-Ukrainian war? OPORA team was looking for answers to these questions in a thorough study of the media activity of Russians who present themselves as opposition to the current Russian government.
DISCLAIMER
The authors of the study analyzed the Twitter accounts of Russian “oppositionists” but the links to their original posts are not included intentionally, in order not to promote the profiles of Russians among the Ukrainian audiences.
In the previous long read, the researchers analyzed how the “opposition” associations of the Anti-War Committee and the Forum of Free Russia see the Russia’s exit strategy from a full-scale war. This article will focus on by far the most famous Russian “opposition” community in Ukraine and in the world — the Navalny Team. OPORA team has been investigating the Twitter activity of some representatives of this association for almost a year (from February 24, 2022 to February 7, 2023).
The objective of this study is to find out what the Russian “opposition” really is and what challenges we would face if they come to power.
While the “Shahids”, “Daggers” and kamikaze drones of the enemy keep flying in the Ukrainian sky, the information-based war keeps running, too. Its aggravation is never notified by an air alarm, though. In addition to the constant retention of foreigners' attention to the full-scale war in Ukraine, Ukrainians now have to win back the media platforms from the so-called Russian opposition. In fact, the Western media willingly invite them to various live broadcasts, radio and television programs. Of course, calling themselves the opposition, such Russians somehow talk about basic democratic beliefs and values, the end of war in Ukraine, the establishment of peace and justice on Ukraine’s terms. However, if you carefully analyze their statements, you can see that it is far from their key topic. Today, the key goal of Russian “oppositionists”, like any politicians, is quite simple: to win the commitment of as many voters as possible.
Who Are Navalny Team?
Navalny Team are supporters of the Russian “oppositionist” Alexei Navalny. It was established in 2011, after he founded the Anti-Corruption Foundation (further — ACF). But he started his public and political activity back in 2004. He founded the “Committee for the Protection of Muscovites.” They addressed issues related to the improvement and protection of the rights and freedoms of Moscow residents. Later, human rights and anti-corruption trends shaped further Navalny’s public activity. Eventually, it institutionalized upon establishing the ACF. In 2013, he ran for mayor of Moscow and came second after the current capital city head, Sergey Sobyanin.
Navalny Team. Photo: picture-alliance, AP Photo
In August 2020, Russian special services attempted an assassination at the so-called oppositionist; they poisoned him with a nerve agent “Novichok”. After rehabilitation from the consequences of this attack, Navalny was arrested at the airport, upon arrival to Russia, because of fraud and legalization of criminal funds. For the next 9 years, he must serve his sentence in a strict regime colony. The investigation of this case was featured by a Canadian film director, Daniel Roher, made a documentary “Bulk.” In 2023, he received an Oscar in the “Best Documentary” nomination. It looks like a typical dossier of an ardent activist whose activities are bothering for the current government. But it’s not all that smooth. Attentive observers have long noticed how skillfully Navalny created an information bubble around himself, which motivates people not only to empathize with him but also to heroize him. Even the case with the presentation of the “Oscar” was part of the game using Hollywood techniques, as aptly noticed by Azad Safarov, the second director and line producer of the film “A House Made of Splinters,” also nominated for this film award. So, before we move on to the study findings, let us see what Navalny “loaded” on everyone.
"The Crimean Question"
One of the most resonant statements that Navalny is still known for in Ukraine is his comment about Crimea, in an interview with the Russian radio station, Echo of Moscow, in 2014. In that case, he was asked a direct question by the interviewer Alexei Venediktov “Is Crimea ours?” and Navalny replied that the peninsula belonged to the people living there. The politician said that although “Crimea was seized with flagrant violations of all international norms,” it is de facto Russian. He also advised Ukrainians to accept the idea that “Crimea will remain part of Russia and will never again become Ukrainian in the near future.” When asked whether Navalny would return Crimea to Ukraine if he were to become a president of the Russian Federation, he replied with the notorious words: “Crimea isn’t a sausage sandwich, is it? To turn it back and forth?” However, no one heard any definitive words from the “oppositionist” claiming that the peninsula was Ukrainian. Since these words of Navalny continue to shape the reputation of his associates, they have to return to this topic from time to time.
To ultimately understand how Navalny relates to the Russian occupation of the Crimea, some video materials of his team members were reviewed as an exception in the study. Those videos allegedly debunked myths about their leader. In the first place, Leonid Volkov accused the Echo of Moscow interviewer. He said that he deliberately provoked Navalny staying on house arrest to comment on the issue of Crimea. Volkov also emphasizes that in the past, the so-called Crimean consensus dominated among the Russian political elite. According to him, Putin then managed to “sell” to his people the idea of occupying Crimea and get reputational dividends from this. Therefore, any statements against it meant almost political suicide for any politician. It must be admitted that despite this, in that interview, Navalny dared to adhere to his position and condemn the criminal seizure of the Ukrainian peninsula.
Navalny on air on the radio "Echo of Moscow", a screenshot from the video
Volkov refers to the “original source” — to the alleged first statement of Navalny about the occupation of Crimea, published in March 2014 on his LJ. He accuses “Twitter critics” who “are lazy to read the original source before pulling out the quotes of the context.” The authors of the study were not lazy to review this publication and found there many other dubious statements of Navalny. Even before reaching the topic of Crimea, at the beginning of the publication, the so-called oppositionist called Ukrainians “Khokhols” and devoted a whole paragraph to the fact that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians are “brothers in different apartments, rather than just neighbors,” and “fraternal” relations with Ukraine and Belarus are “Russia's strategic advantage in this world.” He also refers to a case during one of his imprisonment: “I was staying there for 7 days, in a special detention center, and the cell had, among others, a Belarusian guy, a migrant worker, an Azerbaijani and an Uzbek. All the good guys, and we all ate potatoes with the sprat, but in the situation with Belarusians or Khokhols, each of us immediately feels unity and shared cultural codes. I’m not sure how to offer a more precise description.” Well, Ukrainians had a chance to read those “cultural codes” again — in Bucha, Mariupol, Izium, and other de-occupied places.
LIVEJOURNAL
Eng. LiveJournal is a popular blogging platform in Russia.
In addition, in this article, Navalny asks himself, “is it fair that Crimea belongs to Ukraine?” He answers right away: “Well, of course not. The fact that Crimea accidentally “got” to Ukraine is wrong, unfair, and insulting to any normal citizen of the Russian Federation. Crimea was transferred by the illegal voluntarist decision of the high-handed [Nikita] Khrushchev. The responsibility rests with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and all these stupid political bureaus. It would be great remind the Communists about that, as they became so militant out of a sudden. The need to pay “rent” for the base of the Black Sea Fleet is generally furious, too. Crimea is beautiful, it’s gorgeous. My wife and I had our first vacation there.”
Navalny continues that, despite this, he condemns the occupation of Crimea because it is a violation of international law and internationally recognized treaties, also recognized by by Russia, and they must be respected. As to the pseudo-referendum, which Putin presented as a basis for the occupation of the peninsula, he does not consider it an expression of the will from local residents. The fact that Crimea first became part of Russia at the end of the 18th century through the aggressive policy of Catherine II; that during the seizure of the peninsula by the Bolsheviks at the beginning of the 20th century the inhabitants of Crimea resisted and declared their independence, which is why about 600 qirimli leading the resistance were shot by the occupiers; that in the middle of the 20th century the Soviet regime deported almost 200,000 Crimean Tatars from their homeland — all of this Navalny either does not know (at least, he is good at pretending), or ignores.
At the beginning of 2023, Maria Pievchykh (Navalny team member) was also affected by the “Crimean issue.” In an interview with The Guardian, she refused to comment on Navalny’s statements about Crimea, saying that it did not concern the topic of the conversation (the effort to release the “oppositionist”). However, it remains a mystery what prevented Maria from giving a short and unequivocal answer with just two words — “Crimea is Ukrainian” — and returning to the topic of Navalny’s.
Also, Navalny team every so often posted on their Twitter accounts or added maps to the video series on the YouTube channel, where Ukraine is shown without Crimea, which also legitimizes the Russian occupation of the peninsula. For example, in his regular column on the Navalny LIVE channel, Vladimir Milov, discussed Ukrainian nuclear power plants and used the map of Ukraine without Crimea. He tried to defend himself against criticism by explaining that it was a “scheme”, rather than a map, and therefore it could not be geographically accurate. Ukrainians also recall Navalny team and the map from the 2017 presidential campaign, where Crimea was also designated as part of Russia. In September 2022, Leonid Volkov complained that as part of the campaign, they had no choice but to comply with Russian legislation, which requires that kind of map.
Map with annexed Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Photo from open sources
To summarize all that “sandwich” farce: although in 2022 the majority of Navalny team members learned to pronounce the precious words “Crimea is Ukrainian”, the only thing they refered to are the norms of international law. It certainly is better than nothing. However, Navalny associates are by no means talking about a policy of compensation or repentance to Crimean Tatars who have been repressed by Russia since the 18th century to the present day. But even if the self-called Russian “oppositionists” reflect on this, they do not speak in public about the further status of Russians who illegally seized Ukrainian property in the occupied territories, or about the mechanisms for compensating the losses caused to Ukraine. But still, it makes them “furious” to “pay the rent [for the Black Sea Fleet].
Navalny and the Company After the Start of the Big War
Representatives of the Navalny team stand apart from all other “opposition” communities, and openly declare their refusal to cooperate with them. After Russia launched a full-scale invasion, Navalny’s associates said that virtually all of their activities from then on would be reduced to an “information front.” They cover the details of Navalny’s imprisonment and advocate his release, as well as cover the Russian war in Ukraine.
In addition, the supporters of the “oppositionist” consider the sanctions as another crucial “front” of their own. In April 2022, they created the “6000 List” (or the “List of Corrupt Officials and War Instigators”). It included Russian officials, media people, and oligarchs involved in the theft of Russian property and the incitement of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Since then, representatives of Navalny team have been actively advising Western countries to use the list as a reference for the application of personal sanctions. It is noteworthy that in March 2023, the chairman of the board of ACF Leonid Volkov had to resign because of a scandal with the signing of a letter to the EU regarding the lifting of sanctions from the Russian oligarch Mikhail Fridman, included in the “List of 6000”, and his three business partners.
In October 2022, Navalny’s supporters announced the resumption of the work of the regional cells of the “Navalny Headquarters” founded by the politician during the presidential election campaign of 2017 and recognized in Russia as “extremist organization” in 2021. They are now operating underground. According to Navalnysts, over the past year, the ruling regime of the current President of the Russian Federation has weakened, and therefore it is time to restore the grassroots association of citizens in the fight “against Putin, war, and mobilization.” Also in 2021, ACF published one of their most resonant investigations on Navalny's YouTube channel. It is a film about Putin’s so-called palace in Gelendzhik. The film is about a corruption scheme headed by Putin, according to ACF. They say that he owns a huge mansion of almost 68 hectares, on the Black Sea coast, but hides his property through a number of proxies.
Unlike other Russian so-called oppositionists analyzed in the first part of the study for their media visibility, Navalny team calls on Russians to protest and resist inside Russia. They pay the fines for protesters and provide them with legal support in the event of arrest and the opening of administrative or criminal proceedings. However, their appeals have not reached any massive effect.
Media Profile of "Oppositionists"
To analyze the exit strategies of the Russian Federation from the war, according to Navalny team, we selected 12 of their members with the largest number of followers on Twitter. The sample included two team collective accounts and 10 personal accounts.
Tweets of these so-called oppositionists were analyzed from February 24, 2022 to February 7, 2023. We focused on messages with any references to Russia’s exit strategy from the war. These are the following 9 topics:
– introduction of sanctions against citizens of the Russian Federation and Russian companies;
– support for the supply of weapons to Ukraine or, conversely, calls for its termination;
– the need for negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the conditions for their conduct;
– payment of reparations to Ukraine after the end of the war (amounts of compensation, sources of their revenues, mechanisms for calculating and paying);
– collective responsibility of Russians (who are to blame for the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and views on the policy of repentance in the event of Ukraine’s victory);
– trial of Russian war criminals;
– withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the temporarily occupied territories (TOTs) of Ukraine (not only military, but also political);
– return of children deported from Ukraine;
– vision of the future of the Russian Federation (the likelihood of changing borders, civil war, potential internal reforms, etc.).
Mentioning some of the topics does not mean that the politician spoke about them (e.g. sanctions) in the context of justice and compensation for losses to Ukraine. This study takes into account any mentions of the listed topics.
The sample only recorded written statements of “oppositionists”, so no interviews, podcasts, live broadcasts, YouTube blogs, or other formats of selected politicians were included in the data set. The data was collected using web scraping of selected Twitter accounts (scraping – automated creation of a database of tweets of a particular user). The final sample included only users’ own tweets, their responses to other users’ tweets, and comments on shared articles, videos, or other external content.
In total, in almost a year of full-scale invasion, representatives of Navalny team published 2,577 tweets related to Russia’s exit strategy from the war. This figure is almost three times higher than that of the Free Russia Forum and the Anti-War Committee, whose Twitter media activity was analyzed in the first part of the study — 875 tweets. However, posts about the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from a full-scale war are only about 10% of the total number of tweets by Navalny team members for the selected period of time.
It is no less revealing that since about September 2022, Navalny team have been covering less and less topics regarding Russia’s exit strategy. For example, while in April-May 2022, the sanctions were mentioned by these “oppositionists” 340 times, then in the period from December 2022 to January 2023 there were hardly 70 posts. With other topics, we can observe the same trend: the collective responsibility of Russians was most often mentioned in March 2022 (143 tweets), and in January 2023 it was referred to 24 times only. Presumably, it indicates that the Russian-Ukrainian war is gradually ceasing to be the number one topic for Navalny's team.
Imposing Sanctions Against Russia
In almost a year of full-scale war, the Navalny-ists posted 1,020 tweets about the imposition of sanctions. Leonid Volkov wrote the most on this topic — 232 tweets, Alexei Navalny and Ruslan Shaveddinov — 105 tweets, each. After peaking at 176 tweets in April and 136 tweets in August 2022, there have been fewer calls for sanctions. In January 2023, Navalny’s supporters mentioned them only 29 times.
In February 2023, Navalny team published in their social networks a text entitled “15 Points for a Russian Citizen Wishing Well to Their Country” (further — “15 Points”). It summarizes their vision of an exit strategy from the war. Sanctions were only mentioned once in the “15 points”: after the overthrow of the Putin regime, sanctions from the oil and gas industries of the Russian Federation should be removed, and part of the money from profits should be sent as reparations to Ukraine.
However, in their Twitter accounts, Navalny’s associates paid the most attention to promoting their “6000 List”, which, as of April 2023, included the names of almost 7,000 people involved in corruption in the Russian Federation and war crimes in Ukraine. Navalny team regularly informs their readers who of the Russian oligarchs, politicians, or public figures they added to the list, and who of them had been sanctioned. In the accounts of the so-called opposition, you can find hundreds of tweets investigating Russian figures supporting the war. They describe their undetected real estate, who has children studying abroad or how the sanctioned Russians bypass the restrictions. It is notable that, in comparison with the Anti-War Committee and the Free Russia Forum, Navalny team offers a larger list of people who, in their opinion, should be punished by Western sanctions. In particular, Russian propagandists (Margarita Simonyan, Volodymyr Solovyov, Kateryna Andreeva, etc.). The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Patriarch Kirill are considered guilty of war and worthy of a place on the sanctions lists.
Representatives of Navalny team are also trying to explain to their subscribers their own vision of the sanctions policy. In their opinion, personal restrictions (in support of which the “6000 List” was created) should “make Putin toxic.” The Navalny-ists believe that all persons on their list (currently included or to be added in the future) supporting the war in Ukraine and Putin should not only immediately lose everything they possess outside Russia, but also be deprived by the collective West of the opportunity to go abroad. However, then the “enlisted” must choose: either to support Putin and remain under sanctions, or to be removed from the sanctions lists, if they “are dismissed from their positions, publicly condemn Putin and the war, and disclose everything they know.” However, Navalny’s associates do not indicate whether the reputation of such people will be completely whitewashed. For example, if one day Margarita Simonyan comes out with a statement condemning Putin’s policy, will she also be completely forgiven and removed from the sanctions, despite her obvious involvement in war crimes in Ukraine? At the same time, even within Navalny team, not everyone accepts this approach.
MARGARITA SIMONYAN
A Russian propagandist, editor-in-chief of the Russian edition of Rossiya Segodnya, and head of the multilingual propaganda TV channel Russia Today.
Margarita Simonyan. Photo by Associated Press
As for the introduction of sanctions against Russia in general, here, according to these “oppositionists”, “it’s complicated.” Navalny's team is trying to prove to the Russians that Western countries’ sanctions are effective and will affect everyone. They keep writing that they are painful, that all attempts by the Russian authorities to develop domestic production will be unsuccessful, and would eventually lead to a situation, as in Aeroflot, when some aircraft are dismantled to repair others. While attempts to scare Russians with the highest ever price increase since 1999 may indeed be efficient, they are combined with another, more slippery interpretation of sanctions. For example, Vyacheslav Gimadi wrote that “ACF [advocate for] sanctions not for your passport or place of birth but for specific corruption ties with the Putin regime.”
Regarding economic sanctions, Navalny’s supporters say that this strategy is wrong because it affects “20% of the anti-Putin electorate: people who fly to Europe, transfer money abroad, and own real estate.” As regards other categories of the population, such restrictions are not efficient as these people “had not lived well, and they will not be starting”. “Oppositionists” also reject the policy of EU entry ban for Russians. They say that “banning visas will affect those people who are useful in the fight against Putin” because it “turns anti-war-minded Russians away from the democratic West” and “makes them suffer.” As Leonid Volkov writes, the West’s attempts to force the Russians to overthrow the totalitarian regime through economic pressure and restrictions on exit will only make them “a support for the regime.”
In the same way, Navalny activists criticize the prohibition of access to European resources and educational programs for Russians. They believe it is their only opportunity to go abroad. Also in the tweets, Navalny’s associates claim they do not understand the decisions of some EU countries to ban the broadcast of the “Dozhd” TV channel because it allegedly tells the truth about the war in Ukraine. They also criticize the blocking of Ria Novosti in the EU, saying that to start with, this media should be blocked in the Russian Federation.
Alexey Korostylev on air of the TV channel “Dozhd,” a screenshot from the video
The Collective Responsibility of Russians
During the observation period, Navalny’s associates published 704 tweets about the collective responsibility of Russian. Leonid Volkov (232 tweets), the Navalny Team Twitter account (125 tweets), and Ivan Zhdanov (76 tweets) posted the most. In the process of data coding, any mentions like “Putin’s war,” “Putin’s war,” etc., were labeled by the researchers as those related to collective responsibility because such formulations neutralize the involvement of Russians in a full-scale war and blur their responsibility (direct or indirect) for the consequences of the war that has been going on for more than 9 years. For example, in November 2022, Leonid Volkov tweeted that after Putin announced general mobilization, “support for Putin’s crimes in Russian society is dropping.” It looks like Putin himself set up torture chambers, or raped and shot civilians in various settlements of Ukraine. Yes, it is Putin who “bombs cities and kills innocent people,” as Kira Yarmysh tweeted, factoring out a long chain of soldiers and officials involved in those crimes. At the same time, Maria Pievchykh, among other things, was surprised that “not a single [Russian] minister, deputy, or at least an official, resigned because of the war.” Does everyone support the war? How else could this be interpreted?” she asked her Twitter followers.
Navalny’s associates actively promote the idea that the Russian people actually do not support Putin, and no sociological survey can be relevant under authoritarian rule. In his tweet, Vladimir Milov even directly labelled as idiots those who share data about almost two-thirds of Russians supporting the war in Ukraine. He argues that this only “divides people” and hinders the fight against Putin. In contrast, the Navalny-ists are promoting their own non-representative sociological surveys (which they actually admit) regularly run by the ACF team that allegedly reflect the “real” level of support by the Russians for the war started in Ukraine. Navalny team members claim they had previously conducted surveys under scientific standards. However, after the beginning of a full-scale invasion, representation had to be abandoned because fewer Russians are willing to talk about the war in Ukraine. So, their sample reflects the opinion of residents of Russia’s capital only, as they are active Internet users. The fact that only 7% of respondents (out of a sample of 700 residents of the city of Moscow) consider it necessary to allocate more budget funds to finance the Russian army, in June 2022, was interpreted by Navalny team that very few Russians support the war, after all. In the same way, “oppositionists” disseminate data that increasingly more residents of the Russian Federation are beginning to consider their country an aggressor, not a peacemaker, and accuse it of war. However, like the representatives of Navalny team, they are getting to better understand that their surveys are not representative because they reflect the opinion of the capital city residents only, rather than of all Russia’s regions. Even more so, those are the regions accepting to contact the organization recognized by the Moscow city court as extremist. Navalny supporters are aware of these limitations and emphasize that when conducting these surveys, even with a small sample, they are primarily interested in the dynamics of responses over different periods of time.
WAR SUPPORT DATA
Sociological survey of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (rus. ВЦИОМ), held in August 2022.
Navalny-ists get extremely offended that Russians are called “slaves” and “incapable of democracy.” They believe these statements are “pro-Putin,” “immoral,” and “untrue”. But who will need to tell them that they need to prove the opposite with successful examples or at least with persistent attempts to act, rather than chatting on Twitter? A member of Navalny team, Georgy Alburov, was expressing his surprised claiming that if Russians had slave genes, then why the 3 million Ukrainians without those slave genes living in Russia had not yet demolished the regime? Although Navalny’s associates generally agree that Russian citizens should bear collective responsibility, they usually put a coma after this statement, rather than a full stop. For instance, Vladimir Milov tried to make excuses on his Twitter: “Although Russia and the Russians are guilty, some people go too far”; “I did my best to stop Putin, and I refuse to share this responsibility”. His colleague Vyacheslav Gimadi considers collective responsibility “the quirk of Putin’s policy-making.” The opposing stance of these “oppositionists” seems to be lame.
In line with their counterparts in the “opposition” struggle, Navalny team vigorously criticize any sanctions that complicate the lives of Russian emigrants. Leonid Volkov, among others, complained that he did not know “any Putinist who would be harmed by the decision of Visa and Mastercard but it dealt a huge blow to many people who do not support Putin, as well as to independent media.” At the same time, in his seminal article for the Washington Post, Navalny, as the leader of the “opposition” group, writes that “the war with Ukraine has been started and is waged certainly by Putin <…> but the actual party to the war is the entire elite and the system of power itself, which is the endless self-replicating Russian authoritarianism of the imperial style.” Yet again, according to the Russian so-called oppositionists, “little people” remain beyond the guilt and responsibility, and that “people in Ukraine should spend the night in their warm houses, while they spend the nights in the subway, is Putin’s fault.”
VISA AND MASTERCARD SOLUTIONS
Visa and Mastercard payment services in March 2022 said that they completely stop working in Russia, and deactivate all card transactions.
Trial of War Criminals
The third most popular topic among Navalny team is the punishment of war criminals and the trial for them. In this category, the researchers included any mention of the crime of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the actions of the Russian authorities, and defining the actions of Putin and his entourage as terrorist. During the monitoring period, respondents in the sample posted 354 tweets on this topic. Leonid Volkov (90 tweets), Navalny LIVE account (47 tweets), and Maria Pievchykh (40 tweets) mentioned the tribunal over the war criminals the most.
In “15 points” Navalny recalls that after the end of a full-scale war, the new Russian authorities should “investigate war crimes in cooperation with international institutions.” His associates generally agree with this statement: most of his colleagues in their tweets recognized the actions of certain Russians as war crimes. They urged the creation of an international tribunal or Putin’s transfer to The Hague. Interestingly, but Navalny team often covers war crimes committed by the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine. For example, they informed their subscribers about events in Bucha and other settlements around Kyiv or in the regions. They called the events genocide of the Ukrainian people. Leonid Volkov tweeted that the trial of war criminals was the only way for Russia to move away from Putinism ideology: “If Putin drops dead now, before defeat, before trial, before exposure, then Putinism as an ideology will survive.” Then, according to the “oppositionist”, many people will believe that the Russians “could have won if they had not killed the leader,” while during “Putin rule there was order and stability.” According to Volkov, it is better for Russia if “Putin is defeated and sees the collapse of his own regime” because he “should not stay as a legend in the memory of his supporters” but who he is in reality — a “miserable, cowardly, and greedy madman.”
However, while reading the tweets of Navalny’s supporters about these crimes, it is quite difficult to understand who exactly they consider guilty of them. Their posts include statements that the criminals and occupiers are the Russian army because they “engage in a criminal war.” Therefore, “to serve in the army means to be an accomplice to war crimes.” For example, the account “Navalny LIVE” wrote that “those are not Russian soldiers staying in Ukraine now. Russian soldiers must defend Russia and be in barracks. All those who now are on the territory of a foreign state that has not attacked us are participating in a serious war crime.” As a matter of fact, it highlights the long-standing internal problem of Russia: the indigenous peoples and national communities are ranked differently on the territory of the republic, which is why they send to the front in Ukraine those who have not long been loyal. Another “oppositionist,” Vladimir Milov, encouraged to forget about the “great Russian culture” and come to terms with the fact that “the image of Russia in the world for many years to come will be about the atrocities committed by Russian soldiers in Bucha.”
Navalny's team also calls Russian propagandists war criminals because they “create the public opinion that allows Putin to commit war crimes and also demands them from him.” For example, Maria Pievchykh mentioned the arrest of the CEO of the Rwandan media “Free Radio and Television of a Thousand Hills” (fr. — Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)) of Félicien Kabuga, suspected of sponsoring the 1994 Rwandan genocide. She implied that Margarita Simonyan would follow suit. At the same time, there are tweets supporting the words of the notorious propagandist Marina Ovsyannikova who claimed that “the only person responsible for the aggression is Vladimir Putin.” Kira Yarmysh tweeted that the killings in Bucha and the massive rocket attacks on civilian infrastructure are Putin’s fault and “he cannot be forgiven”. Navalny called the mobilization “an attempt to involve people into the crimes that Putin is committing.”
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (EAST AFRICA)
Massacres of the Tutsi people, organized in 1994 by representatives of the Hutu people, who constituted the ethnic majority in the country. The United Nations estimates that more than a million people have died. Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills worked as a source for propaganda, inciting hatred and violence, and dehumanizing the Tutsi.
There is no definitive vision within the Navalny team about how the trial of Russian war criminals should run. For example, Vladimir Milov approved the action of the European Parliament that in January 2023 adopted a resolution in support of the creation of the tribunal. Ruslan Shaveddinov, commenting on the verdicts in the case of MH17 (the downing of the Boeing 777 near Donetsk on July 17, 2014), wrote that further cases should also be considered in The Hague. The tweet of the “Navalny LIVE” channel sends a message that Russian war criminals should be convicted either by a Ukrainian court or by a court in The Hague. Georgy Alburov wrote that the Russian elite (Putin, Shoigu, Kadyrov, etc.) would appear in an international tribunal after an independent Russian court. However, like representatives of the Anti-War Committee and the Forum of Free Russia, Navalny team does not specify how the Russian Federation, under their leadership, undertakes to extradite war criminals to an international court.
As of mid-May 2023, Russia still has a veto in the UN Security Council, which allows it to block the decision to apply the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the case of Ukraine against Russia. Therefore, such statements of the Navalny team are currently no more than populist tweets.
Return of the Occupied Territories of Ukraine
During the year of monitoring, the so-called oppositionists published 175 tweets about the temporarily occupied territories (TOTs) of Ukraine. For the study, messages were selected with any mentions on this topic, rather than only those containing positions or plans for these lands. The largest number of tweets on this topic was published by Leonid Volkov — 59, while all other “oppositionists” are almost the same — from 11 to 17 posts per year.
In general, Navalny’s associates are in accord with the fact that Ukraine must return all its territories and restore the borders of 1991.
All mentions of TOTs are either news or statements about the criminal occupation and the need to return these territories to Ukraine. Sometimes the “oppositionists” even abuse this topic in order to somehow justify their inability to overthrow their own dictatorial regime. For example, Volodymyr Milov, in response to criticism of the feeble protest movements in Russia, replied that “when residents in the occupied territories of Ukraine overthrow the occupiers, then you will teach us how to “exit” correctly. He also appeals to Ukrainians who allegedly do not know “the real situation of terror in Ukraine” which “you can try to understand by the situation in the occupied territories.” It is highly doubtful that Miglov himself saw the tank somewhere other than in Victory Park in Moscow, or heard artillery shelling other than from the speakers on his laptop.
Vision of the Future for Russia
Over the entire monitoring period, Navalny team wrote 163 tweets on this topic. Compared to the Anti-War Committee and the Free Russia Forum, who paid the most attention to this issue, the topic is only the fifth most popular among Navalny’s supporters. Leonid Volkov (97 tweets, almost 60% of the total), Ivan Zhdanov (19 tweets), and Kira Yarmysh (17 tweets) wrote the most about the future of the Russian Federation.
The future of Russia. Illustration: Artificial intelligence DALL-E-2
In 2022, the Navalny team published in their collective accounts links to two large texts about the vision of the future for Russia. Those were the previously mentioned “15 points” and Navalny’s interview with the U.S. edition of The Washington Post. Both have quite a clear vision of the “Beautiful Russia of the Future,” as the associates of the “oppositionist” call it. They believe that after the end of the war, the strategy of the Western countries and the new Russian authorities should, first of all, ensure that Russia and its authorities “do not want to start wars and do not find any attractiveness in them.” According to Navalny, Russian society itself is not prone to aggression. They are provoked by a small caste of imperial-minded citizens of the Russian Federation. He adds that in order for the aggressive “imps” not to regain power, it would suffice for Russia to take power from the hands of one person, to shift to a parliamentary republic, and create a system where the dominant idea would be “consent, agreement, and account for the interests of the whole society”; “the change of power through fair elections, independent courts, federalism and local self-government” should be established; “Putin’s regime and his dictatorship” should be dismantled, “ideally — through universal free elections and the convening of a Constitutional Assembly.”
In Twitter, Navalny’s associates explore this topic deeper. They write a lot about the future of Russia in Europe. For example, Leonid Volkov quoted a member of the European Parliament, Andrius Kubilius, and tweeted that “it is impossible to drink away the democratic genetics of Russian citizens.” As to Russia itself, after the end of the war in Ukraine it “will return to the Council of Europe, PACE, ECHR” (PACE— Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; ECHR — European Court of Human Rights. — Ed.) because “countries should trade and cooperate, not fight.” By the way, Volkov later shared the same interview to Kubilius, asking readers to pay attention to the paragraph about the Marshall Plan. In that segment, the deputy says that the West would need to create the roadmap for recovery for Russia so that it does not later start another war due to economic troubles.
MARSHALL PLAN
The program of economic assistance to European states after World War II suggested in 1947 by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall (started to operate in April 1948).
In addition, Navalny’s supporters are trying to predict the fate of Russia after the war. For example, Ruslan Shaveddinov tweeted that about 16 million Russians live below the poverty line. Moreover, because of the war, their numbers will only grow, and the power in Russia cannot be changed democratically. Ivan Zhdanov wrote that the arrival of war on the territory of Russia is inevitable, and the scenario of the collapse of the Russian Federation is quite realistic. On the other hand, Leonid Volkov is convinced that “the collapse of Russia into several parts fighting each other and holding nuclear weapons” is impossible. In the first place, the apocalyptic forecasts are advantageous to the Kremlin itself. According to him, it is critical to convince Europe and the U.S. that after the fall of the Putin regime, nothing bad would happen.
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Negotiations Between Russia and Ukraine
The sampled authors tweeted about the negotiations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine 98 times, 75 posts by Leonid Volkov among them. On this issue, Navalny team does not diverge from the Anti-War Committee and the Free Russia Forum. In particular, they support the fact that negotiations are impossible while the parties are at war with each other, and that Russian diplomats behave like “gopniks” and “mobsters.”
It is also certain to them that negotiations are beneficial only to Russia, while any ceasefire agreements are dangerous because they do not mean the final resolution of the war but the freezing of the conflict. It is beneficial only to Russia and to the “fatigued Europe,” which, according to Leonid Volkov, would prefer “bad peace instead of good war.” However, these statements still have weaknesses as the European countries continue to support Ukraine, even if it the support is not as strong as at the beginning of the invasion. Therefore, it is not the case when it the European countries may be considered to only be tacitly looking forward to the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Joseph Biden during the G7 meeting in Japan. Photo by OP.
Navalny team also ridiculed the calls of the Russians for “Christian mercy” and a ceasefire for Christmas because, as the so-called oppositionists tweeted, “mercy and the most correct action would be to gather all the soldiers… and throw them home from a foreign land.” However, is there really any reason to talk about the mercy of the Russian army that unleashed the war in Ukraine? Mercy implies a willingness to help others without pursuing your own interests.
Supply of Weapons to Ukraine
Unlike the Anti-War Committee and the Forum of Free Russia, with whom the topic of arms supply ranks third, Navalny’s supporters spoke about it significantly less. During the monitoring, there were only 50 tweets on this topic, 20 of which were posted by Leonid Volkov.
Navalny’s associates generally support the supply of weapons to Ukraine and emphasize that if Ukraine had previously been given weapons and imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation, a full-scale war would not have happened. Therefore, Russian “oppositionists” often report new deliveries of weapons to Ukraine, rejoice in the supply of tanks and call for providing Ukraine with air defense systems or closing the sky over Ukraine. Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov, in particular, wrote that Western countries should not respond to the Kremlin’s threats to use nuclear weapons by supplying Ukraine with tanks or aircraft, saying that this is only sabre-rattling. Navalny team supports the supply of weapons to Ukraine, rather than negotiate because, in their opinion, the weapons are the tool to ensure the complete defeat of the Putin regime.
Military equipment for Ukraine. Photo: Office of the Prime Minister of Poland.
Also, Russian “oppositionists” mention in their tweets foreign fundraising campaigns for “Bayraktar” and other weapons for Ukraine. They admire the “solidarity and self-organization” of Lithuanians and complain that “Russia had never had any a crowdfunding campaign that would resemble the scale at least remotely.” However, when asked about the possibility of organizing such a campaign in Russia, Leonid Volkov answers that it is too dangerous to donate for the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Russia. That is why Navalny team would not fundraise. At the same time, Russian “oppositionists” actively advocate for the rights of Russians abroad who stay safe there but the researchers have not found any calls to them to donate for the victory of Ukraine.
SELF-ORGANIZATION OF LITHUANIANS
It is the public fundraising campaign for a drone for Ukraine which was announced by Lithuanian TV presenter Andrius Tapinas in May 2022. Lithuanians collected 5 million euros in three days. The Baykar company presented Bayraktar to Lithuania as a gift, and Lithuania transferred it to Ukraine in July 2022.
Return of Deported Children and Reparations
Over the monitoring year, Navalny’s associates published only 12 tweets about Russia-abducted Ukrainian children. Most of them have the news format. They (expectedly) do not mention that it is a sign of genocide; nor do they talk about any mechanisms to help or return the abducted children.
Least of all, the Navalny-ists spoke that after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Russian Federation would have to pay reparations not only to Ukraine but also to every Ukrainian person who lost their property as a result of the unprovoked Russian aggression. During the monitoring, there were only three tweets on this topic: two of them were published by Leonid Volkov (in March-August 2022); another one was published by the Navalny LIVE channel account (in March 2022). In all three tweets, Navalny’s supporters said that after the end of the war, “in addition to shaming Russians, for whom Putin is personally responsible,” Russia will pay Ukraine “hundreds of billions of reparations.” However, according to Leonid Volkov, ordinary Russians should not bear the burden of reparations because “Putin’s friends still stole more, and their arrested assets should be used to pay.” So, even in those three tweets, Russian “oppositionists” promoted the idea that paying reparations is an “incredible moral and material damage” to Russians.
How Much Opposition Do Russian “Oppositionists” Have, After All?
In general, the Twitter activity of the Navalny team members who got into the sample was more like the activities of the media than a political group, whereas some few years ago many observers considered them almost the only alternative to the Putin regime. The activity at the level of the newsroom is just another evidence to the political infantilism of one of the most institutionalized groups of the Russian “opposition.” They regularly complain about critics, including Ukrainians, who do not understand their “difficult fate” and do not appreciate their efforts to achieve peace and democracy in Russia.
The value-based positions of Navalny team, and their views on many aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war (except for condemning it rather as an undesirable manifestation of reality and a basic criticism of the ruling regime) are somewhat contradictory and unconsolidated. In part, this can be explained by the fact that the main challenge for the so-called oppositionists is the release of their leader from prison. However, even the opinions they express about the future of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian relations raise more additional questions rather than provide explanations.
“Oppositionists” are trying to mention violence and crimes of the Russian army in TOTs to highlight the suffering of Russians, such as Russian liberals. Allegedly, in addition to not having an opportunity to resist, they suffer the same as the Ukrainians under the occupation or in relatively peaceful territories that the Russian Federation is persistently shelling.
Similarly, the Navalny-ists are using the talk of reparations and post-war development of Russia to their benefit. They emphasize the need for all kinds of support, in particular financial support to future Russia, so that it could “shove off the bottom” and build up the capacity for the necessary compensation. Such rhetoric certainly looks excusatory and manipulatively. It seems to make Navalny's team forget that this unreasonable war was unleashed by Russia.
Therefore, the findings of the study show that there is no reason to believe that the members of Navalny team understood the threat their country poses to global architecture of peace, and that the terrorist country has already committed several-centuries much of terror in Ukraine. Instead, the Russian “oppositionists” have already begun to fight for resources for the post-war reconstruction of Russia, competing with the country they are destroying. Thus, in comparison with the Anti-War Committee and the Forum for a Free Russia, Navalny team’s attempts to lobby for their own present and future interests, taking advantage of world focus on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian war, look like the actions of a feeble chauvinism-infected “opposition”.
Special for Ukraїner