Observers of Civil Network OPORA have examined how Presidential candidates were campaigning in all 213 territorial election districts. Today, activities of armed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain the key destabilizing factor for the election process.Systematic activities of unlawful units in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts may cause disruption of voting process in a half of territorial communities in these regions. There are no conflicts or violations in other oblasts that may hinder free voting process.
According to the observation results, the following Presidential candidates had the most large-scale election campaigns: Petro Poroshenko (1 place for activeness), Yuliia Tymoshenko (2 place), Anatolii Hrytsenko (3 place), Oleh Tiahnybok (4 place), Oleh Liashko (5 place). This rating shows how well the candidates covered election districts with their campaigning, and assesses the scale of election campaigning conducted by every Presidential candidate.
According to OPORA's monitoring results, the most popular type of campaigning during the snap Presidential Election was media campaigning (publications, announcements, public addresses, and information materials in local media). The most active in this type of campaigning was Yuliia Tymoshenko. The second popular type is outdoor advertising, which was most often used by Petro Poroshenko. Direct campaigning (door-to-door campaigning, collection of signatures, correspondence, meetings) was least used by all candidates during these elections. Street campaigning (rallies, marches, demonstrations, pickets; campaigning tents; dissemination of printed campaign materials; concerts, exhibitions, sport competitions, film shows etc.) is the third popular type of campaigning; it was most often used by Yuliia Tymoshenko.
The most powerful network of election headquarters was created by Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, Anatolii Hrytsenko, Oleh Tiahnybok, and Oleh Liashko. Andrii Hrynenko, Volodymyr Saranov, Vasyl Tsushko, Vadym Rabinovych, and Renat Kuzmin have little number of temporary organizational structures in districts.
Besides intensification of campaigning activities on this final stage of election campaign, incidents of unlawful campaigning and other abuses committed by candidates also become more frequent. Almost in all regions of Ukraine, observers report about surge of "dirty campaigning" (printed materials and content in social networks), directed mostly on Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko. Dissemination of campaigning materials without an imprint, and their placement in prohibited locations became typical incidents. Dissemination of so-called "dzhynsa" (hidden advertising) – political ads in printed mass media without the corresponding marking, under the mask of news.
First time for the whole history of independent Ukraine, the country faces such a large-scale counteraction to free voting. "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic", which were determined by the Prosecutor General's Office as terroristic organizations, commit crimes against electoral rights of citizens. Members of election commissions, as well as premises, property, and equipment of the corresponding commissions, became the target for the terrorists. Due to the intensive dislocation of terroristic groups on the territory of these oblasts, it's difficult to tell how many voters may be deprived of the right to vote.
District election commissions have, in general, qualitatively fulfilled their duties. However, they faced the certain complications during the formation of PECs and during personnel rotations in commissions. The situation was even more complicated by the fact that DECs themselves were undergoing mass rotations. As of 20 May, more than third part (36%) of membership in DECs was substituted. A lot of commission members from candidates, who de facto stopped participating in election campaign (particularly Petro Symonenko), are in fact sabotage activities of election commissions. As for rotations in precinct election commissions, they appeared because headquarters of candidates failed to secure qualitative organization of the selection and preparation of commission members. Besides that, a lot of commission members in eastern oblasts of Ukraine refuse to fulfill their duties because they are threatened and under physical pressure of pro-Russian terroristic groups. Another typical for all Ukrainian territory reason for rotations in membership of commissions is that proxies of candidates submitted documents of people who didn't agree to become commission members, without their permission, or even individuals who don't exist (so-called "dead souls").
In order to assess the quality of election process with a minimal margin of error, and to forecast maximally accurate election results, OPORA will apply the statistically-based quick count. Quick count techniques include stationary observation during the voting and counting process at the polling station, chosen by random sampling. On 26 May, the day after the voting process, at 11:30am in the UNIAN Information Agency, OPORA will promulgate the results of its parallel vote tabulation (quick count).
Civic monitoring conducted by OPORA - is a type of network activity, aimed at impartial assessment of the preparation and conduct of elections, as well as preventing electoral violations through comprehensive civic action. Since March, OPORA conducts a wide observation campaign during snap Presidential election, interim Parliamentary elections (district #83), and special local elections. The organization cooperates with 175 long-term observers, who are watching the course of election campaign in all Ukrainian regions. On the Election Day on 25 May, 3,000 activists will join them to conduct the parallel vote tabulation, based on statistical sample.