How and why states do (not) apply sanctions against russian propagandists.
In September, 2022, the trial of Félicien Kabuga, a Rwandan businessman and co-founder of Radio of the Thousand Hills, began in The Hague. Kabuga is accused in that in 1993–1994, his radio station contributed to the genocide of one of the ethnicities in Rwanda, the Tutsis. This crime was committed by another Rwandan people, the Hutus.
Radio of the Thousand Hills is one of the most popular Rwandan mass media. Their main task, according to Kabuga himself, was to promote and protect the radical ideology "Hutu Power". Because it openly identified the Tutsis as disgusting and dangerous enemies of the Hutus, Radio of the Thousand Hills often humiliated the Tutsis, such as by calling them "cockroaches".
Over time, the degree of hatred was growing, and there were open calls to murder the Tutsis, which prompted the Hutu militia to move from words to actions.
According to various sources, in just 100 days, in a country with a population of six million people, from 500,000 to a million people were killed.
Although it is complicated to compare the genocide in Rwanda and the war in Ukraine, the story of Félicien Kabuga may come in handy very soon. The trial of Rwandan propagandists is one of the few instances where media workers have been prosecuted for incitement to violence (although Kabuga himself is still awaiting trial).
For Ukrainian people affected by the russian propaganda machine, as a larger version of the Radio of the Thousand Hills, this is a good example of how russian propagandists can be punished.
For now, at least until the end of hostilities, a tribunal on russian propagandists seems to have little chance of working. However, there is a way to at least partially reduce the damage from their actions, such as to impose sanctions against the propagandists themselves and against TV channels and other media that share disinformation.
OPORA explored what sanctions against russian media had been imposed by various countries of the world and why it is important to continue lobbying for their introduction.
In this column, we will talk about general trends in sanctions against russian propaganda, and try to understand whether it has become more difficult for the kremlin to spread their narratives in the world.
In the next two pieces, we will analyze who and why got into the sanctions lists, and how to bring real russian propagandists to justice as quickly and effectively as possible.
What Are Sanctions And Why We Need to Have Them
The first thing to understand when it comes to sanctions against russian propaganda is the scale of its spread. Propagandists themselves say that the signal of Russia Today (the major international russian media) "is transmitted by 22 satellites and more than 230 operators, which allows approximately 700 million people to watch the channel in more than 100 countries."
These figures, apparently, do not correspond to the real audience of the channel (to make sure, you can read this study). However, the real situation with the spread of russian channels is also quite threatening.
According to the Detector Media, in March, 2022, about two dozen russian unencrypted TV channels were available on open satellites in the world. Although the French regulator recently ordered the satellite company Eutelsat to stop broadcasting some russian TV channels, russia still has many international and domestic satellites to use.
In addition, dozens of russian channels are included in the packages sold by pay-TV providers, and they are also available in hotels in most countries of the world.
Before the full-scale invasion, russian television could be watched and heard in virtually all continents in at least five different languages.
Researchers have noted for quite some time that russian television abroad not only promotes fakes, but also creates a parallel reality for users who are looking for messages alternative to the "mainstream media".
One of the most striking examples may be the activities of RT and Sputnik during the coronavirus pandemic. Then, as found by journalists of Radio Liberty, Russia Today broadcast drastically different messages to their russian audiences and to the audiences in other countries.
If RT "in russian" talked about the importance of vaccination, facemask regime and social distance, RT in other languages shared the opposite messages: they were saying that vaccination would not protect you from the virus, and facemasks are generally dangerous to your health.
With similar methods, russian propaganda influences political and social life in other countries, undermines their stability, and even directly interferes with political processes (as, for example, during the 2016 US presidential election).f
After the beginning of a full-scale war in Ukraine, these trends have intensified. The russian mass media, which always exclusively defend the interests of russia, tried to influence public opinion in Western countries so that they stop supporting Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees.
In order to reduce the influence of russian media, the states of the world impose sanctions. They are restrictions as a method to convince russia to change their policy and end the war in Ukraine. In the information sphere, sanctions are imposed both against media holdings and TV channels, and against individual propagandists.
If sanctions are applied against propagandists like margarita simonyan or dima bilan, this mainly means that such people:
- cannot enter the territory of the state that imposed sanctions against them;
- cannot use their own money or real estate they own in the state that applied sanctions (their assets are frozen);
- cannot obtain any funding from a state that has applied sanctions.
If the sanctions are applied against some organization (for example, the National Media Group, which owns the majority of entertainment TV channels in the rf), then the restrictions also include a ban on their financing and the freezing of assets.
In addition, if we are talking about the media (Russia Today, Sputnik, Russia RTR/RTR Planet, etc.), then the states withdraw all the licenses, permits and distribution agreements required for their broadcast. Because of this, broadcasting simply stops – both through cable, satellite or digital networks, and through platforms, websites, and mobile applications. In the case of EU sanctions, the ban also extends to the retransmission of russian channels to countries outside the Union. All sanctioned media are also prohibited from buying advertising.
Any of these applied sanctions are not an end in themselves or just a sign of friendly support for Ukraine: they are introduced in order to achieve a certain goal.
Individual sanctions help increase the "cost" of supporting the war for russian propagandists. The idea here is quite simple: if vladimir solovyov really loves his own villa on Lake Como, he will be less inclined to support the war when he is deprived of the opportunity to visit this property.
Similarly, the sanctions should encourage other, lesser-known propagandists who have not yet been subject to restrictions to stop publicly supporting the russian invasion.
Instead, sanctions against media holdings and mass media are designed to limit the access of the population of various countries to propaganda. This is how states try to protect themselves from russian disinformation, which, as we wrote above, can be quite insidious and, unfortunately, effective.
Global South vs Global North
Now that we understand why sanctions are needed and what exactly they provide, we need to look at what the actual situation is with the introduction of such restrictions in the world.
If we talk about the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries, then most of the countries of the world really try to comply with them – other countries fear the so-called “secondary sanctions” for helping russia circumvent the restrictions. But this approach is much more difficult to extend to media corporations and individual russian propagandists.
Individual sanctions are imposed by each country separately, but attempts to force a country to ban the broadcast of Russia Today or Sputnik can be regarded as interference with domestic politics and violation of the sovereignty of this state.
As a result, as few as 50 countries in the world today have publicly declared sanctions against russian media and propagandists. These are mainly the countries of the European Union and the G7, their close allies or candidates for EU membership (Gibraltar, Iceland, etc.) and, obviously, Ukraine itself.
Instead, almost 150 countries around the world either limited the spread of russian propaganda out of public view, or did not impose sanctions against it at all.
Some of these states are close allies of the russian federation: for example, in Venezuela, which openly supported the russian invasion of Ukraine, Actualidad RT is one of the most popular TV channels, watched by millions of viewers.
Some other states, such as in Africa, not only have not reduced the presence of russia on their screens and radio waves, but also created new platforms to spread russian propaganda. For example, they prepare the opening of a new office of Russia Today in South Africa, which will sway the public opinion of the African continent towards russia.
Given that the African states have a total of about 28% of the votes in the UN, such a change may not come in favor of Ukraine.
At the same time, some states are in no hurry to impose sanctions against russian media or propagandists, as they do not want to be added to the russian "list of unfriendly countries".
For example, Nigeria, which strongly supports Ukraine, imports most of the wheat they need from russia, and therefore they try not to apply any restrictions against them. Similarly, close ties with russia interfere with Kazakhstan. In the spring and fall of 2022, the television operators of this country tried to stop broadcasting a number of russian channels. However, since television in Kazakhstan is broadcast through the equipment of russian operators, after "consultations" with the heads of moscow companies, the Kazakh "daughters" abandoned this idea.
How the Sanctions Lists Developed
As of January, 2023, 931 propagandists and 206 media or other disinformation organizations are under sanctions from at least one of the 50 countries that have restricted russian propaganda.
The main trigger for the imposition of sanctions was a full-scale invasion.
Thus, only 14.4% of all sanctions imposed against russian propagandists had been applied by February, 24, 2022. Some of them were imposed in response to the russian aggression in Ukraine that began in 2014. Others concerned propagandists or technical personnel directly related to russian interference in the US presidential election in 2016 (we are talking about employees of the Internet Research Agency led by evgenii prigozhin).
Although some of the most prominent representatives of russian propaganda (such as dmitrii kiseliov) fell under these restrictions, the first sanctions lists were uncoordinated between different countries. As a result, they did not have sufficient impact and effectiveness. As you can see from the graph below, after the full-scale invasion, many countries realized that Japan, Australia, and Canada had no place not only for vladimir putin himself, but also for other propagandists who justified the russian invasion to domestic and international audiences.
As a result, not only did the number of sanctions sharply increase (819 propagandists fell under the restrictions), but the coherence of effort between different states became noticeable – the EU, US, Canada, and other countries' sanctions lists mostly duplicate each other.
In addition, it is difficult to ignore that after February, 24, Ukraine became the real leader in the application of sanctions: this year, 790 russian propagandists fell under the restrictions. The Ukrainian sanctions also demonstrate a change in the focus of the restrictions: whereas earlier the main attention was paid to the most visible media persons such as vladimir soloviov, now they are also russian bloggers, "war correspondents" and singers who publicly supported the russian war in Ukraine, as well as people who finance or manage the russian propaganda machine (read more about this in our next article).
The approach to sanctions against russian propaganda organizations and individual media has also changed.
In 2014, it was quite difficult to imagine a situation where the European regulator obliges to ban the broadcasting of a number of russian TV channels.
Instead, the European Union and the United States tried to counter russian propaganda in another way: through public awareness raising, by debunking russian fakes, or through teaching media literacy in schools. Thus, while Western countries and Ukraine had imposed sanctions on 81 media and organizations that promote russian propaganda by 2022, these attempts to reduce russia's influence were not very coherent or effective.
Since February, 24, about 140 more organizations have fallen under the restrictions.
However, something else is more important here: the West and Ukraine began to act more coherently and roughly, banning russian propaganda from spreading physically – through the banning of TV channels, as well as through pressure on russian state institutions and financial institutions that contributed to the spread of propaganda, providing it with oversized budgets (read more about organizations and institutions that have fallen under restrictions in the next article from OPORA).
Do Sanctions Solve the Problem of Propaganda?
Despite the fact that 2022 brought a real breakthrough in countering russian propaganda, a lot of work still lies in wait for us.
First, we shall not forget that even the minimum sanctions restrictions of russian propaganda today are only found in a quarter of the countries of the world. The support of the other 150 countries of the world is also critical for Ukraine. This requires specific steps, not only on the part of the Ukrainian authorities, and not only in matters of encouraging these governments to introduce sanctions against russian propaganda. Instead, it is possible to take a slightly different approach: to promote pro-Ukrainian views in these countries.
The English-language niche, where most Ukrainian media entering the international market exist today, is quite important for us. However, this part of the media space is already quite friendly. Instead, the creation of pro-Ukrainian media in Arabic, Swahili or Hindi is now a more urgent need (albeit more difficult to implement).
Secondly, even those countries that have imposed restrictions are not necessarily the most protected states. There is no doubt that the termination of the broadcast of russian TV channels and blocking access to russian government media websites is a great gain, but russia has learned to circumvent sanctions in the media space as well as in other areas.
Today, russian propaganda goes online. We can see it in the feeds of any social network, or through an online broadcast and the propaganda media websites.
Although the RT and Sputnik websites are blocked in the EU, russia has created dozens of so-called mirrors, the websites with a slightly different name that actually duplicate the content of the banned media. Likewise, even though a number of russian state-owned media outlets have disappeared from Facebook and Instagram in Europe, the media's pages in Arab countries and Latin America are still active. Another problem is messengers like Telegram, Viber, or WhatsApp, where russian state media in general feel quite free and publish content to an unlimited audience in dozens of different languages.
So today, in addition to states that are increasingly willing to impose sanctions against russian propagandists and media, large social media platforms should also become parties to the process, as each of them has their own policies and they are often not ready to make direct contact with governments.
In the end, we should not forget about the need for further sanctions against russian propagandists and media in other countries and in Ukraine.
After all, sanctions have another important value: they legally record the crimes committed by the russian propaganda machine against the Ukrainian people, inciting hostility and encouraging russians to destroy Ukrainians. Who knows, maybe these sanctions will one day make it easier for us to prepare for the international tribunal on propagandists and help put olga skabeeva and anton krasovsky in the same dock where Felicien Kabuga is currently sitting.