OPORA’s First Observation Report for the Preparation Process to the Local Elections 2020

In August, 2020, OPORA started the monitoring for the pre-election campaign in Ukraine’s regions, and the course of preparing for the regular local elections due on October, 25, 2020. The observation engaged 188 observers all over the country. On the election day, they will be joined by short-term observers. OPORA’s civic observation is a type of active operations of the network intended to obtain an unbiased assessment of the preparation and conduct of elections. The observation objective is the identification of key issues of electoral process, the formation of the evidence base and prevention to violations through a comprehensive civic control, both during the official course of elections, and also in the preceding period.

Summary

From the moment of scheduling local elections by the parliament, the Central Election Commission has been operating in the unprecedented hard settings caused by the unpredictable epidemiological situation and the negative impact of the quarantine restrictions for the exercise of voting rights of citizens, and also in the uncertain legal framework. To regulate the legal and organizational uncertainty about the method of implementing certain electoral procedures, the CEC had to run the active interagency communication. Its outcomes will largely impact the quality and timely delivery by the Commission on its direct obligations. In this situation, any methods of administrative pressure on the commission or its members shall undermine the trust to public institutions and their capacity to provide for the illegal course of exercising electoral procedures in crisis situations. In July-August, 2020, the CEC approved about 80 resolutions, of which 54 were directly related to the organization and conduct of local elections.

The peculiarity of the stage preceding the official start of the electoral process was the unfolding of the system of territorial election commissions in charge of the organizational preparation and support to the campaign, such as establishing the constituencies, candidate registration, producing ballot papers, and establishing results for the respective elections. The CEC composed the oblast, district, and city election commissions in line with the terms and procedures set by the law. The new provisions of the Electoral Code envisage that the commissions composed by the CEC had to start their operations almost a month before the official launch of election process. The practice of increased duration of the preparatory stage for the election administration activities helped the newly established commissions to have a better organized approach to the stage of creating village and township commissions, and to form the constituencies. At the same time, the unregulated issue of labour remuneration for the TEC members in the pre-election period undermined the performance of their current functions by the commission members.

There is the unresolved problem of responsibility of the entities submitting candidacies to the TEC membership for the candidate selection process and the quality of the nomination lists. The fact that it is impossible to contact commission members largely aggravated the conduct of the first TEC meetings. The available procedure of withdrawing commission members by the submitting entities de facto releases the local party organizations from responsibility for such actions and inspires massive replacements of election commission members in response to tackling the issue of poorly submitted nominations.    

Due to the distribution of candidates in the composition of oblast, district, and city election commissions, the highest representation was claimed by local organizations of parliamentary parties (factions and groups). Усі разом ці політичні сили делегували до складу TEC 68% (або 6 496) своїх кандидатур. The analysis of the executives of commissions shows certain prevalence of candidates nominated by local organizations of the “Servant of the People” (27% of the total number of candidates submitted by the party). It goes in line with the legal requirements but negatively affects the exercise of the principle of balanced distribution of executive positions, which compliance shall be prioritized in the CEC decision making of the kind. 

Despite the official start of election campaign on September, 05, political parties, their local organizations, and potential candidates de facto launched their active campaigning back in August. Early campaigning to support future election participants has been run with no control over sources and scopes of funding, especially in part of finances spent by individuals planning to be future candidates. According to observers of the Civil Network OPORA, over 70 political parties have de facto conducted active pre-electoral campaigning activities over the recent month. 11 of them unfolded public activities either within several oblasts, or nationwide. 

The practices to run large scale campaigns that de facto qualify as pre-election campaigning have a negative impact on complying with the principle of equal opportunities for different candidates. Some candidates have the possibility to uncontrollably and with no time constraints spend money on the de facto electoral campaigns, while others are only able to interact with voters within a limited period of time, and under government control over the election funds. There is another unresolved issue related to the uncontrolled spending for campaigning that has already been actively manifested. It is the dissemination of political ads in social media. The number of advertising posts and expenditures for political ads in August was several times higher than in the beginning of the year. However, even the official statistics fails to show the actual picture with expenses incurred by parties and potential candidates. 

A key feature of the unofficial election process was the activity of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi. On his official regional tour, he attended presentations of future candidates from the “Servant of the People” party and presentations of Strategies of the development of regions. Since there are no legal requirements demanding political neutrality of the President of Ukraine, it is highly important to efficiently distinguish between government resources and party interests when organizing such events. OPORA filed a request to the Office of the President of Ukraine, to the “Servant of the People” party, and to local state administrations, and asked to provide complete information about the organizers and the funding sources of the party-related events attended by Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

The peculiarity of local elections poses serious risks of abusing administrative resources, due to the fact that the incumbent officials from local self-government are close to voters. OPORA documented a series of incidents involving potential candidates, with elements of non-compliance with democratic standards of counteracting the signs of abuse of administrative resource for electoral purposes. With the start of election process, the issue of counteracting such abuse has become especially acute. Thus, it will require from central and local authorities to clearly adhere to the principles of political non-participation and neutrality. 

Approval of changes to the Criminal Code of Ukraine and the Code on Administrative Offense open new opportunities for the investigation of electoral fraud. The law-enforcement bodies are obliged to take these opportunities and provide for due informing of citizens about the interim investigation results. Special focus shall be made on the information on the possible voter bribery, which consequences are extremely negative for local elections in particular. Throughout August, 2020, OPORA observers recorded a series of incidents with elements of financial incentivization of voters that could receive a due legal assessment in the context of official election process. 

OPORA monitoring shows the increasing role of social media in political and electoral processes. With the looming official start of election process, a continuous growth in costs for political ads on the Facebook social media has been recorded. According to observers, in August, there was a four-fold increase in costs of political forces on political ads as compared to this February. In the last month before the official start of the election process, the costs accounted to appr. USD 425,469 to 576,345.

In the period from January to August 2020, the highest amounts were spent for political ads on Facebook by the Ukrainian Galician Party, the party “For the Future” and the “European Solidarity” party.

Legal regulation of local elections – 2020. Positive and negative aspects

The approval of the Electoral Code on December, 19, 2019 and its coming into effect after January, 2020 was an important step towards the harmonization of electoral law in line with the recommendations of international and national election observation missions. At the same time, the Code included certain shortcomings and inconsistencies, while the discussion in the dedicated committee of the Verkhovna Rada on the need to introduce technical changes to the book four regulating the procedures for local elections, which will enable the conduct of the first local elections in October, 2020, started immediately after it signing. Therefore, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 9th convocation was not able to secure the guarantees for stability of electoral law and avoid the previous improper practices of updating the election framework shortly before the elections.

The situation was especially aggravated by the lack of legal regulation for the new administrative territorial order caused by the processes of completing decentralization reform, which was supposed to be the basis for having local elections. The parliament failed to approve the changes to the Constitution in part of administrative territorial reform. To date, the framework for the territorial organization of the local elections is stipulated by the Law of Ukraine “On Introducing Changes to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Determining the Territories and Administrative Centers of Territorial Hromadas.” It set the definitions for administrative centers of territorial hromadas and their boundaries according to their perspective plans adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 17.07.2020 set the new district-based division. However, the Parliament shall finalize the reform for decentralization and territorial order by initiating the procedure for approving changes to the Constitution immediately after elections, without undue delay.

Despite the short terms, in February, 2020, the development and discussion of changes to the Electoral Code failed to have started. In April, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Coordinator for OSCE projects in Ukraine, and the Civil Network OPORA called upon Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to resume  the work on the improvements to the Electoral Code, and to hold public consultations on the areas for improvement engaging all stakeholders. The postponement of the new stage of electoral reform led to the hasty drafting and development of amendments, and to the lack of time for their proper technical and legal wording.

As late as in the beginning of May, the dedicated committee started the work on the draft law 3485. In addition to technical changes to the book on local elections, it also proposed the comprehensive update of literally all chapters of Electoral Code books, including also the change of the threshold in using the proportional election system at local elections, updating the procedures for presidential and parliamentary elections, expanding the CEC powers in part of possible conduct of elections using e-voting technologies. Between the first and the second readings, the draft law was amended with numerous changes,  such as the threshold was reduced for the application of proportional election system for territorial hromadas, from 15,000 to 10,000 voters; and the changes to the Criminal Code and the Code on Administrative Offense were included to the draft.

The dedicated committee on electoral framework of the Verkhovna Rada and the parliament in general showed their intention to avoid any monopoly influence of one political group on the final rules for elections.  At the same time, a broad parliamentary compromise included also arrangements on the politically induced decisions on election system and certain aspects for election administration.

Key advantages of the updated election law in the process of reform of September, 2019 – July, 2020 include the following:

• Regulating problematic issues in the exercise of voting rights by internally displaced persons and other mobile groups of voters (such as labour migrants) and voters who left their previous registered address. 
• Enhancing the efficiency of the law on counteracting electoral fraud, their investigation and the application of the relevant sanctions for the perpetrators.
• Improved conditions to guarantee the voting rights for people with disabilities who are still facing significant obstacles in accessing polling stations, in participating in the work of election commissions and during the acquaintance with the campaigning materials.
• Enshrined requirements to gender representation when compiling candidate lists and nominating candidates in multi-member majoritarian constituencies.

Key shortcomings of the electoral law for today are the following: 

• Expansion of the proportional election system to the territorial hromadas with 10,000 voters or more, which crucially reduced the opportunities for self-nomimation, cancelling the electivity of the elders (starostas) in the amalgamated hromadas less than two months before the start of election process, which does not comply with the internationally recognized standards of democratic elections.
• Establishing the minimum number of votes needed for the candidate to pass on to the first part of the territorial election list (25% pf the election quota), which reduces the impact of votes on the candidate’s election. In other words, it affects the actual openness of voting lists.
• The unregulated procedure for the decision made in the oblast civil military administrations on the non-conduct of the first local elections in certain hromadas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
• The text of the Code has grave terminological discrepancies, which lead to the non-application of legal provisions, such as setting the amount for the allowed dissemination of branded campaigning materials produced at the cost of election fund on the level above UAH 1.02, due to shortcomings of the technical and legal finalization. 

To eliminate the latter shortcoming, a draft law No 3971 was registered in the parliament, which unfortunately was not supported by the Verkhovna Rada on September, 3, 2020. Therefore, a possibility was wasted to regulate the simultaneous balloting, to regulate the amount for campaigning materials allowed for dissemination, to set the rules for validity of ballot papers before the start of election process, which will largely aggravate the process of having local elections in compliance with all the established democratic standards and voting rights of citizens.

Certain concerns come from the registration on  September, 3, 2020, of the  Draft Law on Introducing Changes to the Law of Ukraine “On Central Election Commission” on opinion polls (ref. No 4043), which approval may create the legal impossibility to take consulting surveys parallel to local elections, without the procedure of preliminary analysis of questions selected for the survey in terms of their constitutional compliance.

Performance of the Central Election Commission

CEC is a permanent state authority, with its 17 members appointed by the Verkhovna Rada upon submission from the President of Ukraine for 7 years. The current composition of the CEC was composed by the parliament on October, 4, 2019, following the complicated consultations between the President of Ukraine, the deputy factions, and groups.

Along with the territorial and polling station election commissions, the CEC is in charge of the organization of election process during local elections, and is the election commission of the higher level for all other commissions. Adoption of the Electoral Code that de facto introduced the new procedures for the organization of elections and voting imposed a duty upon the CEC to adopt a set of regulatory acts within a short time, in order to regulate and explain all the current administrative procedures related to the conduct of the regular and the first local elections in Ukraine.

From the moment the parliament scheduled the regular local election in Ukraine (July, 15, 2020) and as of September, 1, 2020, the CEC adopted about 80 resolutions, of which 54 were directly related to the organization and conduct of local elections. Within its authority, the CEC approved the Calendar Plan for key organizational events to prepare and conduct local elections on October, 25, 2020. Moreover, the Commission also made decisions on establishing forms of electoral documentation; on the organization of work and document management by election commissions; on the formation of the composition of territorial election commissions and introduction of changes in the commissions’ membership; other important decisions were about the procedures for consideration of complaints, registration of official observers official observers, making monetary deposits, etc. 

Having local elections in the context of uncompleted reform for administrative and territorial order generated the legal uncertainty on the procedure for the exercise of certain powers of the CEC related to the scheduling of the first elections of deputies to district councils and to the composition of district, city, township, and village territorial election commissions. It took a long time for the CEC to schedule the first elections of deputies to district councils for October, 25, 2020, in terms of discrepancies of provisions in the Electoral Code (Article 194), and with the lacking clear legal regulation of the procedures for the establishment of district councils and the authority empowered to set their list. The CEC managed to schedule the first elections of deputies for as many as 119 district councils, only on the basis of letters from the Committee of Verkhovna Rada on the Organization of State Power, Local Self-Governance, Regional Development, and Urban Planning and the Ministry for the Development of Hromadas and Territories of Ukraine.

In a similar manner, on the basis of a request of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, and upon receiving the relevant explanation, the CEC managed to specify which local organizations of political parties are empowered with legal capacity in exercising their powers to participate in elections in the setting of the modified administrative territorial order. In their explanation, the CEC relied on the review of laws and de facto established that oblast organizations of political parties had a priority right to file the submissions on candidates to TECs, provided the party had not registered their centers in the newly created administrative territorial units (rayons/districts). In the event the local centers are available in the new districts, they had the priority right to exercise the stipulated election procedures.

The working group created on the basis of the CEC developed a series of recommendations for executive authorities and local self-governments on implementing anti-epidemic measures during the organization and conduct of local elections. A complicated and unpredictable epidemiological situation and the quarantine restrictions entailed, in the context of intense unfolding of the election process, require from the CEC some active and well-considered decisions, mostly targeted at the maximum exercise of voting rights of all election participants, with account for the unconventional security challenges.

Amidst various circumstances of legal and organizational uncertainty accompanying the election process, it is unacceptable to have any non-public requirements and political expectations on the engagement of the Central Election Commission into problematic issues going beyond its direct competence. Another concerning factor is the information shared in the Ukrainian media about possible attempts to exert administrative pressure on the CEC members, when the head, the deputy head, the secretary, and two commission members were allegedly coerced to file the statements on their early termination of office. Such actions entail certain threat to the independence and impartiality of the commission, and also can generally affect the trust levels and public reputation of public authorities.

According to their legal status, the Central Election Commission is an authority, independent and autonomous from the executive, while the CEC members shall be accountable neither to public officials or civil servants from public administration, nor to the head of state. The 7-year term of office stipulated by the dedicated Law “On Central Election Commission” for the CEC members is fully compliant with the international recommendations and democratic standards for elections. The Code of Good Practices in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission has it that members of election commissions cannot be withdrawn upon the discretion of authorities appointing them. Moreover, the change of the composition in the Central Election Commission shortly before elections or even more so during the election campaign raises doubts about the capacity of the government to secure the exercise of voting rights of citizens. European democratic principle for the preservation of stability of electoral law does not only pertain to restrictions in reviewing the election system less than a year before the elections, but also concerns the change of membership of the Central election commission within this period. 

OPORA hereby calls upon public authorities to keep the impartiality and avoid any actions that might discredit the legal course of election process or infringe the Commission’s independence. In return, whenever there are any grounds for political interference or illegal pressure, the CEC shall invest every effort to engage the law enforcement bodies to investigate such actions and to take the relevant steps for their further termination. Any information available in the media on the attempts to influence the CEC operations, any signs of politically motivated conduct of its members or ther actions casting doubts on the Commission’s impartiality, shall be deemed of public interest, and thus shall be made public, upon condition it is verified and evidence-based.

Any ungrounded termination of office of election commission members during the active phase of election process, or immediately after, shall lead to increased risks for politization of election administration and destroy the relatively interparty compromise reached in the parliament in the formation of the new composition of the CEC in October, 2019. Commission’s impartiality cannot be guaranteed and maintained at the cost of balance of legal interests and mutual  control from parliamentary parties in charge of the formation of the current composition of the CEC. 

Efficient cooperation, solely within the formal powers, broad public awareness building and public communication between all parties in charge of election organization, and the provision of due conditions for their conduct shall be a key safeguard against any shadow influence on the election process or intentions to undermine trust for its legitimacy. The interagency working groups can serve as an efficient and transparent format to establish such efficient communication between public authorities and the CEC as to the organization, preparation and conduct of elections. Establishing an expert council at the CEC made of electoral experts and civil society representatives to discuss key draft decisions of the CEC on election administration and promotion of internal reform may serve as an additional safeguard against the political pressure, and the counterbalance for attempts of informal influence or administrative control over CEC operations.

The discussion around the CEC independence highlights the issue about the improvement of the law on the Central Election Commission, such as in part of appointing and withdrawing its members. In the previous recommendations, OPORA has already emphasized the need to cancel the provision of the Law on the possible early termination of office of the entire composition of the CEC, and to regulate the technicalities of terminating the powers of the CEC members in case their term of office runs out.

Public assessment of performance of the Central Election Commission or the individual members, in the context of preparing and conducting local elections in Ukraine is justified but slightly premature, in terms of the incomplete nature of key administrative procedures related to the organization of election process, and securing the exercise of citizen voting rights on election day, on October, 25, 2020, and at all stages of election process. 

No less important criteria for the quality of performance of the Commission shall be the course of implementing a series of activities under the Strategic Plan of the CEC 2020-2025. It is part of the internal reform process of the CEC, which necessity has been multiple times highlighted by the Civil Network OPORA. Optimization of external communications with stakeholders as a priority of the Road Map of Reforms for the CEC (suggested by OPORA jointly with other dedicated NGOs) implies the development of transparent approaches to the relations with other public authorities, and setting the framework for this interaction as a non-interference guarantee, on the one hand, and the precondition for the organization of work contacts, on the other hand. 

In the context of dynamic expansion of electoral process, the degree of public expectations to transparency and responsibility of the CEC is an all-time high. Therefore, it requires from the Commission some active actions in part of providing immediate access to the data related to the organization of preparation and conduct of elections, as well as a broad awareness raising among voters. Civil Network OPORA highly appreciates and is ready to offer the all-rounded support to the CEC efforts in implementing the open data policy, such as about the well-timed update and publication of key open electoral data sets, as well as the development and creation of the online services adjusted to the CEC needs.

Scheduling the interim elections of the people’s deputies of Ukraine

On June, 5, 2020, the CEC had a meeting and approved the Resolution No 99. Because of the demise of Valeriy Davydenko, the previously elected people’s deputy in the constituency, it scheduled the interim elections for the people’s deputy of Ukraine in a one-member constituency No 208 in Chernihiv Oblast, for Sunday, October, 25, 2020. The Resolution was made public on the CEC website, as of June, 6, but the official publication in the national printed media was made available on August, 26, 2020. In fact, the CEC actions, without any sound legal grounds, delayed the start of election process for interim elections for three months.

The decision of the Central Election Commission to set the date for the interim elections upon its discretion, through the ungrounded separation in time for procedures of promulgating and publishing the CEC acts, does not conform with the principle of proportionality. In fact, the entailed decision to extend the period when the voters from constituency No 208 are going to stay without any representation in the parliament restricts the possibilities for the exercise of their voting rights. 

In addition, the scheduling of interim elections of a people’s deputy of Ukraine in a one-member constituency No 208, simultaneously with elections to village, townshop, city, district, and oblast councils, and of heads of villages, townships, and cities poses a series of complex problems in election administration and organization of voting. Regular local elections are taking place under the provisions of the Electoral Code of Ukraine, while the interim elections of a people’s deputy of Ukraine shall run under the Law of Ukraine “On Election of People’s Deputies of Ukraine.” The need for election commissions to simultaneously enforce the provisions of various sectoral laws jeopardizes the quality of organization of the two election processes.

The need to take into account the restrictions caused by the complicated epidemiological situation, in terms of COVID-19 spread, and the motivation to save budget funds are the important grounds. However, the Commission’s competence does not include any independent assessment of any such circumstances and their further use as an exclusive ground for making decisions falling within the electoral law requirements and established practices for interim elections.

Local elections and COVID-19. Main problems and ways of solving them 

Conduct of elections under conditions of COVID-19 pandemic is a major challenge for all the countries that adhere to democratic election standards. Efficient management of COVID-related challenges to election process requires the allocation of extensive financial resources from state budget, synchronization of electoral procedures with epidemiological response measures, maintenance of guarantees of rights and opportunities for electoral subjects. It is equally important to inform citizens about government measures implemented to ensure safe conditions for voting process. Flaws in public awareness efforts and low quality of preparation of polling stations may lead to significant decrease in voter activity which, in its turn, will have a negative effect on the legitimacy of election results. In the words of secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Oleksiy Danilov pronounced at the special meeting on August 27, 2020, Ukraine will be going through one of the most difficult election processes held under conditions of growing COVID morbidity rate.   

At the beginning of August 2020, the Central election commission addressed the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with proposals aimed at preventing the spread of COVID-19 disease during local elections. A working group comprising people’s deputies of Ukraine, representatives of NSDC, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and other relevant authorities was formed in order to elaborate aforementioned proposals. These included the establishment of requirements for implementing epidemiological response measures in the process of organizing and holding local elections (voting conditions in the polling stations, medical institutions, during self-imposed isolation and pre-election campaigning). In its turn, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine continues to consider proposals for regulation of emergency voting conditions amid the spreading of disease. Meanwhile, TECs that were formed prior to the beginning of election process addressed local self-government bodies with a request to provide proper conditions for their activities with due consideration to the threat of COVID-19.

OPORA’s observers, who monitor the activities of TECs on a systematic basis, pointed to unsatisfactory condition of epidemiological response measures at the level of election commissions. On the one hand, members of TECs weren’t provided with necessary means of disinfection and protective masks. On the other hand, the election commissions do not adhere to quarantine requirements and have no clear plan of action in specific situations related to COVID-19. It should be noted that several COVID-19 cases have already been recorded among TEC members (TEC in Odesa oblast).

According to OPORA, the state government should, in as short a time as possible, provide the following guarantees of proper voting conditions amid the spreading of COVID-19 disease:

• Guarantee the allocation of adequate funds for implementing measures aimed at organizing safe voting process in the polling stations, medical institutions, under conditions of self-imposed isolation, as well as providing members of election commissions with all the necessary means. The list of funded measures should include large-scale awareness campaigns aimed at informing candidates, members of election commissions and voters about key sequences of safe activities in the course of performing electoral procedures.
• Develop recommendations for safe pre-election campaigning and distribute them among political parties, their local organizations and candidates running in local elections.
• Work out recommendations on the best possible ways of preventing the spread of disease in the course of conducting electoral procedures and distribute them among all electoral subjects, including candidates, members of election commissions and official observers. In particular, it is necessary to develop recommendations on the mechanisms for avoiding waiting lines at the stage of submission of documents to election commissions and during voting in the polling stations.
• Write up response scenarios for recorded cases of COVID morbidity among members of election commissions and voters that cast ballots in the polling stations, at their location or under conditions of self-imposed isolation. The absence of such detailed scenarios may cause panic amongst members of election commissions and other electoral subjects as well as lead to violation of electoral rights of citizens, especially in small communities where local citizens may possess information about certain persons who were diagnosed with COVID disease. 
• It is advisable that law enforcement agencies should elaborate plans of action in response to politically motivated attempts to destabilize the electoral process by way of disseminating false information about current situation with respect to COVID disease.

Implementation of epidemiological response measures shouldn’t limit the guarantees of freedom of action for electoral subjects, except in cases of lawfully postponed elections. State government should put an increased focus on comprehensive communication with voters, political parties, candidates, members of election commissions by providing them with clear plans of response action in crisis situations and the rules of safe conduct in the course of performing electoral procedures. Such communication should be backed by adequate level of financial, technical and administrative support.

Local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts: limitation of electoral rights of citizens under conditions of legal uncertainty

On August 8, 2020, the CEC adopted a resolution on the impossibility of holding first local elections in 10 territorial communities of Donetsk oblast and 8 territorial communities of Luhansk oblast. These resolutions were adopted on the basis of corresponding conclusions made by civil-military administrations (CMA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Given the high level of public attention to this issue, the CEC came under strong political criticism, even though it has no statutory powers or practical ability to verify the conclusions of CMAs. The resolutions on impossibility of holding elections in certain territories were adopted under conditions of complete legal uncertainty, in particular, insofar as it relates to lawful grounds for adopting such resolutions and the mechanisms for restoring electoral rights of citizens. The parliament not only failed to solve the problem of legal uncertainty of electoral process in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but also exacerbated it by way of introducing latest amendments to relevant law and thereby extending the effect of legal provisions to united territorial communities. As a result, a significant part of voters residing in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts under government control were deprived of the opportunity to elect local self-government bodies. This situation has all the markings of violation of constitutional rights of citizens, comes into conflict with the state policy on decentralization and potentially may lead to formation of negative attitudes among relevant groups of citizens. In the run-up to official start of election process, Civil Network OPORA advised the NSDC to hear the conclusions of CMAs on impossibility of holding local elections in 18 communities and revise them, if required. It should be noted that in consideration of citizen petitions the CEC addressed the CMAs with repeat requests for revision of conclusions on impossibility of holding elections, but to no avail.

The resolution on impossibility of holding local elections has a direct impact on 475 thousand citizens whose voting addresses refer to 10 territorial communities of Donetsk oblast and 8 territorial communities of Luhansk oblast. The largest among them are Lysychansk city community (almost 91 thousand voters), Severodonetsk city community (84,612), Toretsk city community (50,351), Volnovakha city community (29,716), Maryinka city community (26,865), Avdiivka city community (25,751), Vugledar city community (22 thousand), Popasna city community (21 thousand), Stanytsia Luhanska township community (20,686). By comparison, a little more than 2 million citizens were included on the register of voters in the two regions in 2019 parliamentary election.

All territorial communities that are currently affected by the resolution on impossibility of holding local elections were completely covered by 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections (except for certain voting precincts). In 2015, regular local elections were conducted in no less than 4 territorial communities that are currently banned from holding local elections. This refers to large territorial communities (Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Vugledar, Sartana) which is evidence of limited possibilities of local self-government in the two regions of Ukraine. Furthermore, the decision to conduct elections of deputies to rayon councils, which are intended to represent the common interests of territorial communities, in those rayons where the majority of key populated places were banned from holding elections is highly questionable.

According to OPORA’s observations, the 2015-2019 nationwide and local elections were held in conditions of adequate safety level. Observers recorded cases of violation of electoral law in the aforementioned communities, but these violations were typical for other regions of Ukraine as well.

According to OPORA, CEC resolutions and corresponding conclusions of CMAs once again highlight the problem of legal regulation and practical aspects of the procedure for determining the impossibility of holding elections.

• Non-collegial and non-transparent manner of elaborating CMA conclusions on impossibility of holding elections directly relating to citizen rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine.

The current legislation of Ukraine doesn’t envisage a procedure for interagency cooperation and collegial elaboration of resolutions on impossibility of holding elections. There is no legally binding mechanism for conducting public consultations and involving relevant experts in the process of adoption of such resolutions.  

In order to enhance public legitimacy of decisions on security issues it is necessary to introduce the principles of collegiality and interagency cooperation in the process of elaboration of such decisions as well as shift the responsibility for making such decisions from regional to national authorities.

• The current law of Ukraine and the existing practice of implementing legal provisions don’t build on previous experience of holding elections in the corresponding communities which is important for forecasting the development of security situation under conditions of election process.

As of today, there is no evidence or information to suggest that relevant authorities are making use of previous experience of holding elections in the process of considering the impossibility of conducting local elections in certain communities. Successful experience in holding national and local elections should be considered as an argument for scheduling further elections (in the absence of unbiased information on exacerbation of security issues). Meanwhile, degradation of security situation should be evaluated on the basis of certain quantitative criteria (scale) comprehensible to general public.

• The current legislation and the procedures for implementing legal provisions do not include clear criteria and/or requirements for adoption of grounded decisions on impossibility of holding elections at a certain time period.

In the 2015-2019 timeframe, remoteness of territorial communities from the combat area was frequently used by state authorities as a criterion for adopting resolutions. However, state authorities failed to ensure uniform application of this territorial criterion and resorted to obvious distortions when using it. The resolution on 2020 local elections also provides several illustrative examples of non-uniform application of territorial criterion (for instance, as is the case with Severodonetsk and Rubizhne that form part of one and the same urban agglomeration). Insufficiency of basic requirements and criterions for elaborating conclusions of CMAs was repeatedly demonstrated by the latter through the use of “complicated socio-political situation” as the ground for imposing a ban on voting.

The absence of clear criteria for making conclusions on impossibility of holding elections is compounded by the fact that the election process is considered separately from other fields of activity of territorial communities.

The negative effect of significant degradation of security situation in comparison with the previous periods can’t be limited to election process only. Generality of measures aimed at ensuring security of citizens in different spheres of public life is a good way of preventing potential political abuse of electoral procedures. Furthermore, it is important to use statistical data on development of security situation which would provide evidence of advisability of implementing special security measures.

• The problem of restoring local self-government rights of territorial communities is characterized by legal uncertainty following the adoption of resolution on impossibility of holding specific elections in their territories.

The legislation of Ukraine doesn’t include a clear definition of the procedure for initiating and adopting a resolution on the matter of holding local elections in territorial communities affected by previously adopted decisions on impossibility of organizing the voting process. The Law of Ukraine “On Civil-Military Administrations” only stipulates that the powers of CMA shall be terminated on the day of holding the first session of newly elected local council. Legal uncertainty of the term of restoration of electoral rights of citizens and local self-government rights of territorial communities creates significant obstacles to planning the development of territorial communities. It also creates a risk of potential abuse given the interest of local elites in managing community resources without getting a mandate through democratic elections.

The matter of holding elections of deputies to rayon councils remains unresolved since the adoption of resolution on impossibility of holding first local elections in 18 territorial communities of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts forming part of these rayons. At the time of publication of this report, conduct of elections to rayon councils with disregard for the above-mentioned 18 communities was the most likely approach to solving this problem. In some cases, this may lead to de facto violation of the principle of joint representation of the interests of territorial communities at the level of rayon councils. Furthermore, inability to ensure representation of common interests of all territorial communities served as the ground for postponing the elections of deputies to Donetsk and Luhansk oblast councils.

Formation and commencement of work of territorial election commissions 

Central election commission and local organizations of political parties have duly performed their functions insofar as they relate to forming and staffing of key collegial bodies responsible for preparation of local elections scheduled for October 25, 2020, and general administration of electoral process within the boundaries of oblasts, rayons and cities.

Central election commission formed all 22 oblast (except for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), 119 rayon (except for certain rayons of Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts and Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and 381 city election commissions on the last of the days allotted by law (August 10) in compliance with statutory deadlines. The CEC also formed 10 rayon election commissions in the city of Kyiv.

In their turn, rayon election commissions formed 625 village and 433 township election commissions on or before August 25. Furthermore, city election commissions formed 70 rayon election commissions in the cities. OPORA’s observers monitored the process of formation of TECs and the compliance of rayon election commissions with legal procedures.

Territorial election commissions are permanent collegial bodies that hold responsibility for forming the electoral constituencies, registering the candidates, producing the ballot papers and establishing the results of elections of deputies to relevant councils (oblast, rayon, city, township, village, city rayon councils) as well as the results of local mayoral elections (mayors of cities, townships or villages). Members of TECs shall exercise their powers until the beginning of next regular elections and the formation of new election commissions, that is, for the entire term of office of local councils to be elected in October 2020.

The Electoral Code defines three types of entities for nominating candidates to territorial election commissions: 1) local organizations of political parties that formed deputy factions in the current convocation of the Verkhovna Rada – they have the right to delegate two candidates to each election commission; 2) local organizations of political parties that concluded an agreement on political cooperation with parliamentary group of people’s deputies – one candidate to each commission; 3) local organizations of political parties registered in relevant administrative-territorial unit – one candidate to each commission. Candidates representing the first two of the aforementioned nominating entities (parliamentary political forces) were included in election commissions on a mandatory basis, while the candidates representing other nominating entities (extra-parliamentary political forces) were selected through lot drawing procedure regulated by special resolution of the CEC. As a result, 12 out of 18 seats (67%) in each territorial election commission, in fact, were reserved for representatives of five deputy factions and two deputy groups of the Verkhovna Rada, while the remaining 6 seats were contested by all interested parties, including those represented in parliament.

It is not the first time that legislative body has provided parliamentary political forces (deputy factions and groups) with a priority right to fill the seats of territorial election commissions. A similar approach to forming the election commissions had already been used during previous election campaigns in Ukraine. In particular, political parties with parliamentary factions nominated two candidates to each TEC in 2015 regular local elections and as many as three candidates in 2010 local elections. However, the fact that parliamentary groups and factions were given equal mandatory right to form the election commissions is a completely new development in legislation. Given the legal uncertainty of the role of parliamentary groups in party system and electoral process as a whole, the adoption of this legislative decision may lead to weakening of mutual control exercised by political parties and further politicization of election administration bodies.

In practice, parliamentary groups had the opportunity to nominate candidates to TECs by way of concluding an agreement on political cooperation with one of political parties instead of doing it directly. In particular, parliamentary group “Dovira” (Trust) concluded an agreement on political cooperation with “Solidarity of Women of Ukraine” party, while parliamentary group “For the Future” entered into political agreement with their namesake – “For the Future” party.

The results of formation of oblast, rayon and city election commissions 

The results of allocation of seats reserved for parliamentary political forces show that three parliamentary factions (that is, local organizations of parliamentary parties), namely “European Solidarity”, “Servant of the People” and “Batkivshchyna” nominated two candidates to each of 532 territorial election commissions that were formed by the CEC. Parliamentary faction of the “Opposition Platform – For Life” made almost full use (96%) of its quota for nominating candidates to election commissions. Meanwhile, local organizations of “Holos” (Voice) party nominated only 716 candidates to TECs instead of 1,064 (2 candidates to each of 532 commissions) as provided for by the law, which means they made use of 67% of their quota. Political parties that concluded agreements with parliamentary groups also exercised their right to delegate candidates to TECs to different extents: “For the Future” party nominated one candidate to each of 532 TECs (made use of 100% of its quota), while “Solidarity of Women of Ukraine” party nominated its candidates to just over half of the election commissions (to 309 TECs or 58% of the total number).

Local organizations of political parties represented by the factions in the parliament (“Servant of the People”, “Opposition Platform - For Life”, “Batkivshchyna”, “European Solidarity”, “Holos”), as well as of the parties “Solidarity of Women of Ukraine” and “For the Future” have fully used their priority right to form the election commissions. In total, they submitted 5,774 (or 90%) of the possible 6,384 persons who had to be excluded on a mandatory basis. Therefore, the parliamentary political forces can make use of their dominating influence on the formation of commissions and manage to organize their work in the duly authorized empowered composition, even with the lacking representation from other (extra-parliamentary) political entities. On the one hand, we may testify to the mutual control coming from parliamentary parties, and thus, from the system of checks and balances in election process administration. The practice of preferring the parliamentary parties in compiling the commissions does not contradict the European democratic approaches towards the formation of election commissions commonly used in similar election administration models. On the other hand, under-representation of extra-parliamentary parties in election administration authorities indicates to the lack of political balance, which is much needed to build trust for election administration from all actors.

As little as 256 local organizations of political parties used their right to submit candidacies to TEC membership, while their total number exceeded 28,000. Of them, Central Election Commission rejected 1,092 persons, due to nonconformity of the submitted documents with the legal requirements, while 842 persons were withdrawn by the submitting entities. Since 5,774 persons have already been included into TECs on mandatory basis, there remained over 20,000 persons (20,571) competing for the 3,798 vacancies in the commissions. To distribute the seats, the Central Election Commission held the procedure of drawing lots. Upon the results, it identified the order of succession for candidates nominated from the respective local organizations of political parties to be included into the TECs. The draw was conducted for all territorial election commissions simultaneously: there were 527 of them, out of 532, since for five commissions the number of submitted candidates was either equal or lower than the maximum composition. The CEC conducted the draw in a public and transparent manner (with online streaming), in line with the procedures set by the resolution No 113 of 25.06.2020. 

As determined by the draw, 205 local organizations of political parties delegated their representatives to TECs. The largest number of candidtes in commissions (one for each commission) was drawn for the “Servant of the People” party (146 commissions), the “New Policy” party (139), “Batkivshchyna” (137), and the “European Solidarity” (130).

Taking into account the total results of the draw and the mandatory distribution of candidates for territorial election commissions, the highest representation was predictably obtained by local organizations of parliamentary parties (factions and groups). In total, the political entities delegated to TECs 68% (or 6,496) of their candidates, such as: “Servant of the People,” “Batkivshchyna” and “European Solidarity” – about 13%, “Opposition Platform - For Life” – 12%, “Holos” – 8%, “For the Future” – almost 7%, “Solidarity of Women of Ukraine” – ab. 4%. Thereat, in many commissions, the parliamentary parties (factions) have three representatives in each. Thus, the “Servant of the People” party received three members in each of the 151 territorial election commissions (in 28%). A similar figure was shown by other parliamentary factions (except for the “Holos”) – they are all represented by three members in each of the 25% of TECs. Instead, the “Holos” party has three members in each of the 29 TECs established by the Central Election Commission (or 5% of the total number). Other members of election commissions of the total number, i.e. 32% (or 3,076 persons), were included into TECs upon submission of local organizations of 198 political parties. 

When compiling the executive staff of the oblast, district, and city election commissions, the CEC had to appoint to the positions of the head, deputy head, and a secretary of each commission the persons submitted from different entities. Here, the Electoral Code does not have any provision on the proportionate distribution of each category of executive positions in election commissions in charge of preparation and conduct of local elections (even though the requirement applies in formation of commissions at the presidential and parliamentary elections). Thus, in practice, the CEC had broad opportunities to provide fo ra more or less balanced distribution of executive positions among the submitting entities.

Central Election Commission invested much effort into securing the proportional representation of local organizations of political parties among the executive staff of commissions. However, the results of such distribution turned out not balanced enough. In total, the candidates represented in TECs were submitted by 94 organizations of political parties. The highest number of positions of heads, deputy heads, and secretaries have been taken by candidates submitted by local organizations of the “Servant of the People” party. Of the total number of candidates nominated by the party (1,211 persons), executive positions have been taken by 323 persons, or almost 27%. At the same time, the “European Solidarity” and “Batkivshchyna” parties, that have a roughly similar number of members in TECs (1,195 and 1,197 persons, respectively), the same as the “Servant of the People,” received in the executive positions the representation of 19% (222 persons in the “ES” and 229 persons in “Batkivshchyna”). Representatives of the “Servant of the People” prevail among all categories of executive positions, and also expressly dominate among TEC heads. In total, 139 persons were appointed as heads of commissions, upon nomination from the “Servant of the People.” It largely exceeds the number (and ratio) of similar positions obtained by other entities with comparable general representation. In particular, the “Batkivshchyna” received 86 positions for heads of commissions, “European Solidarity” – 76, “Opposition Platform - For Life” – 66. The additional criteria declared by the CEC for selection of candidates for executive positions on the basis of professional qualification of the suggested candidates and their organizational background in electoral field, is important but poorly justified argument in favour of such a discrepancy in the representation levels.

In terms of gender distribution, women prevail in the composition of territorial election commissions established by the CEC. The general correlation of men and women in TECs is 29% and 71%. In the previous regular local elections in Ukraine, the parameter was similar: in 2010, the territorial election commissions established by the CEC, the share of women was 68%, in 2015 – 74.5%. women also dominate on among the executive staff (75% of women and 25% of men). Their share is especially manifest among secretaries of commissions (80%). However, the situation is crucially different on the level of heads of oblast election commissions, where the share of women accounts to as little as 32%. If we compare local organizations of political parties that delegated the highest number of members to TECs, the correlation of persons of different age among their candidates is roughly the same – with the lowest levels in the “Holos” (68% of women in TECs), with the highest levels in the “Servant of the People” party (77% of women in TECs). 

Gender Distribution in TECs

Gender Distribution among TEC Heads

Start of work of regional, district and city election commissions

(based on the results of OPORA's observation over 115 out of 552 election commissions)

TECs established by the CEC were required to hold their first meetings no later than the second day after the day of their formation. Given the formation of election commissions on August, 10, TECs were to convene for their first meetings no later than August, 12.

OPORA representatives monitored the first meetings of 115 TECs, which included 22 oblast TECs, 31 district and 60 city election commissions. The publicity of the first TEC meetings was also ensured by journalists who attended the meetings of 35 out of the 115 commissions monitored by OPORA. In total, the CEC formed 532 election commissions.

According to the Electoral Code, TEC members shall take an oath at the first meeting. Refusing to do so means refusing to be a member of the election commission. A TEC meeting shall be valid provided that more than half of its members are attending. All TECs monitored by OPORA were composed of 18 people. This requires the presence of 10 people to ensure the credibility of their meetings.

According to the observation findings for the first meetings of 115 TECs, OPORA hereby states the following:

• 113 of the 115 TECs covered by OPORA’s monitoring had their first meetings taking place in time, with the key issue of which was the swearing-in of election commission members.
• At the first meeting, 10 of the 115 TECs covered by OPORA’s observation were attended by less than half of the members of the newly formed TECs (under 10), while in other commissions the meeting was empowered and authorized.
• In 12 of the 115 TECs, the number of commission members who took the oath at the first meeting was less than required to hold their authorized meetings. It was due to the fact that some of the newly appointed TEC members refused to take the oath and begin further work.

According to observers’ provisional estimates, at the first TEC meeting, 61 persons or almost 3% of TEC members observed by OPORA were dismissed. Thus, 12 TECs have not reached the authority during the first meetings, and had to return to the oath taking procedure at subsequent meetings. There may be more such TECs in total, as OPORA representatives did not observe the commissioning of all CECs. For more details on the first TEC meetings in terms of territorial communities and regions, you can follow the OPORA website in the “Regional News” section https://www.oporaua.org/region-news

Key Challenges on the Initial Stage of TEC Operations

• A key challenge in the initial phase of TECs operations was the lack of remuneration for the permanent work of commission members and the staff involved. According to the current legislation, remuneration for permanent members of TECs and the staff can be possible only after the official start of the election process. At the same time, election commissions function before the start of the election process, and are obliged to exercise many important powers. In particular, these commissions should form village, settlement, and city district TECs, prepare draft decisions on the formation of constituencies, etc. The TEC’s mandate requires the involvement of election commission members on a permanent basis, as well as of the support staff such as system administrators, lawyers, record keepers, and other staff.

The unregulated issue of remuneration of TEC members before the official start of the election process negatively affected their motivation to work in such an environment. OPORA calls upon public authorities to resolve the issue of remuneration to members and employees in August 2020.

• In some cases, restrictions on access to government administrative facilities in the face of COVID-19 led to problems with the participation of journalists and members of the public at the first TEC meetings. In particular, difficulties with access for observers were noted during the first or other meetings of Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih TECs, Lviv City TEC, Lviv Oblast TEC, Zolochiv and Yavoriv District Territorial Election Commissions, a.o.

The uncertain format of election commissions during the COVID-19 remains a pressing challenge and requires concrete and coordinated decisions to be made by the government. In particular, during the first TEC meetings, OPORA representatives noted the lack of protective facemasks and disinfectants for the newly appointed members of the commissions. Some election commissions have already officially addressed the authorities with a proposal to provide the necessary funds to members of election commissions (in particular, the Zhytomyr Regional Territorial Election Commission).

OPORA commends the CEC’s efforts to develop a set of measures to ensure safe working conditions for election commissions during the pandemic, and calls upon public authorities to provide them with everything they need in a timely manner. At the same time, we would urge the government to attend to the fact that it is unacceptable to have the de facto restriction on the rights of electoral subjects during the implementation of COVID-19 containment measures, which should not substitute the requirements of the election legislation. The experience of holding elections in foreign countries showcases the possibility to fully comply with the election procedures, while simultaneously implementing pandemic containment measures.

• OPORA observers noted a number of issues in the proper provision of TECs with premises, computer equipment, Internet communication, etc. According to OPORA’s observations, during the monitoring of the first TEC meetings, only 19% of TECs were provided with information boards on their premises, 42% of TECs had access to the Internet, and 21% of TECs had a stand for official commission materials.

These problems are typical for elections in Ukraine, and they are usually resolved during the work of election commissions. Unfortunately, members of many TECs had to request from the authorities to be provided with the premises and other working conditions, or to tackle the issues on their own. For example, members of the Kalush City TEC (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast) informed OPORA observers that they had to purchase the stationery, seals, and TEC signs at their own expense. Members of the Ivano-Frankivsk Commission also informed about the need to temporarily spend personal funds for the organization of TEC work. Chernihiv City TEC, in turn, addressed the regional council and the regional state administration with a request to resolve logistics-related problems. OPORA representatives call upon the authorities to promptly create appropriate conditions for the smooth operations of TECs in local elections.

• The premises of a large part of TECs were not adjusted for the unobstructed access for people with disabilities. Its is due to the placement of TECs on the upper floors of government buildings without elevators, the lack of ramps or other features non-compliant with accessibility standards. These circumstances directly disable citizens with disabilities to participate in the work of election commissions or to communicate directly with them. 

OPORA calls upon the authorities to promptly analyze the current state of affairs and bring TEC premises in line with accessibility standards, and ensure the true inclusiveness of the election process.

Risks of misuse of administrative resources 

One of the most important and common risks to the democracy of local elections is the misuse of administrative resources in the interests of candidates and local party organizations. Civil Network OPORA plans to pay special attention to this aspect of the election campaign, in particular by initiating the signing by candidates who are public officials the Code of Conduct for Public Officials and Civil Servants during Elections developed by the organization. The Code includes a list of specific requirements for officials whose compliance with the election will ensure that their activities meet democratic election standards. Comprehensive monitoring of the practices of candidates and parties and communication of issues with officials will help reduce the intensity of abuse of administrative resources. 

Abuse of administrative resources means an unjustified advantage gained by certain parties and candidates through the use of their official positions or connections with public administration bodies in order to influence the outcome of elections. 

The list of administrative resources includes human, financial, material, natural and other intangible resources used during elections by elected and appointed public administration officials through control over staff and finances, the decision-making process and through personal links in the government. Administrative resources are also public administration resources that candidates use in the form of prestige, public and informational visibility to gain election support. For example, such events include the selective invitation of political leaders or candidates to official events of public administration bodies. 

No clear distinction between the public administration, political parties and candidates, may invalidate the principle of equal opportunities for all actors in the electoral process. 

The specifics of local election campaigns are in the close and direct connection between local officials and voters, the ability of local managers to directly influence citizens through personnel decisions, implementation of infrastructure projects and social programs, or even through pressure or intimidation, and more. Unfortunately, the misuse of administrative resources in local elections has been receiving less attention and control than during national campaigns. 

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, in its special handbook “Administrative Resources and Fair Elections”, provides the following examples of abuses that best describe the problem of administrative resources during local elections:

• Abuse of financial resources (initiation of infrastructure or other projects in the run-up to election, in order to gain the support of voters in specific areas, plans to implement long-term projects shortly before the election).
• Abuse of material resources (use of material values, transport, premises or equipment of public authorities for the election campaign, granting permits to citizens or businesses to build, use land, other community property before or during elections, etc.).
• Abuse of human resources (involvement of public servants in election campaigns, organized campaigns in support of candidates among civil servants and employees of budgetary institutions, introduction of new programs of assistance to citizens by social or medical workers, pressure on election commission members at their main place of work, appointments to office in order to gain loyalty during the election).
• Abuse of communication resources (providing individual candidates or parties with access to offline or online government resources, preference in coverage of individual candidates in public or private media, etc.).
• Abuse of symbolic resources (candidates announcing new high-profile projects in communities, raising funds or signing contracts shortly before the election, except for cases when such announcements were not caused by extraordinary circumstances);
• Abuse of legislative resources (change of election rules in the interests of individual candidates or parties, selective investigation of violations by election participants). 

Thus, an important task of the state is to create appropriate tools to prevent the abuse of administrative resources, while political parties and candidates shall independently adhere to the principles of a democratic electoral process. The development of political practices that reject direct or covert abuses of power in the election interests is one of the key preconditions for competitive and democratic elections. 

At the unofficial stage of the election process, OPORA is forced to acknowledge the incidents with elements of abuse of administrative resources in the interests of potential candidates and political parties. These cases are not yet formally linked to the official election process, but they already demonstrate a lack of distinction between the public administration and the electoral interests of political forces and future candidates. 

Major incidents with elements of misuse of administrative resources

In the run-up to the official start of the election process, OPORA observers recorded a significant increase in the number of local government officials who initiated or intensified local socio-economic and infrastructure projects. The current activities of elected officials and their subordinates have become more active with the approach of the election campaign, which is a prerequisite for the use of government resources for election purposes. At the same time, in most cases no extraordinary circumstances were recorded that would justify changes in the daily activities of the authorities and their officials.

Incidents with elements of abuse of human resources in the election interests 

In August 2020, OPORA observers recorded a number of incidents involving the involvement of local government personnel in activities that were de facto aimed at supporting political parties, their local organizations or potential candidates. 

Such incidents in the reporting period include:

• Active public promotion of the Hennady Kernes Bloc “Successful Kharkiv” during the official events of the city council, district administrations, and municipal utility companies. In particular, the political advertisement of the Hennady Kernes Bloc “Successful Kharkiv” was placed in most secondary schools, which may indicate to the mass involvement of their employees in party activities.
• There is a fact of the possible involvement of employees of the fire and rescue brigades and their corresponding equipment for placement of political advertising of the “Servant of the People” party in the settlement of Kazanka in Mykolayiv Oblast. The Main Board of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Mykolayiv Oblast has officially launched an investigation into the incident.
• The process of distributing social packages from Orest Kavetsky, a potential candidate in the local elections from the “Servant of the People” party, involved the head of the Busk Regional State Administration of Lviv region Yevhen Kychurchak.
• Observers recorded the regular presence of representatives and candidates of local organizations of the “Servant of the People” party at official events and during working trips of the head of the Lviv Regional State Administration Maksym Kozytskyi. Political advertising and de facto campaigning at such events were not recorded, but there were elements of a selective approach to the presence of party representatives at the events of the head of the regional state administration. 
• Some employees of the Mykolayiv Regional and City Councils have publicly expressed support for the “Proposition” and “Nash Kray” political parties, which has signs of violating the principle of political neutrality of the public administration.
• The mayor of Mykolayiv Olexander Senkevich, during the public presentation of his performance report, is actively using symbols of the “Proposition” political party, which may include elements of using human resources of local governments in electoral interests of the political entity. In addition, there is a problem of insufficient separation of the current activities of a local government official and his political activity.
• At least half of the delegates at the party convention of the “Ihor Sapozhka Team “Yednist,” headed by Ihor Sapozhka, Brovary city mayor, were the staff of the city council executive committee.

OPORA observers had a separate focus on the activities of the heads of regional and district state administrations in the context of the approaching election campaign. As a rule, heads of local state administrations avoided direct involvement in political and party processes, except in cases of joint participation with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky in presentations of Regional Development Strategies. These presentations, according to preliminary information, are events related to the “Servant of the People” party. The Law of Ukraine “On Civil Service” envisages guarantees of political neutrality of civil servants but it does not apply to heads of local state administrations. Instead, the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption” imposes on the heads of regional state administrations and district state administrations the obligation to adhere to political neutrality in the performance of their official duties (Article 40 of the Law). Despite the legal ambiguity of the case, the transitional state of Ukrainian democracy requires a committed position from officials to ensure equal treatment of all political opinions and parties. Given the challenges for the development of competitive political and electoral processes, those in office must also show moderation, and promote the political neutrality of the public administration. 

Incidents with elements of abuse of budget (financial and administrative) resources

In the run-up to local elections, the "Servant of the People" political party, its local organizations, and MPs from the political party are actively covering in their own campaign materials the data on the progress of state infrastructure projects under the general name "Big Construction." This project envisages large-scale repairs of roads of national standing, the construction of bridges, social, medical, and educational facilities. The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi has been consistently attracting social attention to these national projects, as he himself has been offering his direct support, as a political figure, to the “Servant of the People” party.

According to the best international practices to prevent the abuse of administrative resources, in particular at the level of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, public promotion of national projects by political parties may be qualified as abuse of financial (budgetary) resources for electoral purposes. Moreover, OPORA observers are unaware of any legitimate and emergency circumstances that require increased public awareness of the interim results of the "Big Construction"Program.

In connection with the widespread practice of having the political party cover the outcomes of the state program "Big Construction", OPORA hereby states:

• Making voters feel that a political party is responsible for the results of taxpayer-funded programs is an inappropriate practice in the context of preventing the misuse of administrative resources.
• Officials of all levels of government who are personally members of political parties have the right and obligation to inform citizens about the results of their activities. However, such information should not relate to the activities of a political party or be used in its electoral interests.
• Appropriate conditions for preventing the misuse of administrative resources are formed not only at the level of legislation, but also by the political entities themselves, that should avoid identifying state programs with party achievements. 

In addition to high-profile and resource-intensive state projects, on the eve of the local elections there is an increase in the activity of local authorities in the implementation of infrastructure projects. This intensification is often directly linked to the preparation of local officials for elections and their party affiliation. Such incidents have been reported, in particular, but not exclusively, in Mariupol. They were related to the activities of the mayor Vadym Boychenko, leader of "Vadim Boychenko Bloc." In Kharkiv, they were related with the activities of the Mayor Hennadiy Kernes and the party of "Hennady Kernes Bloc "Successful Kharkiv." In Bila Tserkva, it was about using the process of reconstruction of the local stadium in the interests of the local organization of the "European Solidarity" party. In Cherkasy it was  the restoration of local infrastructure in the context of public officials who were members of the "Svoboda" AU. Another case was about posting performance reports on the activities of Cherkasy Mayor Anatoliy Bondarenko that indirectly used symbols of the "For the Future" party. In Kyiv, a number of current deputies of the city council take part in the implementation of local infrastructure projects, directly or indirectly linking them with the UDAR party (the party's leader is Mayor Vitaliy Klychko). Instead, on the Day of Derhachi City (Kharkiv oblast), the political advertisement of the "Servant of the People" party and its representative Konstiantyn Zhydkov was shown at an official concert funded by the local budget.

In addition to cases showing the connection between budget programs and electoral interests, there is a significant stir among public officials planning to run in elections who increase the intensity of implemented budgeted programs shortly before the election. Even though they do not openly declare their electoral ambitions or party affiliations, the untypical large-scale activities of officials create the preconditions for the abuse of administrative resources.

Potential risks of misuse of financial (budgetary) administrative resources arise as a result of the decision of the current people’s deputies of Ukraine to run in local elections. In particular, in Volyn Oblast, local electoral lists of “For the Future” party organizations will be headed by incumbent MPs of Ukraine, who are positioned as lobbyists for the allocation of subvention funds from the state budget for socio-economic development of territories. Without even assessing this report in terms of participation of people’s deputies of Ukraine in the distribution of state subventions and the implementation of budget programs, we hereby state that it will be difficult for a voter to distinguish between parliamentary activity and campaigning of a candidate in local elections. This requires the people’s deputies of Ukraine to adhere to clear standards and distinguish state resources and electoral interests.

Misuse of corporate administrative resources

In the 2020 local elections, OPORA observers planned to monitor the abuse of “corporate” administrative resources. It means the representatives of the private (business) sector engaging into campaigning their subordinates, official vehicles, communication means, equipment, or premises, as well as the use of work or operational meetings, or team meetings for campaigning. Tracking this type of administrative resource is an important component in assessing compliance with the principle of equal opportunities for candidates and the transparency of their election finances. The unaccountable use of resources of enterprises and corporations under the candidates’ control poses risks of illegal influence on voters and non-competitive advantages in financing the campaigns. 

At the time of drafting the report, there have been individual cases that may qualify as abuse of corporate administrative resources during the official election phase (for example, the involvement of resources of the “Epicenter” and “Epicenter-Agro” companies into events of the incumbent local council deputies in Khmelnytsky Oblast from local party organizations of the “For Tangible Deeds;” in Rivne Oblast, the water bills had a political advertisement of Andriy Karaush, director of “Rivneoblvodokanal”)). OPORA observers urge potential candidates to abandon the use of controlled companies, their material and human resources in order to ensure free and competitive elections. 

Political activity of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky in the run-up to 2020 local elections

On the eve of the official start of elections, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi started regional working visits. On the tour, the President has already visited Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts. 

One of the items on the visit agenda to each oblast was the speech of the President of Ukraine at the presentation of the Regional Development Strategy, which also included the presentation of future candidates for local elections from the “Servant of the People” party. 

The branding of the public event included the design of the stage with the slogan “Ze!local.” Behind, there was a large green banner with the inscription “Ze!local.” Presentations of the Strategy and of future candidates in local elections were broadcast on the official Facebook page of the Office of the President of Ukraine, as well as on the relevant page of the “Servant of the People” party. Following each visit, the Office of the President of Ukraine released a special video, which also covered the presentations of the Regional Development Strategies with the appropriate presentation of future candidates from the ruling party. In a number of regions, these events were attended by heads of regional state administrations (Kirovohrad, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv regions), some of which have already been announced by candidates in local elections (Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration for the position of Kharkiv mayor). In the Zaporizhia region, one of the main speakers was Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, who heads the regional organization of the Servant of the People party.

A series of presentations included speeches by the leaders of the “Servant of the People” party, including the head of the Kirovohrad regional organization, Mykola Poturayev, and the head of the Mykolayiv regional organization, the head of the “Servant of the People” parliamentary faction, David Arahamia. At the end of each event, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky had a speech to support future candidates from the party, while in some regions he noted it was impossible for him to campaign for anyone.

Public events in support of future candidates in the local elections from the “Servant of the People” party attended by the President of Ukraine and the heads of regional state administrations caused a significant resonance in the media and among politically active citizens. The key issue for discussion was the presence or absence of abuse of administrative resources in the interests of the political party on the part of Volodymyr Zelensky, his Office, heads of regional state administrations, and some other officials. This issue has become relevant due to the lack of verified information about the formal and actual organizers of the events and sources of their funding. In order to obtain accurate data on the process of organizing the presentations, OPORA addressed inquiries to the Office of the President of Ukraine, regional state administrations, and the “Servant of the People” party. At the time of publication of this report, responses to inquiries have not yet been received, but public comments from representatives of the “Servant of the People” party (for example, a party leader Oleksandr Kornienko) indicate that party structures and philanthropists have organized and financed the events. In particular, during the live broadcasting on the ICTV channel, Oleksandr Kornienko promised to provide financial information in the party’s regular report to the NAPC, as well as to respond to inquiries from NGOs. OPORA plans to comprehensively assess events nominating future candidates from the ruling party attended by the President of Ukraine, on the basis of complete information.

OPORA’s preliminary assessment of the relevant events includes the following items:

• The top leadership of Ukraine, first of all President Volodymyr Zelensky, chose a political strategy to demonstrate the synchronized activities of the head of state, the Government and the one-party majority of the “Servants of the People” in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The strategy does not violate the current legislation, but poses potential risks of non-compliance with the principle of political neutrality of civil servants who do not hold political positions and fall under the requirements of the Laws of Ukraine “On Civil Service” and “On Prevention of Corruption”. 
• In the absence of a clear public distinction between a political party and its de facto political leaders, it is difficult to ensure that the state is properly separated from party interests. This problem is addressed in key international documents on the abuse of administrative resources in elections, which should be taken into account by the current leadership of Ukraine. 
• The activity of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky is not limited to the principle of political neutrality, which allows him to freely express his political position. In particular, according to Article 40 of the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption,” the principle of political neutrality does not apply to elected officials and persons holding political positions. The heads of local state administrations are in a different position, as they are subject to the principle of political neutrality in accordance with the legislation on the prevention of corruption. The problem of the participation of the heads of regional state administrations in party-related events is also acknowledged by the leaders of the “Servant of the People” party, who claim that they are on official vacation leaves from work during such events.
• Preliminary results of the monitoring of the visits of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky testify to the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between the official activities of the authorities with his participation and party presentations. This is due to the specifics of the organization of the stay of the President of Ukraine in the regions, which involves local state administrations. In particular, in response to a request from OPORA observers from the Kirovohrad Regional State Administration, it was noted that the regional state administration did not finance or organize presentations of Regional Development Strategies with the participation of Volodymyr Zelensky, except for accreditation of journalists. The Mykolayiv Regional State Administration, in turn, denies the participation of its employees in accreditation of journalists for party-related event, thus informing about uniform accreditation of mass media on the working visit of the head of state. OPORA observers reported about the accreditation of journalists at the presentation of Regional Development Strategies attended by the President of Ukraine through the efforts of regional state administrations in Mykolayiv, Kropyvnytskyi and Dnipro. In Cherkasy, though, the relevant accreditation was provided by the party organization. Thus, OPORA does not have any convincing facts about the proper separation of the working activities of the President of Ukraine from his participation in party events. This fact is extremely important, as civil servants do not have the right to be involved in the activities of political parties and the organization of their activities during working hours. 

Thus, the key parameter for assessing the compliance of the party-related events of the President of Ukraine is the involvement of civil servants and employees of local self-government bodies into their organization. Unlike the head of state, they are obliged to constantly adhere to the principles of political neutrality and impartiality in their current activities in the inter-election and election periods. At the same time, the Electoral Code shall guarantee equal and impartial attitude of state authorities, local governments, state and municipal enterprises, institutions, establishments, organizations, their staff and officials to the subjects of the election process.

OPORA calls upon the President Volodymyr Zelensky, officials of central and local authorities to take into account the transitional state of democratic practices in Ukraine. Strengthening such practices in the public interest requires greater action than in countries with stable democracies and traditions of fair elections. Despite the legal conditions for the activities of persons in political office, they should help strengthen citizens’ confidence in the impartiality of the state to all political views and positions. This applies, in particular, to the clear separation of state programs from the electoral interests of an individual party. We also appeal to the Office of the President of Ukraine, to the “Servant of the People” party with a proposal to promptly publish full information about the organization and sources of funding for these events attended by the President.

“Electoral charity” at the unofficial stage of the election process

The unofficial stage of the election process motivates candidates and political parties to provide citizens with goods, services, social and entertainment events for them. After the official start of the election process, such activities by registered candidates can be treated as voter bribery. The Criminal Code of Ukraine, amended on the eve of the election, provides for liability both for the receipt of an illegal benefit by a voter, and for the offer or provision of such a benefit to a voter (Article 160 of the Code). The current legislation also envisages the liability for providing voters and legal entities with illegal benefits, accompanied by election campaigning. The 2020 local elections are a kind of test of the state’s ability to implement the reformed provisions of the law, which provide for effective sanctions for illegal technologies of voter bribery. Still before the official start of the election process, it was revealed a fact of detention in Luhansk Oblast of a truck with humanitarian aid, which was intended for the population from the charity fund of the People’s Deputy from the “Nash Kray” party Serhiy Shakhov. According to the National Police of Ukraine, the relevant detention took place within the framework of the initiated criminal proceedings under Article 160 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (voter bribery).

In August 2020, OPORA observers noted that incidents with material voter incentives or “electoral philanthropy” were moderate. Potential self-nominated candidates resorted to such forms of de facto campaigning more often than representatives of political parties. Some potential candidates attract charitable foundations to their actual promotion on the eve of the local elections. Charitable foundations affiliated with political leaders are traditionally widely represented in the Volyn region. 

Preparation for the election amidst the pandemic contributed to the proliferation of potential candidates who supplied medical goods, equipment or services to voters and health care facilities (local organizations of the “European Solidarity” Party, “Batkivshchyna” All-Ukrainian Union, “Opposition Platform - For Life,” and some other political parties). Sports and entertainment events were a popular topic of “charitable” activities of future electoral subjects. For example, Oleksandr Tsertiy, a potential candidate for the Kropyvnytskyi City Council from “Batkivshchyna,” organized an entertainment event called “Dance and Ice Cream Festival.” 

A series of potential candidates in local elections have launched special social projects for vulnerable communities. In particular, Orest Kavetskyi, a former candidate for the People’s Deputies of Ukraine from the “Servant of the People” party in single-member constituency No 119 in Lviv Oblast, opened “social huts” in the Zolochiv district. At these points, citizens can buy products at discounted prices and fill out a questionnaire for the underprivileged citizens to receive financial assistance.

It is not the first time that the establishment of playgrounds for children has become a top topic for the potential and registered candidates in local elections. This activity is typical of political leaders in most regions of Ukraine. The beginning of the school year in secondary schools was accompanied by the presentation of gifts and souvenirs to students on behalf of local political leaders who plan run for local elections. For local politicians, the provision of tourist and excursion services to voters remains widespread (for example, such activity is shown by current deputies of the Kyiv City Council).

One of the important problems of “election-related” charity is the lack of reliable information about the sources of its funding. With the official start of the election process, of prime importance will be the issue of charitable foundations that openly or covertly provide material assistance to voters in the interests of specific candidates. At the same time, we draw the attention of potential electoral subjects that the relevant Law of Ukraine “On Charity and Charitable Organizations” prohibits charitable organizations to provide charitable assistance to political parties or on behalf of political parties, as well as to participate in election campaigning.

Civil Network OPORA hereby calls upon the National Police to respond promptly to information about voter bribery and to keep the public regularly informed of the interim results of investigations of cases.

Investigation of attempts to illegally use the procedure for changing the election address

Significant progress in ensuring the rights of citizens has been the introduction of the procedure for changing the electoral address at the voters’ request submitted to the bodies of the State Register of Voters at the actual place of residence. The liberalized procedure shall be applied in the inter-election period, but not later than on the 5th day of the relevant election process. In fact, it tackled the lasting problems with voting in national and local elections for internally displaced persons, internal labor migrants, and other mobile citizens. The State Register of Voters not only provides the opportunity to submit a paper application of citizens to the relevant bodies of the Register, but electronic services have been developed therefor. The new election procedure has been highly praised by national and international human rights organizations. It is evidence to the changed attitude of the state towards its citizens’ voting rights.

Given the insufficient provision of the principle of inescapable punishment for electoral fraud, some unscrupulous participants of the political struggle still have the opportunity to manipulate any electoral procedures, including the one of changing the electoral address. Against the background of a stable process of changing the electoral address at the actual place of residence, several incidents with elements of illegal use of the procedure were recorded. On August 4, 2020, the CEC appealed to the National Police of Ukraine regarding a significant number of changes in the electoral address in the village territorial hromadas of Karolino-Bugaz, Tairove, and Fontanka in Odessa Oblast. Since a citizen shall be obliged to actually live at the place s/he claims to be their electoral address, the massive changes to such addresses raised suspicions. OPORA welcomes the CEC’s proactive stance in responding to law enforcement regarding possible illegal changes to the election address. 

OPORA observers also independently appealed to law enforcement agencies regarding possible attempts to illegally use the procedure of changing the election address among Zhytomyr residents. In this city, unidentified individuals received copies of passports of Ukrainian citizens and identification codes from a group of citizens for a monetary reward. At the same time, citizens who received illegal benefits were informed about the upcoming organized trip to Kyiv to vote on election day. Given the set of facts revealed by OPORA observers, illegal attempts to falsify the procedures for changing the electoral address, including through the use of the respective electronic services, cannot be ruled out. In this regard, OPORA appealed to law enforcement agencies and calles upon those responsible to ensure a proper investigation into the circumstances of the incident. 

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine has publicly stated that it was monitoring attempts to illegally use the procedure for changing the election address. OPORA notes that the effective work of law enforcement is an integral part of ensuring the legitimacy of elections. In fact, the current legislation does effectively counteract the fraud, and in practice ensuring the principle of inescapable punishment for electoral fraud.

The Early Campaigning

The analysis of various forms of public activity of parties and potential candidates, which was systematically conducted by observers of the Civil Network OPORA in August 2020, indicates the full-fledge unfolding of the election campaign. At this stage, it is not regulated by election legislation. The legal uncertainty of the concept of early campaigning and the narrow scope of the official campaign pose certain risks, such as to have the shady election costs and to distort the principle of competitiveness of the election campaign.

In August, about 70 political parties were publicly active, which de facto showed elements of campaigning. At the same time, 41 political forces from this list were manifestly active only within one oblast, 6 of them - in two oblasts. At the same time, 9 political parties launched campaigning events in several regions (3 to 5 oblasts), including the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, UDAR, Shariy Party, Democratic Axe, Ukrainian Galician Party, National Corps, the People’s Power, People’s Movement of Ukraine, and the “Public Control” Civic Movement. In about one third of the regions of Ukraine, four parties were represented by their campaigning events: “Svoboda” AU, “HOLOS”, “Nash Kray,” and “Siyla i Chest.” According to the scale of campaigning, the “Proposition” and “Opposition Platform - For Life” parties covered more than half of the regions of Ukraine. At this stage, five political parties have already launched a full-fledged nationwide campaign in the vast majority of oblasts: “Servant of the People,” “For the Future,” “European Solidarity,” “Batkivshchyna,” and “Palchevsky Victory.”

Intensive campaigns, focused only on certain regions, are carried out by local political projects and local parties. In particular, “Trust the Deeds” in Odesa Oblast, the party of the “Platform of Hromadas” AU in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, “Perspective of the City” in Kirovohrad Oblast, “Cherkasy Residents” AU in Cherkasy Oblast, “Ridnyi Dim” Party in Chernihiv Oblast, and the Public Movement “The Conscious” in Volyn oblast, “Volodymyr Buryak’s “Unity” party in Zaporizhia region, the party “Kernes Bloc - Successful Kharkiv!” in Kharkiv region, “Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman” in Vinnytsia region, Ihor Kolykhayev’s party “WE SHALL LIVE HERE!” in Kherson region, “For specific actions” in Khmelnytsky region, “United Alternative” in Chernivtsi region, “Andriy Baloga Team” party in Transcarpathian region, “VARTA” party in Lviv region, “Ridne Misto” in Poltava region, and others.

The prevailing form of early campaigning during this period was the placement of political advertising on external advertising media. Its massive placement was recorded by observers in regional centers and large cities since May 2020. Another popular format of early campaign, common for local elections, was the direct engagement of potential candidates with voters, which included campaigning (fundraising for the military, installation of medical equipment, social assistance for health care facilities and the socially vulnerable groups of citizens).

The scale of early campaigning of political parties

Peculiarities of running political ads campaign in the Facebook social media in the run-up to local elections  2020

In the recent years, Ukraine has seen the increasing role of social media during the electoral race, even though the Electoral Code has not yet enshrined or regulated campaigning on the Internet. Therefore, for lack of any sanctions for campaigning on the Internet, it shall be expected that a large part of costs spent for political ads for local elections shall stay in shadow. 

Since there is no legal regulation available, the only mechanism to control the campaigning on the Internet is in internal self-regulated rules of social media on the publication of political ads. Thus, by far the only source of information on campaigning on the Internet is the Facebook social network. It requires advertisers to mark all political ads / campaigning posts with the special labels. Facebook saves all campaigning posts in the Political Ads Library. One can access it to learn details about the costs, the target audiences, the advertisers, etc. 

Since the early 2020, OPORA has run monthly monitoring for intensity of using political ads on the social media of Facebook and Instagram. Since February, 2020, the Facebook social network showed steady increase in intensity of using political ads. Thus, in February, only 6,417 ads were posted on Facebook, while in August, the parameter exceeded 20,000 advertising posts. Along with the number of ads, there was a four-fold increase in costs of political forces spent for advertising in social media. In August, the costs exceeded USD 400,000.

Intensity of using political ads in the social media of Facebook and Instagram 

Among the political parties, the highest amount of funds in the pre-electoral period was invested by the Ukrainian Galician Party, having spent USD 28,887 for political ads. All ads of the party targeted users from three Ukrainian regions only: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil Oblasts. 

The political party “For the Future” spent for political ads the USD 28,777, while about 80% of party costs accounted for August. The party’s political ads equally covered users from all regions of Ukraine.

The top three parties in terms of epxenditures for ads in social media also include the “European Solidarity.” It invested into political ads the USD 23,916. The political advertising of the party targeted users from all regions but about 30% of views of the party ads accounted for Kyiv city.

In addition, the top ten parties in terms of spending for ads in social media are the “Shariy Party,” “Servant of the People,” “Proposition,” “Palchevskyi Victory,” “Nash Kray” and “Holos.”

Costs of party official pages for political ads in the Facebook social media (February – August)

In addition to political parties, iintense activity levels in social media were shown by official pages of certain politicians. Thus, starting from February, Petro Poroshenko invested USD 32,735 into political ads on Facebook, while targeting it mostly at the users in Western Ukraine. 

Over USD 30,000 was spent for political ads by a people’s deputy from the “Servant of the People” party, Mykola Tyshchenko. All ads by the politician were shown in the period from June to July, and targeted the residents of the Ukraine’s capital exclusively. 

Likewise, Volodymyr Groysman also got into the top three spenders for ads in social media. He spent USD 23,983. Advertising policy targeted the users from all regions of Ukraine. 

Costs of Politicians on Facebook Ads (February – August)

Recommendations

To the executive authorities and to local self-governments:

• To officials and civil servants of public administration, when fulfilling the activities with elements of pre-electoral campaigning, to take into account and to follow the restrictions set by the Laws of Ukraine “On Civil Service” and “On Prevention of Corruption.”
• With account for the recommendations of the CEC, to take a well-timed and public approach to develop a set of security measures and quarantine restrictions in the context of election campaign, to minimize the risks for destabilization of the election administration process or arbitrary restriction of voting rights of citizens.
• To regulate the issues of paying to members of election commissions for the period preceding the official start of election process.

To the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:

• To secure the timely development and broad dissemination for the target audiences of the behaviour algorithms for citizens when exercising electoral procedures.

To the Office of the President of Ukraine:

• To make public the complete information on the organizers and the sources for funding regional party-related events attended by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• To provide for due distinction between the work-related and party-related activities attended by the President of Ukraine, in order to prevent the breach of principle of political neutrality of civil servants on the local and national levels.