The study was conducted based on the analytical work of the Civil Network OPORA and the Kyiv School of Economics. Full PDF is available at the link. 

The study aimed to determine the degree of affective polarization in Ukrainian society. Unlike ideological polarization, which arises from differences in political or ideological positions, affective polarization describes the growth of social and emotional distance from other groups. It explains why cohesion and benevolence between different groups and individuals decrease. As part of the study, we assumed that Ukrainian society is divided into a certain number of groups according to their experience gained after the outbreak of a full-scale invasion. 

We assumed that members of these groups tend to have a more positive attitude towards people belonging to their group and a more negative attitude towards members of other groups. We intended to assess our assumptions about (1) the fragmentation in Ukrainian society, (2) the increasing polarization between various groups in society, (3) the increasing likelihood of social conflicts between these groups, and (4) the growing tendency of people to believe that their views are shared only by a minority of the population.

The survey was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from September 11 to 30, 2024. As part of the study, 2,055 online interviews were conducted. The survey is representative of the adult population in Ukraine but not representative of Ukrainians staying abroad.

Vignette Study

In the first part of the study, respondents had to evaluate several scenarios, each of which described a person with different combinations of the following characteristics and experiences: (1) religious affiliation (Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, (2) participation in hostilities (serves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has a reservation/deferral, evades mobilization), (3) language of communication (Russian, Ukrainian), (4) the fact of displacement due to the war (local, left from the occupation, left from the frontline territories, went abroad after February 24, 2022 and returned) and (5) consumption of Russian content (watches Russian news, watches Russian entertainment content, watches Russian oppositionists, does not consume Russian content as a matter of principle). After reading the description, the respondents had to assess their attitude to the character we proposed. 

  • Respondents are generally neutral towards other people, regardless of the characteristics described in the scenarios. No feature caused any pronounced negative or positive response among the respondents and did not contribute to greater distancing from the described characters.
  • However, we observed a noticeable deterioration in the respondents' attitude towards the character if two of the following characteristics are combined simultaneously: if the character has not broken ties with the Russian information space and evades military service. They are rated much worse than those with a clearly expressed "Ukraine-centric" position.
  • We also recorded two characteristics that, on the contrary, positively affect the attitude towards the character: service in the army and a fundamental refusal to consume Russian content. 
  • Viewing Russian media negatively affects the attitude towards the character, but this influence is not pronounced. A negative attitude hardly changes depending on what the character is watching: either Russian news, entertainment content, or the Russian opposition.

Polarization

In the second part of the study, we applied the scale of affective polarization to test the respondents' attitudes towards other groups of people: 1) social distance as unwillingness to interact with representatives of another group; 2) aversion expressed through negative assessments of another group; 3) incivility, which characterizes a hostile but non-violent attitude towards members of another group. In addition, since polarization not only indicates the degree of antipathy to another group but should be mutual, five pairs of groups were outlined, and the degree of their antipathy to each other was tested: 1) Ukrainians staying in Ukraine — Ukrainians staying abroad; 2) those who lived in the TOTs/in the hostilities areas — those who do not have such experience; 3) members of the OCU and the UGCC — members of the UOC-MP; 4) members of the military/their family members — civilians/those who do not have military relatives, 5) Ukrainian speakers — Russian speakers. Respondents were asked to rate their attitude on a 5-point scale to 28 statements that measured social distance, aversion, and incivility to members of the opposite group. 

  • In general, respondents are not inclined to feel hostility or aversion towards members of the opposite group. The longest distance is found between the groups "representatives of the OCU and the UGCC — representatives of the UOC-MP." The smallest gap is between the groups "Ukrainians in Ukraine — Ukrainians abroad." 
  • Ukrainians in Ukraine vs Ukrainians abroad. The social distance between Ukrainians living in Ukraine and those living abroad is small. In other words, groups are generally ready to interact with each other (in matters of romantic relationships and marriage to a lesser extent). The aversion of these groups to each other is also insignificant: the groups evaluate each other quite neutrally (at the same time, both groups believe that members of the opposite group tend to condemn them — this opinion is more common for Ukrainians abroad). The incivility of groups is also insignificant: the attitude towards the other group is mostly not hostile (although both groups note that they sometimes feel satisfaction from the fact that a member of another group is put in place — this opinion occurs more often among Ukrainians abroad).
  • Those who lived in TOTs/in the hostility areas vs persons with no such experience. The social distance between these groups is small, but those who did not live in the TOTs and/or in the hostility areas are somewhat more distanced than persons who have such experience. The groups are ready to interact, but people who did not live in the TOTs or the frontline zones show slightly less readiness (especially unwillingness to have a romantic relationship). The aversion of these groups to each other is also insignificant: they evaluate each other mostly neutrally (while both believe that the other group is inclined to condemn them). Incivility to another group is also uncommon among the respondents, except for the mutual statement of satisfaction when a representative of another group is put in their place. 
  • OCU and UGCC vs UOC-MP. The distance between these groups is the longest. However, the fieldwork of the study took place during active discussions of the ban on the activities of the UOC-MP, which may have affected the results. OCU and UGCC members are noticeably socially distanced from representatives of the UOC-MP (i.e., they are less willing to interact with them), and the latter declare a better attitude towards OCU and Greek Catholics. The slightest desire for interaction has been recorded for groups in matters of possible marriage with members of the opposite group. Aversion is also noticeably higher among the OCU and Greek Catholics towards the UOC-MP than among the latter towards the OCU and UGCC parishioners. Members of the OCU and the UGCC are most inclined to believe that the believers of the UOC-MP cannot be trusted. Instead, members of the UOC-MP more often believe that the OCU and Greek Catholics are dishonest and indifferent. Incivility is somewhat lower but still quite noticeable. Thus, both groups (OCU + UGCC and UOC-MP) mostly agree that they enjoy it when a member of another group is put in their place.
  • Ukrainian speakers vs Russian speakers. The social distance between these groups is insignificant, which implies they are ready to interact. Still, Ukrainian speakers are somewhat more distanced from Russian speakers, and Russian speakers are quite skeptical about making friends with those who mainly speak Ukrainian. The aversion is not too pronounced, either, but Ukrainian speakers assess Russian speakers somewhat worse than vice versa. Ukrainian speakers are more likely to view Russian speakers as untrustworthy and claim they don't like them. Russian speakers are most likely to treat Ukrainian speakers indifferently. Incivility is not inherent in either of the groups, but Ukrainian speakers are somewhat more often hostile to Russian speakers. Both groups agree that they enjoy having a member of the other group put in their place.
  • Military/their relatives vs civilians. The social distance between these groups is small, but the military and their families are somewhat more distanced from civilians than vice versa. Civilians most often say they would not like to make friends with the military/their families. The aversion of these groups to each other is insignificant, but among the military and their families, the aversion towards civilians is slightly higher. The military and their families are most likely to view civilians as evil and point out that they don't like them. Civilians are likelier to say that the military and their families cannot be trusted. Representatives of both groups are not inclined to manifest incivility to each other. The military/their relatives are more likely to feel satisfaction when civilians are put in their place. 

Self-Attribution to Majority/Minority

In the third part of the study, we tried to determine whether respondents self-attribute themselves to the majority or minority. We offered the respondents five statements: about the fairness of mobilization, about the actions of the authorities to prevent prolonged power outages, about the sources of support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (donations or the government), about the need to return Ukrainians from abroad, and about support for decommunization. First, the respondents assessed the share of Ukrainians they thought agreed with each statement. Next, they assessed their own support for the statement. This allowed us to analyze the respondents’ subjective sense of whether their views coincide with the dominant perspectives in society.

  • For the most part, respondents rate their opinions as such that coincide with the majority's opinion. The greatest sense of consensus is observed in the issue of mobilization — 77.5% of respondents believe that the majority thinks the same way as they do. Regarding all other statements, the number of respondents who consider themselves the majority is almost the same — from 64.4 to 68%. 
  • About a third of respondents consider themselves a minority on all issues. This indicator is the largest on the issue of donations — 35.5% believe that their opinion differs from the opinion of most Ukrainians. The result is close to this level for other issues besides mobilization — here, only 23% consider themselves a minority.

This study is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Civil Network OPORA and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.