On October 22, 2024, Civil network OPORA held the second civic summit “(Dis)connected: rethinking social resilience in Ukraine”. The summit based itself on the results of joint research study on polarization of Ukrainian society, which was carried out by OPORA in cooperation with Kyiv School of Economics. Key results of research study are available here.

More than 120 participants - diplomats, government officials, experts from specialized international and Ukrainian NGOs and think tanks - gathered for civic summit to acquaint themselves with research findings and reflect on them in the Chatham House format. The format envisages a closed-door discussion with an option to freely cite other participants after the event without mentioning their names.

OPORA’s research did not record a high level of polarization between different social groups, so the key talking points were as follows: 1) there are no rifts in the society or we are looking for them in the wrong places: avenues of future research; 2) what are the risks of raising the level of polarization and how to prevent it; 3) why does it seem that Ukrainian society is more divided than it actually is and how to rectify this problem.

We have grouped the key recommendations of the panelists and our team into 5 thematic blocks: preservation of unity, strategic communications, information security, communication with Ukrainians living abroad and under occupation, post-war challenges of European integration.

Key conclusions

  • Currently, there are no visible signs of high polarization between different social groups that have had different experiences since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. At the same time, it is necessary to monitor and measure the dynamics of polarization using various approaches and methods, especially after the start of a full-fledged political cycle.
  • To prevent different groups of Ukrainian society from distancing themselves, it is necessary to create and maintain a meta-group image – constantly remind everyone that we are all citizens of Ukraine first and foremost, and this unites us despite our different experiences, social roles, etc. The key to maintaining unity within our society is the Ukrainian identity that encompasses all social groups with different views and experiences, as well as ongoing dialogue and interaction between different social groups. 
  • In times of war, there is a growing demand for open dialogue between the government and the society. Specific officials or institutions must take proactive responsibility for discussing specific topics. Open communication about the State’s limited capacity to support vulnerable groups is especially important. 
  • The emergence of information gaps (due to the lack of availability or the lack of understanding of socially important information) increases the risk of spreading of disinformation and other information operations conducted by Russia. To prevent and counteract Russia’s influence, it is critical that we ensure information protection and regulation of social media, which largely remains a legal gray area in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainians living abroad and under occupation are large population groups (totaling 11-13 million people), with which the State finds it most difficult to maintain systemic communication. Proactive work with these two groups is an important aspect of maintaining unity.
  • In the context of Ukrainians abroad, priority areas of activity include creating a specialized ministry, ensuring social security, fair justice, transparent rules of the game, and anti-corruption reforms. In particular, affordable housing for citizens who have lost their property should become an element of the country’s social policy.
  • The State should proactively (to the extent possible) ensure the safety and security of Ukrainians who lived or still live under Russian occupation. As long as Russian troops remain in control of part of Ukraine’s territory, two security vectors are important: legislative regulation and legal protection of victims of Russian aggression, as well as awareness campaign on how to behave under occupation in order not to put yourself and others at risk.
  • Currently, Ukrainians are united on the policy of European integration and accession to NATO. However, integration into the EU may become a focus of tension once the war is over. The examples of Georgia and Moldova demonstrate the high risk of post-war resentment over European integration, especially as a result of pressure from Russia (e.g., promoting the idea that European integration could lead to resumption of hostilities).

Preservation of unity

As of today, there are no visible signs of high polarization between different segments of Ukrainian society that have had different experiences since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This is due to highly tolerant Ukrainian society and many other factors, including the lack of clear ideological stance related to regional or social divisions, as well as indifference caused by the deep trauma of full-scale war. At the same time, OPORA emphasizes the importance of monitoring inter-temporal changes in the level of polarization and employing different approaches to measuring polarization (taking into account ideological polarization, the results of other behavioral studies, etc.) in order to make correct assessment of the actual state of Ukrainian society. This should form the basis for conducting future research.

The beginning of a full-fledged political cycle in the future may lead to increased polarization between different segments of Ukrainian society. This process may be further exacerbated by the intervention of internal or external actors (in particular the Russian Federation) through manipulation of information space and exertion of influence on socio-political processes in Ukraine.

According to summit participants, such interventions would be based on existing vulnerabilities or controversial topics that could become a source of intergroup conflicts. Controversial topics may include the unfair distribution of the burden of war between different segments of society, foreign policy choices, etc. Proactive communication of these topics through the efforts of the state and civilian sectors can prevent the rise of polarization between different population groups.

Despite the fact that sociological research did not reveal any deep divisions in Ukrainian society, citizens of Ukraine have a feeling that our society is plagued by internal contradictions. According to some of the summit participants, Ukrainian society is currently in a state of “self-fulfilling prophecy” – a vision of the future that prompts us to follow a certain pattern of behavior in the present. In other words, if we believe that there is a rift in the society, it will eventually appear.

Summit participants noted that the Russian Federation is putting in a lot of effort to find and widen the existing differences between different social groups. Furthermore, any vulnerabilities of our society can be instrumentalized by internal actors. Representatives of state authorities and civilian sector need to communicate with the people on a constant and consistent basis to prevent the increase of polarization within Ukrainian society.

One way to prevent different groups of people from distancing themselves is to create and maintain a meta-group image – that is, we should constantly remind them that we are all citizens of Ukraine and focus their attention on the traits that unite all Ukrainians despite differences in their life experiences, social roles, etc. The key to maintaining unity within our society is the Ukrainian identity that encompasses all social groups with different views and experiences. Summit participants pointed out that the work on development of Ukrainian identity is performed in an inconsistent fashion. Today, national identity is closely associated with religiosity, and religion plays a key role in mobilizing the nation during the war. Therefore, it is important that church institutions participate in the formation of a coherent Ukrainian identity.

Another way of preventing the increase of polarization is to facilitate an ongoing dialogue and interaction between different social groups. Summit participants noted that we should not be afraid of conflicts and discussions on controversial issues, since dialogue forms the basis of a democratic system and represents the best way to ensure that different segments of society understand each other’s views and pressing challenges.

OPORA emphasizes that communication and joint activities will allow people with different experiences to find common ground, which will facilitate the exchange of views and prevent stereotyped thinking. It is important that such a dialogue should take place both at the vertical (communication between civil society and government structures) and horizontal (one social group communicates with the others) levels. The dialogue should include citizens residing in the government-controlled areas, as well as those who live abroad and in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.

In practice, such a dialogue should involve not only the formation of full-fledged strategic communications between the state authorities, civil society groups and population as a whole, but also the creation of platforms for communication and joint discussion of important social issues with the participation of social groups that have diverse experiences and face different challenges. At the same time, organizers of these dialogues should take due account of security challenges faced by people living in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.

In order to maintain and strengthen unity of Ukrainian society, it is also necessary to perform more purposeful work in the cultural sphere (in particular, summit participants placed an emphasis on the unifying role of national holidays), develop a culture of respect for military personnel and veterans, commemorate the fallen soldiers, etc.

Strategic communications: proactive leadership and direct conversation

Our enemy conducts disinformation campaigns and other types of hybrid warfare that reinforce destructive trends in the interaction of different population groups and pose a significant threat to social cohesion in Ukraine. Currently, the government institutions are losing Ukrainian people’s trust. Therefore, communication between the government and civil society as well as proactive dialogues on sensitive topics are important in maintaining national unity and information security of Ukraine.

Summit participants noted the reduced ability of Ukrainian society to think critically due to war fatigue. As a result, public perception of certain information or events can provoke an emotional reaction. Information vacuum and deliberate silencing of important issues by the state authorities is equally harmful to Ukrainian society, as it creates a risk of filling the information space of Ukraine with hostile and manipulative propaganda.

The war exacerbates the sense of injustice, which is why there is a growing demand for openness and bilateral dialog between the government and the society. It is extremely important to communicate complex issues and unpopular policies to Ukrainian society because otherwise our enemy (the Russian Federation) will fill the information vacuum. The State must take responsibility for discussing sensitive topics with specific social groups (military personnel, IDPs, Ukrainians abroad, etc.) and population as a whole. The most complicated issues that require Ukraine’s government to provide proactive leadership and communication are as follows: the cost of victory; the fight against corruption; mobilization and demobilization; the return of Ukrainians from abroad; reintegration of veterans; tax increase; reforms, etc.

Summit participants also pointed out that a proactive position and public assumption of responsibility by specific officials or institutions for discussing specific development issues or problem-solving topics is one of the methods of strategic communication that can be used by government agencies. The State should have the honesty to report about limited resources under conditions of war, as well as communicate true information about the timing and amount of financial support that it is willing to provide to different social groups, without creating inflated expectations. Otherwise, the State will undermine public trust in government institutions and raise the risk of internal conflicts.

Clear and systematic communication should be the main focus of national policy on Ukrainians living in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT). Residents of the TOT should be convinced that the State does not play a double game, has not forgotten about its citizens, fully understands the situation in which they find themselves, and is ready to provide them with every possible support in the conditions of a full-scale war.

Ukraine’s information policy concerning the TOT must take due account of the fact that people living under occupation have almost no access to unbiased information. In such circumstances, it is important for the state authorities to speak in unison and avoid ambiguity, when one official recommends that Ukrainians apply for Russian passports in order to survive under total pressure, while the other official says that they should not do it. 

Ukrainians have a knack for creating informal institutions that strengthen the State of Ukraine. This is where civil society organizations can be involved in solving certain problems or social conflicts, but despite this, the State cannot be fully replaced by third sector, and the state authorities also need to demonstrate willingness to engage in dialogue. Therefore, civil society organizations can be involved in the elaboration of legislative changes, communication strategies, or take part in public discussions. The participants of previous summit pointed out that civil society can also focus on supporting the State by getting directly involved in the activities of government bodies, since Ukraine is in dire need of qualified personnel in all areas of public administration.

Summit participants emphasize that Ukrainians are united by the demand for implementing reforms, social standards, national security and anti-corruption policy, and the desire for justice. These topics can be used to resolve current and prevent future conflicts, as well as to strengthen social resilience.

Information security, or how to preserve subjectivity in the information space

Summit participants brought up the topic of information security to prevent the formation of social rifts and provide an explanation for a widespread impression that Ukrainian society is highly polarized. Formation of information bubbles around users of social media platforms that serve as the main source of news for most Ukrainians is often cited as one of the reasons why conflicts between social groups may seem more acute, large-scale and deep-rooted than they actually are. If you see a certain topic or opinion in your news feed more often than others, you may get the false impression that it is more popular than it actually is.

Although summit participants did not focus attention on information security nor did they provide any recommendations on how to prevent the strengthening of cognitive distortions and information exclusivity of various groups, which are caused by social media algorithms, we would like to emphasize that this issue is an important element of EU regulation of information space. For example, Article 27 of the Digital Service Act (EU’s main instrument for regulating the actions of online platforms) requires that providers of online platforms ensure transparency of algorithms for displaying social media content. To this end, online platforms must disclose information about the key criteria used by their algorithms when determining the content suggested to users on their newsfeeds, as well as provide justification for using these criteria. Moreover, this information must be presented to users in a comprehensible and easily-accessible form. Carrying-out of these requirements should increase the subjectivity of social media users and provide real tools that allow users to customize their news feeds. Therefore, harmonization of EU and Ukrainian legislation in so far as it relates to social media regulation (which remains a legal gray area in Ukraine) is one of the key safeguards in the context of preventing polarization of Ukrainian society.

The issue of social media regulation was actively discussed by summit participants in the context of protecting Ukraine’s information space from Russian influence. In particular, they sought to find the answer to the problem of protecting Ukrainians from Russian information influence on Telegram. This social media platform is the preferred choice for more than 70% of Ukrainians when it comes to consuming news content. The platforms that have no rules and can be controlled by Russians (whether Telegram falls into one or both of these categories remains an open question) create the most favorable conditions for conducting Russian information operations. Therefore, Telegram is turning into a preferred platform for the enemy that exploits our vulnerabilities and exerts information influence on the larger portion of Ukraine’s population with the aim of escalating the existing conflicts between different groups of people, turning the spotlight on the problems of Ukrainian society, government, or current policies. The enemy has free scope for its activities on Telegram by contrast with YouTube and Facebook, which are actively fighting Russian bots, disinformation and hate speech, restricting or blocking the activity of Kremlin’s agents of influence. In this context, Telegram serves as the most convenient point of entry into Ukraine’s information space, and thereby increases the risk of formation of social rifts in the future.

Although there is a consensus of opinion that Telegram represents a threat to social solidarity in Ukraine, summit participants are split over necessary measures to counter this threat. The most controversial issue is the potential ban of Telegram. On the one hand, summit participants emphasized the need to put a restraint upon Telegram’s activity in Ukraine. On the other hand, the prevailing view is that Telegram is a platform for transmitting threats rather than a source of danger. It is worth mentioning that Telegram gained popularity after the blocking of other Russian social media (Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki) in Ukraine. Therefore, our information policy in the field of social media regulation should be aimed not only at banning the existing vulnerable platforms, but also at preventing the emergence of new “telegrams” in the future. OPORA’s experts emphasize that Ukrainian legislators should provide a clear mechanism of interaction between the State and online platforms with the state in order to avoid these restrictions. Therefore, it is necessary to employ a much more comprehensive approach to regulating the digital information space instead of pinpoint restrictions on the activities of specific web resources or platforms (and thereby avoid facing justified complaints and questions from Ukrainian civil society and international partners about the proportionality of imposed restrictions). In cases where blocking or restrictions are deemed necessary and appropriate, Ukrainian law should also provide a clear and universal mechanism for blocking or restraining the activities of any given online platform: legal grounds, criteria, authorized decision-making body, conditions for lifting restrictions, etc.

The distant close ones: how to maintain connection with Ukrainians living abroad and under occupation

Russia’s full-scale invasion led to significant changes in Ukrainian society. Today, approximately 11-13 million Ukrainians live in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) and abroad. According to various sources, 5-7 million citizens of Ukraine have left the country since the beginning of 2022. According to Ukrainian government, as of June 2024, 6 million Ukrainians reside in the TOT, of whom 1.5 million are children. Organization of work with these two groups of citizens is one of the primary challenges facing the State of Ukraine.

A significant portion of Ukrainians have adapted to new living conditions in host countries during the two-and-a-half year period of full-scale war. For example, in 2023, 71% of Ukrainian refugees in Poland provided for themselves without exterior help. Ukrainian refugees have already produced about 1% of Poland’s GDP, which is twice as much as Poles have spent on supporting Ukrainians. According to Kiel Institute, Poland has spent a total of €26.49 billion on Ukrainian refugees during the period from February 24, 2022 to August 31, 2024.

Therefore, the state government, including but not limited to the newly-formed relevant ministry, should employ a systematic approach to working with Ukrainians abroad. Ukrainians who have settled down in a new environment can be persuaded into returning to Ukraine only if the State guarantees their security in a broader (not just physical) sense of the word. This includes ensuring social security, fair justice, transparent rules of the game, and anti-corruption reforms. Affordable housing for citizens who have lost their property should become an important element of our country’s social policy.

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine is decreasing. According to the Ministry of Social Policy, as of October 22, 2024, there are 4.6 million IDPs in Ukraine. At the beginning of 2023, that number exceeded 5 million. Summit participants believe that some IDPs have returned to the TOT and frontline areas due to socio-economic difficulties (inability to find a job, housing problems, etc.) in the new place of living.

IDPs return to the TOT for various reasons, including the need to settle personal matters (e.g., sale of property, reuniting of family, etc.). They are facing the risk of being targeted by the occupation authorities as potential “Ukrainian agents”. Russia imprisons and tortures TOT residents, whom it suspects of collaborating with Ukrainian authorities. Therefore, Ukraine must do everything possible to ensure the safety of citizens who return to the TOT. For this purpose, the State needs to communicate with those returning to the occupied territories, develop clear safety instructions and rules of conduct to help them preserve their lives and health under Russian occupation.

Ukraine also needs to elaborate clear and transparent security policies concerning the line of conduct of Ukrainians permanently residing in the TOT. For example: a guide on how to behave during illegal elections and referendums organized by Russia; what to do when the occupation “authorities” confiscate your property and force you to obtain a Russian passport. Ukraine needs to convey the following message to Ukrainian citizens living under occupation: its priority goal is to help citizens survive while waiting for liberation.

The issue of guaranteeing security for Ukrainians displaced from the TOT is primarily about satisfying their basic needs, including provision of housing. Firstly, the State should find and allocate additional funds for supporting the IDPs. Secondly, the State should be frank with IDPs about the term of financial support, so that they know how much time they have to prepare for making a living without financial assistance.

Clear and systematic communication should be the focal point of our national policy on Ukrainians in the TOT. Residents of these regions should be reassured that the state government is aware of their situation and is ready to provide them with all possible support.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s information policy on the TOT should take due account of the fact that the people under Russian occupation have almost no access to objective information. In such circumstances, it is important that the state government should speak with a single voice to avoid ambiguity and situations where one official recommends that Ukrainians obtain Russian passports in order to survive under the pressure of occupation authorities, while the other official says that they should not do it. 

Russian propaganda elevates these fears and sells the idea that TOT residents are considered as traitors in Ukraine and they will be imprisoned as soon as Ukraine recovers occupied territories. In order to counteract Russian propaganda, the State of Ukraine which has much more resources than non-governmental organizations must actively communicate the following message to civil society and TOT residents: life under Russian occupation does not constitute a crime and shall not be punished in any way.

It is necessary to adopt legislative regulations that prevent ambiguous interpretation of legal status of TOT residents and take due account of the situation created by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Human rights defenders emphasize that the Criminal Code of Ukraine does not contain a clear definition of the term “collaboration”, while the courts do not examine or take into account the motives of people accused of collaboration. As a result, the people who collaborated with the occupying forces in an attempt to help fellow villagers and survive the Russian occupation (but not because of their pro-Russian views) are also being detained by the police.

Problems with integration of IDPs into local communities (hromadas) can be used by Russian propaganda to polarize Ukrainian society. Enemy action is aimed at convincing internally displaced Ukrainians that they have no other options but to return to the TOT. It is important that the host communities realize the value of their assistance to IDPs and do not perceive them as strangers. The most effective mechanism to avoid division lines between IDPs and local residents is to bring them into the dialogue.

Postwar challenges of pro-European policy course 

Summit participants emphasize that Ukraine is united on policy of European integration and accession to NATO. According to the results of sociological survey carried out by Razumkov Center on September 20-26, 2024, more than 80% of Ukrainian citizens support the idea of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO. Ukraine currently finds itself in a unique position: the country implements European integration reforms and, for the most part, observes the principles of democratic governance in the midst of full-scale war.

Experts noted that adherence to pro-European political course and preservation of democratic system is a complex and painstaking work that requires constant efforts from the State and civil society of Ukraine. Public sentiments may change after the war ends. It is likely that Ukrainian society dealing with the trauma of war will be less inclined to support the pro-European policy course for fear of provoking another war with Russia.

This thesis is confirmed by the fact that Russia is trying to intimidate Eastern European societies into believing that they will pay a high price for embarking on a westward trajectory not so much in terms of lost business profits as in terms of human losses due to the risk of armed conflict. As illustrated by Georgia (where the country’s leadership has significantly deviated from pro-European line of policy), nothing terrifies the postwar society more than the prospect of going to another war. Georgian government is trying to reverse its foreign policy course and reassure the society that they will not start a new war with Russia, and there is reason to hope that Georgia will recover occupied territories.

Traumatized societies are heavily influenced by their emotional states and the fear of new war. Russia is exploiting this fear to undermine public support of pro-Western course in post-Soviet countries. This is exemplified by neighboring Moldova, which recently held a referendum to enshrine the irreversibility of country’s accession to the EU in the Constitution. Despite expectations that at least 60% of Moldovans would vote in favor of joining the EU, this constitutional amendment won the support of just over 50% of voters, which jeopardized Moldova’s European path. Such an unconvincing result could provoke domestic political conflicts.

Protracted war has a negative impact on the economic status of most citizens. This can lead to the rise of populism and the growing demand for quick and simple solutions to complex problems. According to experts, active political processes will be resumed after the end of hot war in Ukraine. Populist parties may emerge on the political stage to manipulate public sentiments and call for abandoning the policy of Ukraine’s integration into EU and NATO in order to prevent a new war with Russia. Given the complexity of the European integration process and the high European market entry threshold for Ukrainian businesses, Ukraine has to start preparing for this threat right now by explaining to the public the long-term benefits of EU membership. The same applies to Ukraine’s accession to NATO as the only absolute guarantee of security and stability in the region.