Electoral threshold as a challenge of 2012 parliamentary campaign

Rising electoral threshold to 5% on 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, provided by the governmental law, provokes a direct analogy with Russian technologies of strengthening the governmental vertical in early 2000ies. The Russian trend on establishment of the system with one dominative party was also accompanied by increasing of the electoral threshold (to 7%), what have considerably limited the political competition in this country. However, the similarity of Ukrainian and Russian tendencies doesn’t exclude the possibility of our native legislators to be even more skillful in technologies.

An electoral threshold is a minimum percentage of votes which political parties should get to participate in mandate distribution. The purpose of the threshold is to eliminate small parties and create conditions for structuring social interests within the influential political forces. The electoral threshold, which in most cases is a result of political compromise, should take into account relevant issues of parliamentary and party system development under particular political and legal conditions.

In world practices the level of electoral threshold is a matter of political expediency. Political expediency of the electoral threshold is based on national legal customs and needs of modern political institutions. European court of human rights repeatedly rejected complaints from the public and politicians about the level of electoral threshold, since no electoral system can avoid losing votes. Nevertheless, the international community has also many examples of settling the question of electoral system formation on nationwide referendums (Italy, Ireland, New Zealand), what balanced political and public interest in this matter.

A size of the electoral barrier considerably varies in different countries. For example, on 2011 elections it was:  Denmark - 2%, Latvia - 5%, Turkey - 10%, Poland - 5% (parties) and 8% (blocks) and so on. On 2009 Israel parliamentary elections the threshold was 2% (on previous elections – 1% and 1,5%). Parliamentary elections in Liechtenstein are conducted with 8% electoral threshold (2009).

European political institutions try to reach a consensus on democratic control of the electoral threshold. In particular, PACE resolution (1547/2007) provides recommendation to keep the election threshold on the level of 3%, because substantially high electoral threshold may be recognized as restraining of free expression of political positions. It means that the electoral threshold is set for stabilization and improvement of political structure, and not for preservation of current political interests. A typical example here is Turkey, which is for many years subjected to international criticism for overly high electoral threshold set by the national law on parliamentary elections.

Draft law of Ukraine "On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine” (No.926-1 of 10.10.2011) submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by Yefremov and other deputies, provides that political parties which received five or more percent of votes in relation to the total number of votes given for all electoral lists of parties may participate in distribution of deputy mandates. In comparison to 2007 and 2006 parliamentary elections the election threshold will increase in 2%. Comparing to 1998 and 2002 elections the election threshold will rise in 1% of votes.

International organizations and national experts repeatedly expressed serious concerns about possible increasing of the electoral threshold on 2012 parliamentary elections. This position is based on the absence of political discussion on this issue, what should have been secured by Ukrainian government. Rising electoral threshold without paying attention to the opinion of public, minority and extra-parliamentary forces, doesn’t meet the requirements of democratic political process.

Although argumentation of ruling groups concerning their intention to rise the election threshold was expected, it can not withstand scrutiny. Initiators of rising election barrier appeal to the necessity for structurization of the deputy corps, increasing of the parliamentary activity liability. This argumentation is far from the reality, because the unification of proportional and majoritarian systems can’t be in any way related to the target of political structurization of Ukrainian parliament. Repeating the usage of mixed electoral system in current situation can hardly lead to other consequences than in 1998-2002.

The bill submitted by the government means rather creating conditions for unnatural concentration of deputy mandates within one political centre.

Administrative dominance in majoritarian districts will allow compensating rating losses of the ruling party on the national level, and rising electoral threshold will confine political competition proportional component of the elections. Narrowing opportunities for the competition concerns not only oppositional parties, but also political forces which are political allies of the Party of Regions. Initiative of rising the electoral threshold coincided with intensification of a merger of some political forces with the Party of Regions, what vividly demonstrates possible consequences of its practical implementation.

According to the practice established in Ukraine, a number of deputy mandates from political parties that overcame political threshold, is determined in three stages.

On the first stage are determined political parties which overcame political threshold in relation to the total number of votes given for all electoral competitors.

To the second stage belong procedures for installing electoral quota which is necessary for receiving one deputy mandate by parties which overcame the election threshold. The electoral quota is determined through division of votes given for the electoral lists of parties that overcame the threshold by the number of deputy mandates.

Procedure of determining the number of seats for each political party belongs to the third stage. This number is calculated through dividing the electoral quota by the number of votes given for the political party that overcame the threshold.

Using the scheme for mandate division mentioned above in conditions of rising electoral threshold will lead to further reduction of electoral legitimacy. The reason for this will be increasing number of voters that do not have representation in the Ukrainian parliament.

Table 1

Number of votes given for political parties which haven’t overcame the electoral threshold (compiled by the author according to CEC)

Rising election threshold to 5% on parliamentary elections may create a situation when almost half of the voters will vote for parties which will not receive the minimum number of votes determined by the law.  A big quantity of election participants and dissipation of sympathies between "old" and "new" political projects may become factors affecting this phenomenon.

The bill of governmental majority doesn’t provide mechanisms for correction of the situation with potential growth of votes given for political parties that haven’t overcome the election threshold. However, even in the Russian Federation which experience is often adopted by Ukrainian legislators, a norm on “variable” election threshold exists on federal and regional levels. “Variable” election threshold is applied when lists of candidates, which overcame the election threshold established by the law, received less than 50% of the total number of votes. Then to the distribution of parliamentary seats other electoral lists are involved by the reduction of order.

Planned law amendments discriminate political parties that are to gain nearly 3% election threshold according to the results of public polling in 2011. The problem of these political forces is worsened by the mixed election system which will increase two times the election quota for receiving mandates in nationwide district (number of votes will be divided by 225, not 450 seats, as in the 2006-2007.) If there won't be provided equal conditions for all political parties in majoritarian single mandate constituencies, than rising electoral threshold in nationwide district will become fatal for most of their parliamentary representations.

Table 2

If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held soon, which party or bloc would you vote for? (a survey by the Razumkov Center polling agency, May 2011.)

Sociological surveys in 2011 show that rising electoral threshold to 5% may push Ukraine to a specific bipartism. The main peculiarity of such system would be in providing electoral advantages for "the party in power" and "the party in opposition". However, the real parliamentary influence will be distributed by the agreement between pro-governmental party and several non-influential and unstable political forces. Such version of "two-party plus" system will allow Ukrainian government to demonstrate international partners competitiveness of elections and preservation of influence by the leading oppositional force, although it will also provide the possibility to dominate in the political process. Rising the electoral threshold will limit the parliamentary prospects of the CPU, party “Blow” V.Klychko, VO "Svoboda"; the party “Strong Ukraine is also at risk. This political forces should considerably increase their electoral resources during one year.

Conclusion

• Since there is no public and political consensus, the initiative on rising the election threshold can’t become effective in strengthening Ukrainian parliamentarism.
• Increasing electoral threshold, combined with the majoritarian system of relative majority will not promote qualitative structuring of Ukrainian Parliament.
• Rising electoral threshold is aimed on forced confining of renewal in political circles and intensifying the processes of political integration around the Party of Regions.
• Rising electoral threshold will decrease the level of political legitimacy of Ukrainian parliament. The number of constituents that will have no representation in Ukrainian parliament may dramatically increase in 2012.
• Legislative initiatives of the ruling majority have discriminative character towards political forces, that are on the verge of passing to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Taking into consideration the number of possible risks in realization of ruling majority initiatives, it is expedient to preserve 3% election barrier on 2012 parliamentary elections. At the same time, formal procedures for the allocation of parliamentary seats need additional details, which are to be based on the maximum account of voting results.

Oleksandr Klyuzhev, the Head of analytical programs of Donetsk regional branch of All-Ukrainian NGO "Committee of Voters of Ukraine"; specially for elect.in.ua